The British Infantry Battalion of 1912
Battalion Organization (Part I)
In the days of ink and paper, The Tactical Notebook published many reprints. In doing so, it provided readers, most of whom lacked easy access to a large research library, with materials that they could not otherwise read. The current incarnation of The Tactical Notebook, however, rarely posts copies of works that can easily be found, for free or for cheap, on the internet.
Battalion Organization, however, provides an ‘exception that proves the rule’. For one thing, it marks a milestone in the development of the sort of infantry battalion fielded by most English-speaking armies of the last century or so. In particular, it explains why most such battalions have consisted of four combatant companies, why lieutenants lead platoons, and why, in armies in which majors wear crowns on their shoulder straps, officers of that rank are entrusted with the command of companies.
The article, which is now in the public domain, was originally published in the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution in January of 1912. A copy of the original article can be found here, at the Military Learning Library.
Battalion Organization
by Brigadier-General Frederick Ivor Maxse
In venturing to offer some remarks upon the organization of an infantry battalion in peace and war, I trust that it may be understood that no claim is made for either originality of thought or novel discoveries. The subject is an old one, and has been mooted before in this Institution. I hope, however, that those who may have the patience to follow this lecture to the end will at least concede that a case has been made out for further investigation, and that our hard-worked General Staff may deem that the time has at last arrived when a close inquiry into the condition of our infantry battalions should be instituted. It is only because I believe that the present is an opportune moment for reconsidering an old problem from a new point of view that I am willing to hazard the displeasure which is usually incurred by those who criticize a time-honored institution with the object of improving it.
I agree with Captain Hereward Wake [the author of a previous article in the British debate on battalion organization] that some-thing more than a mere preference is required to justify an important change: a change which will necessarily be applied to our big battalions in India, to the Expeditionary Force, to the Territorial Force, and to the national armies which the virile men of Australia and New Zealand are organizing by the method of compulsion.
The question can, of course, be approached from several points of view, including those of the economist and those of the academic student, but in this paper the subject will be dealt with in its practical aspect, as it presents itself to one who has commanded a battalion and a brigade and is possessed by a deep rooted admiration of the qualities of our infantry officers.
Under existing arrangements, which are to be found in various regulations, I submit that these officers are not given a fair chance of performing their allotted task; that some of the most thoughtful of them are dissatisfied with the eight-company battalion, and wish for a change which will give more scope to leadership; and that this conclusion has been arrived at, in spite of their personal inclinations, by the logic of facts as they see them in their daily life.
Our quarrel is not only with the eight-company battalion, which we think mischievous, but also with the fact that a company has no scientific organization to enable it to fight with advantage. A company of the Expeditionary Force cannot just muddle through somehow because our officers happen to be about the best in the world, and we assert that these same officers and their men could be made far more effective in battle, if the companies and battalions were more thoughtfully organized in peace for war.
To give a clearer idea of my meaning, I will utter seven platitudinous military axioms, which are not put into practice merely because our existing arrangements forbid it:
(1). The object to be achieved through organization is to facilitate, by forethought in peace, the difficult task of launching a battalion of a thousand men into battle and controlling them throughout it.
(2). Co-operative fire-tactics are the essence of good infantry work, and companies should be organized to facilitate fire tactics.
(3). The chain of command and responsibility should be clearly defined and habitually practised by all ranks.
(4). The best way to train young officers is to give them the responsibility of managing a definite command, as in the navy, the cavalry, and the artillery. The command of a half company is not a definite command because the half-company is not a tactical or administrative unit.
(5). Every detail of mobilization should be arranged with a view to facilitate the transition from peace conditions to war conditions, without impairing fighting efficiency. To import into a battalion some six or more new company officers, on mobilization, is calculated to impair efficiency for immediate war.
(6). In an eight-company battalion the command of a section is entrusted to a sergeant in war. He should therefore train it in peace.There are 32 sections in a battalion: there should therefore be 32 sergeants in peace and war. Our present peace establishment provides only 15 sergeants to train 32 sections.
(7). It is not wise to keep 141 N.C.O.s and men on the strength of companies if none of them will ever be available to fight in the ranks.
These plausible platitudes could be multiplied by anyone who takes the trouble to think the matter out and has experience in commanding a home battalion. They are all violated under existing arrangements, but no one complains because it is the glory of the British officer to say nothing and to do his best. But, just think what that “best” would be, if you only gave him a fair chance of utilizing his acknowledged characteristics. He is compelled to-day to make bricks without straw, but what splendid bricks he could produce if he also had the straw No one in the world loves responsibility and opportunities more than a company officer. This has been proved on the Indian frontier, in Sudanese campaigns, and through the length and breadth of Africa in so-called times of peace. Why then do we deny him scope for his abilities in the training of British infantry. Why render his task so difficult?
To be continued …
For Further Reading:
To Support, Subscribe, or Share:
The four rifle company Bn remains the ideal combat structure in the attack and defense. It provides the proper frontage and the reserve company to exploit the break through or blunt an enemy penetration.
The myriad of ways a Bn Commander can employ his unit dwarf the options available with a three Company Bn. Three platoons per company and three squads per platoon give the Company Commander 9 maneuver squads and the Bn Commander 36 squads. The weapons platoon adds medium machine guns, mortars and anti tank capabilities. The HQ company adds 8 81mm mortars and, preferably anti tank weapons and heavy machine guns.
The modern squad should consist of 15 Marines. Three fireteams of four Marines each. A universal observer who also mans the radios , an RPV operator with short range RPVs and the squad leader.
A Bn organized in this manner would consist of approximately 1100 Marines. The versatility of a Bn like this cannot be in dispute. We know from experience that it can function from low intensity guerrilla warfare to high intensity conventional conflict. Yet, it is resisted at every turn? The reasons are many but none related to combat effectiveness. This leads one to conclude that the reasons are tied to other priorities, politics, fiscal restrictions or manning shortfalls. Each are troublesome when the institution is and should be infantry centric.
Bruce! I’m looking forward to the next section, in which the 8 small companies are folded in half to generate 4 large companies, and superfluous officers are given the title ‘XO.’ (And the Americans are amazed!)