Considering how many specialized pieces of equipment an army needs to fight, and how different the requirements can be between mission types, I wouldn't be surprised if there were simply very few mine clearers in general. Before February 2022, "attack through a defended minefield covered by fire", was probably not a requirement on most people's minds, probably even the professionals.
Because equipment is so specialized now, more and more, you go to war with what you have rather than with what you want or can make.
<em>the Anglo-Canadian landing at Dieppe in August of 1942. ... had no operational objective.</em>
The author David O'Keefe (<em>One Day in August</em>) would disagree sharply with this assessment. Based on documents being declassified since the war, he makes a strong case that Operation Jubilee was mounted as <strong>cover</strong> for an intended "pinch" raid to capture updated Enigma machines and associated encryption materials (this was just after the Germans had introduced the four-rotor Enigma, which disrupted Bletchly Park's ability to decipher German naval traffic). A small raid, whether successful or not, would let the Germans know that the British were actively trying to get their hands on the new machine and paraphernalia, but a big "invasion rehearsal" where there was a lot of damage might (and O'Keefe believes, <em>did</em>) confuse the situation enough to hide the real reason for the operation.
In the event, Operation Jubilee was a cluster on so many levels, including the crucial "pinch" team's ship being hit and seriously damaged while still offshore, that nobody came out of the day with reputation intact ...
The YouTube channel D-Day 24 Hours had an interview with O'Keefe in this episode (beginning at about the 17:30 timestamp) - https://youtu.be/k_uleFxJ1MM
Bruce, are you saying that the Ukrainians, by failing their breaching operations, have a parallel political objective? Namely, to demonstrate a need for breaching equipment? Certainly MiCLiCs are cheap and mobile and we have plenty to donate (or did).. Enough engineers at enough places would almost certainly overwhelm the Russian ability to react with synchronization and sufficient lethality. Once a breach is achieved, soldiers long entrenched and overconfident are likely to rout. The Ukrainian IPB is excellent and they will find weaknesses.
That is their game, I think: hit em where they aint... With MiCLiCs, of course.
I suspect that, in the hierarchy of motivations, the desire for military equipment takes a back seat to the need to maintain the flow of cash. That said, the ability to say "we did our best with what we had, and will try again next year, once we get new equipment" may garner both cash and weaponry.
Alternatively, this might be a feint rather than the actual axis of the Ukrainian counter-offensive. It’s hard to believe that no one thought to equip Ukrainian forces with proper mine clearing equipment and devices, though.
Of course, stranger things have happened in war planning, so we will have to wait and see.
I would not be surprised if Ukraine didn't neglect offensive maneuver assets in favor of counter-mobility. After all, the US compelled them to destroy art amounts of aging conventional munitions as an appeasement in the Nunn-Lugar expansions.
A minefield breach is requires a degree of synchronization the Ukrainians may not yet have. Certainly the Russians didn't have the ability last year after their many bridging failures.
Considering how many specialized pieces of equipment an army needs to fight, and how different the requirements can be between mission types, I wouldn't be surprised if there were simply very few mine clearers in general. Before February 2022, "attack through a defended minefield covered by fire", was probably not a requirement on most people's minds, probably even the professionals.
Because equipment is so specialized now, more and more, you go to war with what you have rather than with what you want or can make.
<em>the Anglo-Canadian landing at Dieppe in August of 1942. ... had no operational objective.</em>
The author David O'Keefe (<em>One Day in August</em>) would disagree sharply with this assessment. Based on documents being declassified since the war, he makes a strong case that Operation Jubilee was mounted as <strong>cover</strong> for an intended "pinch" raid to capture updated Enigma machines and associated encryption materials (this was just after the Germans had introduced the four-rotor Enigma, which disrupted Bletchly Park's ability to decipher German naval traffic). A small raid, whether successful or not, would let the Germans know that the British were actively trying to get their hands on the new machine and paraphernalia, but a big "invasion rehearsal" where there was a lot of damage might (and O'Keefe believes, <em>did</em>) confuse the situation enough to hide the real reason for the operation.
In the event, Operation Jubilee was a cluster on so many levels, including the crucial "pinch" team's ship being hit and seriously damaged while still offshore, that nobody came out of the day with reputation intact ...
Here's a Toronto Star review of the book (which I believe has been updated with a second edition) - https://www.thestar.com/entertainment/books/2013/11/05/one_day_in_august_by_david_okeefe_review.html
The YouTube channel D-Day 24 Hours had an interview with O'Keefe in this episode (beginning at about the 17:30 timestamp) - https://youtu.be/k_uleFxJ1MM
Bruce, are you saying that the Ukrainians, by failing their breaching operations, have a parallel political objective? Namely, to demonstrate a need for breaching equipment? Certainly MiCLiCs are cheap and mobile and we have plenty to donate (or did).. Enough engineers at enough places would almost certainly overwhelm the Russian ability to react with synchronization and sufficient lethality. Once a breach is achieved, soldiers long entrenched and overconfident are likely to rout. The Ukrainian IPB is excellent and they will find weaknesses.
That is their game, I think: hit em where they aint... With MiCLiCs, of course.
I suspect that, in the hierarchy of motivations, the desire for military equipment takes a back seat to the need to maintain the flow of cash. That said, the ability to say "we did our best with what we had, and will try again next year, once we get new equipment" may garner both cash and weaponry.
https://tacticalnotebook.substack.com/p/the-folly-of-the-big-push
Alternatively, this might be a feint rather than the actual axis of the Ukrainian counter-offensive. It’s hard to believe that no one thought to equip Ukrainian forces with proper mine clearing equipment and devices, though.
Of course, stranger things have happened in war planning, so we will have to wait and see.
I would not be surprised if Ukraine didn't neglect offensive maneuver assets in favor of counter-mobility. After all, the US compelled them to destroy art amounts of aging conventional munitions as an appeasement in the Nunn-Lugar expansions.
A minefield breach is requires a degree of synchronization the Ukrainians may not yet have. Certainly the Russians didn't have the ability last year after their many bridging failures.
I expand here:
https://heapcoup.substack.com/p/a-bridge-to-defeat-athenian-and-russian