Russia faces another limiting factor. It does not want to provoke further American/NATO intervention, especially when political support for Ukraine is declining. Dramatic advances might provoke a heavier response from the foreigners. The kind of grinding, day to day, un-telegenic attrition which is slowly putting Ukraine through the meat grinder may be the optimal way to win the war. Also, columns of tanks are precisely the kind of targets modern weapons which the West specializes in are optimized to destroy. Swarms of infantry with small arms scrambling over the rubble their artillery created do not invite counter-attack with expensive, sophisticated weapons. Similarly, Russian anti-aircraft firepower seems to have gained them a semblance of air dominance over the front, but that may not be able to keep up with rapidly advancing columns, thus exposing the spearheads to air attack. It is easy to imagine Western pilots in Ukrainian-marked aircraft picking of such formations. My guess is that whatever dreams the Russians may have of another Operation Bagration, they are going to keep doing what is working for them.
In my view, the possibility of Euro-American entry into the Russo-Ukrainian War--'intervention'--is less than zero. Neither polity has the assets to commit. Neither can afford an attritional war. The potential for nuclear exchange in such an event is not only high but specifically spoken to by Putin recently in public address. This is just not happening. There are potential constraints with which Russia may have to reckon if a wider war is threatened but Euro-American deployment in force to Ukraine isn't one of them.
Ukraine's 'Air Force' is negligible. The aerial impact on Russian spearheads would be largely drones and to a degree long range, high precision, high payload, targeting. Ukraine still has significant munition assets of both kinds and has been effective in deploying them tactically and operationally, as has Russia itself now even more so. NO combatant can afford to concentrate large force structures in small areas, especially where not dug in. Nor is it possible to concentrate large force structures without satellite and drone detection, a major strategic problem though there is one solution. Supposing that nothwithstanding those constraints Russia achieved a breakthrough on some frontage past the mine belts which have forced positional war on both combatants here, offensives would need to be in mobile but smaller and dispersed contingents, 'Kharkiv offensives,' as in Ukraine's one salient success. Some such probes could be repulsed by counterattack and partisan action. Russia took this approach but the wrong way in the first months of the war, as force complements were simply too small and too isolated. Many small contingents over a larger area with mutual support offer a different potential. The problem for Ukraine in such an event is that they have very limited remaining manpower reserves. Multiple 'horde spread' advances could hold their own against brigade sized Ukrainian counter attack, whose forces themselves would be decimated by superior Russian tube and rocket bombardment, while others Russian packets spread out to cut logistical lines to Ukrainian frontage, forcing Ukrainian withdrawal over large sectors of the current front line.
I do believe that a broad front assault and major breakout success is possible in the Russo-Ukrainian war. But very difficult to operationalize. But I do NOT believe that attrition alone will force Ukraine to sue for peace on the kind of terms Russia is likely to see as its minimum. And absent that, attrition will only shift the front a few miles in another year's time and expense. You're talking about a 5-10 year war if you mean to win it that way, certainly so if Ukraine had not foolishly expended its manpower in foredoomed offensives over the past Summer. To me, Russia will move to shorten things up once force ratios are sufficiently in its favor. When Ukraine lacks the reserves to meet multiple threats on a broad front, it's H-Hour for Russia. And that time is very nearly here.
Interesting points for certain and from a Ukrainian perspective, this illustrates why you absolutely need strategic depth and sufficient forces to counter attack Russian attacks. Those are really challenging problems, particularly for Ukraine right now. However, one of big limitations the Russian Army suffers from (and largely always has) is their inability to sustain forces during operations, especially over a wide area during high OPTEMO periods. That creates some real opportunities, but only if you have the nerve and resources to attack that vulnerability.
Gonna have to get some more work out of those darn lazy Ukrainian Boomers , especially the workaround for having no ammo. (Sarc).
The Ukrainians are out of blood, money, munitions. The young people are in the West, including my little rural area 🤣 and the munitions money is in Western bank accounts. My little rural area is so remote the people who never heard of it , even they never heard of it. But money has no borders.
With respect to Footnote 1, if memory serves, Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model’s exceptional skill at defensive operations earned him the nickname of Hitler's "Feuerwehrmann".
We need a big beautiful empty theater in depth to do this, in short everyone and everything camouflaged and light , noise, movement Iron discipline and above all ELECTRONIC emissions VOID …
Until and unless any absolutely necessary.
Only passive detection unless sneaky peaky recon, drones, satellite. Anything that has to shoot moves, anything that emits moves, draconian sanctions for the FIFO testers.
Remember the Chinese moved 300,000 crack troops into North Korea unknown to us. They were in the foothills not mountains.
= we’ll still need ground reconnaissance. As long as anyone is fighting there or doing logistics on ground, we’ll need ground reconnaissance.
Anything that shoots on new empty theater sized battlefield moves. Logistics resupply will have to return to cold war mobile logpacs + essentially spy type dead drops or handoffs. Once they fuel up and resupply I, III, V, IX the loggies and the supplied units cannot remain at that location. Caches and essentially dead drops are suggested, and if I understood Karber correctly were used in Ukraine in the 2015-2018 period he discussed at West Point.
Empty Battlefield becomes Empty Theater given range of weapons.
And we’d better learn how to go empty electro-magnetic spectrum, or transmit then move, unless signal thrown off, geolocation mislocated.
You make an interesting and relevant point, Bruce, in noting the _cultural and political importance_ of a broad front offensive for Russia in the current Russo-Ukrainian War. Stalingrad, the Leningrad relief, Operation Bagration, the Oder Crossing in 1945 were all major, broad front, and massively successful offensives. Moreover, they were successes quite different from typical Russian performance in most European wars, where offensives with a few salient exceptions had ended in disaster, unlike successful Russian offensives in most wars with Turkey, for example. Brusilov's initial conception of the theater equivalent of a broad front action reset Russia's operational concepts, with strategic implications, however. The 'big arrow' offensives of WW II demonstrably proved that Russia could do Big War against the best and win. The domestic cultural importance of that is not something to which I've given enough thought, but I concur with your reading there, thinking back on it.
I do believe that a major Russian offensive will be coming this year, of much the kind you describe. That has been my conclusion on material and strategic grounds: Russia is close to the force and material ratios to do this now and succeed, and success in such an offensive could very well end the war outright in Russian victory, however one values such an outcome. The _psychological_ impact of an outright Russian win by a big offensive is something to consider as well, as you note. Certainly the impact on Europe and on American strategic calculus, both already bolloxed thoroughly in this conflict, would be substantial. The concept of 'Russia, the Unstoppable' would be re-established for the first time since Afghanistan in the '80s. But the domestic impact of winning outright at Big War, especially after Russian gross misjudgment and short run ignominious results in starting the war with too few forces, would be major indeed. That would be a reason IN ITSELF for Russia's leadership to stake a lot on a major offensive, the profound effect on public perception and so on strategic posture in Russia and its near abroad in the event or Russian operational success.
I have always respected your work here, Bruce. I write myself on tangential matters here on Substack at The Jagged Spend. I'll drop you a DM in a few days.
Russia faces another limiting factor. It does not want to provoke further American/NATO intervention, especially when political support for Ukraine is declining. Dramatic advances might provoke a heavier response from the foreigners. The kind of grinding, day to day, un-telegenic attrition which is slowly putting Ukraine through the meat grinder may be the optimal way to win the war. Also, columns of tanks are precisely the kind of targets modern weapons which the West specializes in are optimized to destroy. Swarms of infantry with small arms scrambling over the rubble their artillery created do not invite counter-attack with expensive, sophisticated weapons. Similarly, Russian anti-aircraft firepower seems to have gained them a semblance of air dominance over the front, but that may not be able to keep up with rapidly advancing columns, thus exposing the spearheads to air attack. It is easy to imagine Western pilots in Ukrainian-marked aircraft picking of such formations. My guess is that whatever dreams the Russians may have of another Operation Bagration, they are going to keep doing what is working for them.
In my view, the possibility of Euro-American entry into the Russo-Ukrainian War--'intervention'--is less than zero. Neither polity has the assets to commit. Neither can afford an attritional war. The potential for nuclear exchange in such an event is not only high but specifically spoken to by Putin recently in public address. This is just not happening. There are potential constraints with which Russia may have to reckon if a wider war is threatened but Euro-American deployment in force to Ukraine isn't one of them.
Ukraine's 'Air Force' is negligible. The aerial impact on Russian spearheads would be largely drones and to a degree long range, high precision, high payload, targeting. Ukraine still has significant munition assets of both kinds and has been effective in deploying them tactically and operationally, as has Russia itself now even more so. NO combatant can afford to concentrate large force structures in small areas, especially where not dug in. Nor is it possible to concentrate large force structures without satellite and drone detection, a major strategic problem though there is one solution. Supposing that nothwithstanding those constraints Russia achieved a breakthrough on some frontage past the mine belts which have forced positional war on both combatants here, offensives would need to be in mobile but smaller and dispersed contingents, 'Kharkiv offensives,' as in Ukraine's one salient success. Some such probes could be repulsed by counterattack and partisan action. Russia took this approach but the wrong way in the first months of the war, as force complements were simply too small and too isolated. Many small contingents over a larger area with mutual support offer a different potential. The problem for Ukraine in such an event is that they have very limited remaining manpower reserves. Multiple 'horde spread' advances could hold their own against brigade sized Ukrainian counter attack, whose forces themselves would be decimated by superior Russian tube and rocket bombardment, while others Russian packets spread out to cut logistical lines to Ukrainian frontage, forcing Ukrainian withdrawal over large sectors of the current front line.
I do believe that a broad front assault and major breakout success is possible in the Russo-Ukrainian war. But very difficult to operationalize. But I do NOT believe that attrition alone will force Ukraine to sue for peace on the kind of terms Russia is likely to see as its minimum. And absent that, attrition will only shift the front a few miles in another year's time and expense. You're talking about a 5-10 year war if you mean to win it that way, certainly so if Ukraine had not foolishly expended its manpower in foredoomed offensives over the past Summer. To me, Russia will move to shorten things up once force ratios are sufficiently in its favor. When Ukraine lacks the reserves to meet multiple threats on a broad front, it's H-Hour for Russia. And that time is very nearly here.
Interesting points for certain and from a Ukrainian perspective, this illustrates why you absolutely need strategic depth and sufficient forces to counter attack Russian attacks. Those are really challenging problems, particularly for Ukraine right now. However, one of big limitations the Russian Army suffers from (and largely always has) is their inability to sustain forces during operations, especially over a wide area during high OPTEMO periods. That creates some real opportunities, but only if you have the nerve and resources to attack that vulnerability.
Gonna have to get some more work out of those darn lazy Ukrainian Boomers , especially the workaround for having no ammo. (Sarc).
The Ukrainians are out of blood, money, munitions. The young people are in the West, including my little rural area 🤣 and the munitions money is in Western bank accounts. My little rural area is so remote the people who never heard of it , even they never heard of it. But money has no borders.
Let’s call it a day on this one.
With respect to Footnote 1, if memory serves, Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model’s exceptional skill at defensive operations earned him the nickname of Hitler's "Feuerwehrmann".
We need a big beautiful empty theater in depth to do this, in short everyone and everything camouflaged and light , noise, movement Iron discipline and above all ELECTRONIC emissions VOID …
Until and unless any absolutely necessary.
Only passive detection unless sneaky peaky recon, drones, satellite. Anything that has to shoot moves, anything that emits moves, draconian sanctions for the FIFO testers.
Remember the Chinese moved 300,000 crack troops into North Korea unknown to us. They were in the foothills not mountains.
= we’ll still need ground reconnaissance. As long as anyone is fighting there or doing logistics on ground, we’ll need ground reconnaissance.
Anything that shoots on new empty theater sized battlefield moves. Logistics resupply will have to return to cold war mobile logpacs + essentially spy type dead drops or handoffs. Once they fuel up and resupply I, III, V, IX the loggies and the supplied units cannot remain at that location. Caches and essentially dead drops are suggested, and if I understood Karber correctly were used in Ukraine in the 2015-2018 period he discussed at West Point.
Empty Battlefield becomes Empty Theater given range of weapons.
And we’d better learn how to go empty electro-magnetic spectrum, or transmit then move, unless signal thrown off, geolocation mislocated.
To define THIS, I mean operations on a broad front.
You make an interesting and relevant point, Bruce, in noting the _cultural and political importance_ of a broad front offensive for Russia in the current Russo-Ukrainian War. Stalingrad, the Leningrad relief, Operation Bagration, the Oder Crossing in 1945 were all major, broad front, and massively successful offensives. Moreover, they were successes quite different from typical Russian performance in most European wars, where offensives with a few salient exceptions had ended in disaster, unlike successful Russian offensives in most wars with Turkey, for example. Brusilov's initial conception of the theater equivalent of a broad front action reset Russia's operational concepts, with strategic implications, however. The 'big arrow' offensives of WW II demonstrably proved that Russia could do Big War against the best and win. The domestic cultural importance of that is not something to which I've given enough thought, but I concur with your reading there, thinking back on it.
I do believe that a major Russian offensive will be coming this year, of much the kind you describe. That has been my conclusion on material and strategic grounds: Russia is close to the force and material ratios to do this now and succeed, and success in such an offensive could very well end the war outright in Russian victory, however one values such an outcome. The _psychological_ impact of an outright Russian win by a big offensive is something to consider as well, as you note. Certainly the impact on Europe and on American strategic calculus, both already bolloxed thoroughly in this conflict, would be substantial. The concept of 'Russia, the Unstoppable' would be re-established for the first time since Afghanistan in the '80s. But the domestic impact of winning outright at Big War, especially after Russian gross misjudgment and short run ignominious results in starting the war with too few forces, would be major indeed. That would be a reason IN ITSELF for Russia's leadership to stake a lot on a major offensive, the profound effect on public perception and so on strategic posture in Russia and its near abroad in the event or Russian operational success.
I have always respected your work here, Bruce. I write myself on tangential matters here on Substack at The Jagged Spend. I'll drop you a DM in a few days.
The Russian is slow to get in the saddle but rides fast- Churchill
Interesting book from 1917 on Trench warfare by JS Smith.
https://ia601603.us.archive.org/5/items/trenchwarfareman00smitrich/trenchwarfareman00smitrich.pdf