This post concludes the serialization of ‘The Art of Command’. It follows five previously published portions of our own translation of the original article.
Situation X
A battalion defends against an enemy attack. The commander decides to commit his 10th Company, which he had kept in reserve. What does he order?
‘The 10th Company will stop the enemy attack.’
The captain deploys his company in a way that best fulfills this mission. He might extend the existing firing line or take up a position that permits flanking fire. If it stops the attack, either choice would be correct.
The captain also enjoys the option of attacking. If terrain and situation permit, he make a shallow maneuver that allows hiis company to strike the enemy flank.
He may also solve the problem offensively. If the ground permits, and if it seems sound, he may strike against the enemy flank by means of a short movement, without lengthy detours.
He must, however, remember that, if he attacks, his company will suffer higher losses than if it remained on the defensive, and that an attack will only succeed if the enemy lacks reserves or if he strikes before the enemy can bring up his reserves.
If the captain remains on the defensive, he must take up a position that is not too far from that of the enemy. Otherwise, the enemy can use his reserve to continue the attack. At the same time, he must not move to close to the enemy, because doing so will give the enemy time to react. A company that pushes too far ahead of its parent battalion invites destruction.
Situation XI
As before, a battalion defends and the 10th Company is in reserve. This time, however, the enemy attempts to envelop the battalion’s left flank.
What order does the battalion commander give to the leader of the 10th Company?
‘The 10th Company will repel the flank attack.’
Thus the captain retains freedom of action. If the terrain favors a counterstroke, he can launch a sudden fire attack. If he deems it better to remain on the defensive, he chooses a position to the side of and slightly behind the battalion’s main line. This would force the enemy to choose between a wider envelopment or giving up on the maneuver.
Situation XII
The regiment fights an enemy whose superiority has become evident only as the battle unfolds. The colonel wishes to break contact by means of his reserve battalion. What order does he give?
‘The First Battalion will enable the regiment to break contact.’
The battalion may strike back directly, threaten the enemy’s flank, or employ any other means it finds fitting and effective. It enjoys full freedom of choice.
If the colonel had instead ordered, ‘Attack the enemy’s right flank,’ the battalion would have to press on with its assault even if the enemy already abandoned his own attack. The wording hides the colonel’s real aim of disengagement and compels an action that might work against that aim.
It is obvious that continuing the attack in such a situation would be an error. Disengagement becomes impossible, and the colonel has thrown away his reserve battalion, fragmenting his strength.
Conclusion
These examples should suffice to illustrate the point I am trying to make.
We may safely assume (indeed I have already done so) that no intelligent officer in battle will cling slavishly to the bare wording of an order. Out of a proper sense of responsibility he will treat the purpose of the order as more important than its phraseology. Even so, no superior may use that fact as an excuse. He must discipline himself never to order more than the situation truly demands and never to prescribe what, in practice, cannot be carried out.
We are fortunate to fight with no ‘fixed pattern’ (Schema), no ‘standard battle’ (Normalgefecht). For that very reason, no commander should make the mistake of trying to force the course of combat into lines he sketched beforehand. Once troops have gone into action, they pass out of the higher commander’s hands. In real war he can no longer reach in to redirect them.
What holds true for war must guide us in peace. Otherwise we will develop habits on the exercise grounds that we will have to unlearn in war.
We learn most from friction and from mistakes. We should therefore let them run their natural course. Premature interference, repeated corrections, and similar meddling do not foster confidence, independence, and initiative. They breed hesitation and doubt, and in the end they kill ‘joy in taking responsibility’ (Verantwortungsfreudigkeit).
One thing is certain. Superiors who grant their subordinates in battle, and wherever else it makes sense, the independence they deserve, and who even demand it of them, will not find themselves deserted. Their troops, down to the smallest squad, will turn up, during and after the fight, in the right place, as a matter of course.
Finis
For All Posts in this Series
Related Reading
Sources and Notes
Clemens Spohn ‘Die Kunst des Befehlens’ (‘The Art of Command’) Jahrbücher für die Deutsche Armee und Marine (Annuals for the German Army and Navy) (October 1907) pages 337-340 (Hathi Trust)
‘The Art of Command’ (unpublished typescript prepared by the British War Office, 1907) (Military Learning Library)
Prussia (War Ministry) Felddienst Ordnung (Field Service Regulations) (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1900)
Prussia (War Ministry) Exerzier Reglement für die Infanterie (Infantry Training Regulations) (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1906)
Readers can find a copy of the Bavarian printing of the Infantry Training Regulations at the Internet Archive.