This post continues the serialization of Battalion Organization, an article, published in 1912, in the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, that argued for the replacement of the traditional eight-company battalion with a unit made up of four much larger companies. A copy of the original article can be found here, at the Military Learning Library.
Links to earlier posts in this series can be found below:
The Headquarter Section a Necessity
It is not, however, desirable to greatly alter the conditions of service of our army, and it is probable that we must stick to the Cardwell system for the infantry. My object in pointing out its inconveniences and drawbacks is merely to emphasize the desirability of lightening the task of company commanders so as to minimize the difficulties inherent in the Cardwell system. Now, one way of doing this would be to create in every battalion a Headquarter Section, under the command of the senior major, into which would be drafted all those officers, non-commissioned officers and men who will not be available to fight in the companies in war. They need not, therefore, be trained in them in peace. A table has been worked out [see below] from which it appears that no less than 141 officers, NCOs and men could with advantage be permanently transferred in peace and in war to this Headquarter section, thereby simplifying their own special work and relieving the fighting companies of tradesmen, clerks, musicians, signallers, bands men, etc., etc. In peace time,I advocate that certain other non-commissioned officers and men should also be placed in the Headquarter Section in addition to the 141 who will belong to it in war. The total in peace would then stand at 213—see the appendix which gives full details.
Recapitulation
Let us now summarize for a moment what has been urged so far. It will then be easier to deal with the remedies which will be put forward for consideration. My criticisms can best be tabulated under the two headings (A) those which are inherent in the eight-company battalion; (B) those which are caused by false economy or lack of forethought.
(A) The following are due to the eight-company system as we know it:
(1) Once launched in an attack, a battalion loses cohesion owing to the excessive number of its companies and sections.
(2) The companies, being too numerous, fail to combine their fire tactics or to generate intensity of fire at critical moments.
(3) In a company no proper chain of command is established.
(4) Young officers do not command men, as they should. They are merely assistants and onlookers.
(B) The remainder are the result of economy or lack of forethought, an are not peculiar to the eight-company battalion:
(5) Officers and sergeants are not kept at full strength ready for mobilization.
(6) Non-combatants are retained on the books of companies instead of being transferred to a Headquarter Section.
(7) Understudies are not provided to fill the places of unit commandeers who are with-drawn for various reasons, or, when provided, it is done at the expense of other units.
(8) No provision is made for thoroughly instructing the recruits of the ExpeditionaryForce without destroying the program of progressive training in the companies.
(9) The question is not squarely faced of providing military music without depleting companies of serving soldiers. There can be no decent band or drums without acting bandsmen and acting drummers.
Here are nine definite criticisms, none of which are invented by me. I have looked at them for many years, but can find no solution which does not involve reorganizing the battalion. Most of the points apply to all battalions whether serving at home or abroad, but some obviously only concern battalions at home. We will therefore proceed to sketch a new organization and to indicate how it will tend to abolish or mitigate the evils complained of.
To be continued …
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We don’t have bands
We have HR