Moral Response to Mental Maneuver
A Boydian look at the Iranian robot operation of 13 April 2024
John R. Boyd frequently encouraged his listeners to sort the effects of warlike actions into three boxes. The first, full of the things that loom large in accounts and analyses of military operations, he called physical. The second, beloved of folks who think themselves clever, provided a home for mental maneuvers. The third, which contained measures aimed at weakening the ‘bonds that permit an organic whole to exist’, bore the label of moral.1
On 1 April 2024, the Israeli aircraft struck the Iranian consulate in Damascus, thereby creating a mental dilemma for the government of Iran. If it responded to this act, the war between Israel and Hamas would become part of a wider conflict, one that would reduce the political costs incurred by Israel as a result of its bombardment, and subsequent siege, of the Gaza Strip. If, however, the Iranian leadership failed to retaliate, it would lose the respect of many of its most important supporters, whether foreign or domestic.
On 13 April 2024, the Iranian government squared this particular circle by dispatching a swarm of flying robots in a way that minimized the likelihood of civilian casualties. In particular, it did two things. First, it aimed its missiles and drones at places other than civilian communities. Second, it used a variety of back-channels to provide those who defend Israeli territory from aerial attack with a good deal of warning of the impending storm, thereby increasing the possibility that most of the unmanned aircraft would be destroyed in the air.
Spokesmen for the Iranian government have claimed that its attack served the military purpose of striking the hangers that sheltered F-35 fighter jets. Whether or not any damage was done to these structures, however, played little, if any, role in the success or failure of the overall operation. After all, the number of people in the world who care about the well-being of innocents greatly exceeds the handful of hoplophiles concerned with the fate of a half-dozen over-priced, over-hyped, rarely-ready relics of a bygone era.2
In the realm of diplomacy, the moral victory won by the robot swarm allows Iran to retain the support of the enthusiasts in its camp without endangering the friendships it has made in the past few years, whether in its immediate neighborhood or the world at large. To be more precise, while both Houthis and the partisans of Hezbollah might have preferred an old-school rocket attack against a settlement, they cannot fault Iran for failing to retaliate. At the same time, the unmistakable restraint displayed in the details of the operation will reassure, among others, the eponymous owners of Saudi Arabia that the hijack happy, bomb-setting Islamic Republic of the last century has, indeed, gone the way of the cassette tape.
As successful as it was, the Iranian drone and missile operation has not resulted in a defeat for Israel. The absence of civilian casualties has derived the advocates of ethnic cleansing of the tu quoque images that they would love to be able to flaunt.3 At the same time, the mere fact of the robot swarm has caused the rulers of countries full of folks sympathetic to the suffering of the besieged and bombarded population of Gaza to replace muted criticism with declarations of ‘iron-clad’ support.
At the same time, the participation of many governments, from Amman to Washington, in the shooting down of Iranian drones and missiles, weakens the position of the Carthaginian party within Israel. Likewise, the many statements of support made in the hours that followed the attack, however perfunctory they may have been, strengthen the hand of those in the Israeli camp who prefer the ambiguities, frustrations, and contradictions of collective defense to the seemingly simple solution of driving Ishmael into the desert.
Herein lies the paradox. If one assumes, as I do, that treating Gaza like the Warsaw Ghetto will do great damage to the moral foundations of the Jewish State; if my characterization of the Iranian drone and missile attack is at all accurate; and if there is any truth in my belief in the beneficent influence of international support, then the folks who call the shots in Tehran have done a great favor to Israel, and, indeed, humanity as a whole. In the short term, the architects of this operation have made it easier for people around the world to distinguish between support for the security of Israel and acquiescence in ethnic cleansing. In the longer term, the admirable restraint shown by a regime once famous for its support of terrorism may, Deo volente, promote the practice of proportionality.
For Further Reading:
To Support, Share, or Subscribe:
John R. Boyd (Chet Richards and Chuck Spinney, editors) Patterns of Conflict (Defense and the National Interest, 2007), starting at slide 110.
Yes, Virginia, the F-35 is a lemon of gargantuan proportions. That, however, is a tale for another day.
In the language of argumentation, tu quoque (Latin for ‘so’s your old man’) describes a classic logical fallacy.
That’s quite the series of intellectual somersaults to turn a catastrophically pathetic revenge attack by Iran into some sort of moral victory.
Let’s review some of the known facts. First, sending 350 drones, ballistic and cruise missiles is not signaling but a full on attack. That, reportedly, half of the 100+ ballistic missiles failed to launch or blew up over Iran, Iraq and Jordan without being intercepted shows quite a degree of technical incompetence.
Since many drones and cruise missiles were intercepted heading toward the middle of the country, it’s hard to pretend civilians weren’t targeted.
As to the F-35s, those would likely be deployed in any air strike against Iran and Iran has no defense against it. The selection of the target was telling, just as much as the attack’s failure.
And if Iran’s intent were as you claim, why try to convince your people that the attack was a devastating success by televising forest fires from other countries and pretending it is post-attack Israel - especially when the average Iranian can surf the internet and see what a dog’s breakfast the Ayatollahs have made of things.
Iran has shown the world that the fight in Gaza is in fact its own fight against the West. It was Iran’s own media that reported that the dead ranking IRGC general killed in Damascus was involved in planning October 7.
Iran has also created a new strategic nightmare by pushing the Sunni Arab states into an increasingly public coalition with the U.S. and Israel - having learned nothing from Putin’s sending Sweden and Finland rushing to join NATO.
And now time is on Israel’s side to decide when and where to retaliate against an Iran that has made it more than clear that it cannot confront Israel directly.
Finally, trying to analogize Gaza with the Warsaw Ghetto is historically incoherent. Instead, you might wish to consult John Spencer, Chair of Urban Warfare at West Point, to gain some understanding of the reality if this war, and either Penn’s Abraham Wyner about the statistical unlikelihood of the Gaza Health Ministry’s casualty statistics - a critique made all the more relevant by the GHM’s sudden concession that about 12,000 deaths have “incomplete” information - and all of those come from their “trusted media source” which means Hamas.
Prithee Gentle Sir - what solutions are realistic other than “driving Ishmael into the desert”?
Reset and wait for the next attack? Ishmael’s have made their choice in Gaza, you might notice that Ishmael has no use nor offer shelter to… Amalek.