This post follows four previously published portions of ‘The Art of Command’
Situation V
The regimental commander concludes that he faces superior forces and that, as a result, the attack he had planned will fail. He therefore decides to withdraw his regiment into a defensive position. He employs the 12th Company, which has yet to engage the enemy, to prevent the enemy from interfering with this movement.
What does the colonel tell the captain of the 12th Company?
‘The regiment will change positions. Its left flank will rest on Point X. You will cover this withdrawal.’
Adding anything else to this order would trespass on the territory of the company commander.
The order must not read: ‘deploy your company along that line’ or ‘occupy the edge of the woods’. Such details would shackle the captain. He might see, from his own vantage point, a far better position, yet feel obliged to either follow the order he was given or violate it.
Even if, at the time it was given, an order to occupy the woods matched the captain’s own intent, such an order would still be wrong. After all, a few minutes after the colonel gave it, the situation might change, thereby rendering it obsolete. That is why we must leave the choice of means to the man on the spot.
Situation VI
A regiment marching forward against an advancing enemy must pass through a defile To protect the passage, the commander deploys advance‑guard battalion.
What order does he give?
‘The advance guard will protect the regiment as it passes through the defile.’
The advance‑guard commander will look for a position in front of the defile, in a location that will prevent enemy artillery from firing on the regiment. The order gives him a free hand and thus allows him to adapt to changing circumstances.
If, instead of doing this, the regimental commander prescribed how far forward the advance guard should move or ordered the battalion to occupy a particular strip of ground in a specific formation, he would err three times. First, he would dictate the means instead of the aim. Second, even if he was located with the advance guard at the time he spoke, he could not foresee how the battle would unfold. Third, he would fetter the battalion to a single fixed spot.
Suppose, for instance, that a patch of woods in front of the defile offers an excellent position. The advance‑guard commander will, of course, see it. At first glance, one might see no harm in pointing the woods out to him. Yet that is not so. If the enemy later appears on the flank and opens fire on the regiment as it debouches, the advance guard must deploy against that enemy, even if this means abandoning the woods. Thus, the detailed order would compel disobedience.
‘The advance guard protects …’ imposes no such restriction. It simply demands that the battalion commander act, with prudence and intelligence, in accord with the situation.
Situation VII
The ‘Red’ force has been beaten. In retreat it has formed a front in a patch of woods that faces the defile, with the obvious goal of delaying our pursuit. Holding this little forest means a lot to ‘Blue’, which wants to send forces through the defile.
What does the regimental commander tell his leading battalion to do?
He must not say ‘attack the patch of woods.’ That wording forces the battalion commander to attack, even if he sees that the enemy has already begun to withdraw, leaving nothing more than a covering force in the woods.
An attack against the woods would force ‘Red’ to fight again. Indeed, the enemy might even deploy his reserves, turning what might have been the easy occupation of empty ground into a bloody engagement.
As the possession of the woods serves the purpose of protecting the forces moving through the defile, the order should say: ‘take possession of the woods’.
The battalion commander then decides whether to wait to enter the woods until the enemy has left it or occupy some ground that threatens the enemy’s line of retreat, thereby convincing him to pull out of the woods. The order grants the commander the choice of means and allows him to select the most appropriate course of action. That could be, but need not be, an attack.
Situation VIII
A battalion runs into a prepared enemy position. From where it stands, it cannot gauge either the size and extent of the works or the strength and nature of the garrison. First, it must clear up the situation. What order should the battalion commander give?
‘The 10th Company will reconnoiter the enemy position at Z.’
The company commander advances to a point from which he can see as much as possible without losing freedom of action to enemy fire.
Officers’ patrols, squads, or, if the situation demands it, half-platoons, conduct the reconnaissance, while the rest of the company provides them with a backstop.
The patrols must note everything of importance: field fortifications, obstacles, strength of defending forces, weak spots, pattern of occupation, reserve positions, and so forth.
The battalion commander should not say how far the company should advance. From his position, he cannot see whether or not a given point will allow the company to fulfill its mission. Likewise, he cannot tell whether a particular piece of ground will force the company to fight, which, at the moment, is something he wants to avoid.
Situation IX
A regiment attacks with two battalions forward and a third behind. The regimental commander sees a threat to his regiment looming to the left. What order should he give?
‘The Third Battalion will cover the regiment’s left flank.’
Any embellishment would damage the order.
If, for instance, the commander said ‘the Third Battalion will occupy Cherry Hill and cover the regiment’s left flank’, the instruction might fit the situation at that instant. It might even match the plan of the commander of the Third Battalion.
But what would happen if, as the battle continues, the regiment moves forward?
The occupation of the hill would cease to serve its original purpose of covering the regiment’s left flank.
The regimental commander would then have to issue a fresh order. (Had he issued the original order, the battalion would not have needed additional instructions to follow the regiment.)
What is worse, sitting atop Cherry Hill might prevent the Third Battalion from providing any flank protection at all. Thus, unable to both occupy the hill and protect the regiment, the major in command of the battalion would have to deal with contradictory instructions. If he stays on the hill, he cannot fulfill the second part of his order. If, however, he leaves the hill in order to defend the flank, he violates the first task.
I have encountered few older officers who have been spared the experience of receiving contradictory orders. Therefore, we must take pains to avoid giving them.
To be continued …
For All Six Posts in this Series
Related Reading
Sources and Notes
Clemens Spohn ‘Die Kunst des Befehlens’ (‘The Art of Command’) Jahrbücher für die Deutsche Armee und Marine (Annuals for the German Army and Navy) (October 1907) pages 337-340 (Hathi Trust)
‘The Art of Command’ (unpublished typescript prepared by the British War Office, 1907) (Military Learning Library)
Prussia (War Ministry) Felddienst Ordnung (Field Service Regulations) (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1900)
Prussia (War Ministry) Exerzier Reglement für die Infanterie (Infantry Training Regulations) (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1906)
Readers can find a copy of the Bavarian printing of the Infantry Training Regulations at the Internet Archive.
> As the possession of the woods serves the purpose of protecting the forces moving through the defile, the order should say: ‘take possession of the woods’.
What of placing time constraints on orders to synchronize the actions of multiple units? This is common practice now, but I have read of the difference between Phase Lines and Axes of Advance, the latter preferred by Prussian-style command. However, this does require a certain insensitivity to changes in timing based on realized tempo, and invites comparisons to different formalisms in information processing, namely synchronous (centrally clocked, cf. phase lines) versus asynchronous/delay-invariant (locally clocked, cf. axes of advance) computing.