Minor Tactics 1920
German advice for American platoon commanders
In 1920, and thus within two years of the armistice that ended the First World War, the United States Infantry Association published a book of map problems called Minor Tactics from the Infantry Journal. Marvelous to say, the introduction to this book, the work of men who had recently fought (or, had the very least, prepared themselves to fight) soldiers of the German Empire, consisted largely of quotations from collections of tactical decision games composed by German officers.
The paragraphs that follow repeat, verbatim, a portion of that introduction.
A field officer joined a battalion to which he had been assigned. In his enthusiasm, he at once organized a school for his officers in Minor Tactics with a series of problems involving the operations of small infantry units.
An old friend and classmate called him aside and confidentially informed him that all of his officers were ‘fed up’ on this. That they could do Griepenkerl forward and back. They had had much Gizycki and had waded through Von Moltke to the bitter end. ‘All right’, replied the major, ‘I haven't had any of this stuff. They will have to come back and help me catch up’.
He gave out his first simple problem covering the operations of a small unit and insisted on every man going into all the details of troop leading. They worked a week on the problem, boning hard every night. They wrote pages of solutions and finally ended up by acknowledging that perhaps they did not know so much Minor Tactics after all. They knew how to write an ‘estimate of the situation’ and argue for their solution. They could write an order for a brigade or division, ‘passing the buck’ to the brigade and regimental commanders, but when it came down to being Second Lieutenant A or Sergeant B commanding the second platoon, they had to go back and bone up the fundamentals - get down to bed-rock and basic principles.
Now this is what you will have to do to reap the full benefit of the problems contained herein.
In his introduction to Tactical Decisions [and Orders], Buddecke states:
The tactician needs a thorough knowledge of the fundamental principles to build on as well as the faculty of rightly applying them. Through uncultivated genius alone, which pays no attention to form, he will never become equal to the difficult problems of a serious crisis. Still less will the mere theorist be able to fill the position if his powers be limited to the knowledge of formal tactics.
That power of decision and action which is able to cope with all the situations of war is gained only by developing the ability to form a judgment in technical matters with certainty.
Therefore tactics is an art to be learned. Like every other art, it demands a measure of talent, and the highest stage of perfection can be reached only by those highly gifted at the start. In spite of this, however, the less gifted can, through practice, gain a considerable degree of facility, and many a tactician has only begun to find out his powers as he advanced in the knowledge of his profession. Here also, one may say, ‘industry is genius’.
It should therefore be the aim of every officer to progress through the individual study of tactics and thus prepare himself for the highest duties of his calling. As an introduction to his tactical problems Gizycki says:
He who seeks to become a leader of troops should therefore develop the following qualifications:
1. The ability to reach a clear and intelligent decision.
2. The ability to communicate this decision clearly and unmistakably to others.
3. The necessary knowledge to enable him to lead the troops so as to carry out his intentions.
By constant practice in the solving of particular problems bring out the infinite variety of possible situations; by means of these bring out the nature of war and thus, by inciting the student to formulate a large number of definite decisions and orders, seek to develop the above-mentioned qualifications. The actual procedure to be pursued in the solving of a tactical map problem is such a matter of personal equation that any word of assistance is difficult to give. You must decide for yourself how best to go about the task in accordance with your own habits and manner of performance. But, while fitting your routine to your own equation you can, nevertheless, learn something from what others have found to be advisable.
At the service schools the time allotted for the solution of a tactical problem is four hours. This means four hours of downright hard, concentrated and systematic work. No periods of just sitting in a brown study, waiting and hoping that a stroke of genius will arrive with the proper answer. The only way to get that stroke is to dig for it, systematically.
In the first place you must find out what the problem is all about. You must have a thorough realization not only of the bald outline furnished by the statement of the problem, but of all the attendant circumstances that can only be guessed at. Your imagination must be stimulated to the point where you can realize the many hopes and fears that tug at the commander, who has to make, under actual service conditions, the decisions that you are called upon to make. You must become thoroughly imbued with the realities of the imaginary situation if you are to arrive at a satisfactory solution. All of this takes time and concentration.
The statement of the problem should first be read over carefully, perhaps underlining in red those parts that refer to Reds, and in blue those referring to the Blues; and the places mentioned should be staked out on the map or maps. Then the problem must be read again and again until certain that all points have been correctly located and that you have worked yourself completely into the atmosphere of the drama. It would seem unnecessary to caution so carefully that you must know what your task is before you start to perform it. But it is a fact that students constantly solve, in whole or in part, some other than the problem laid down.
Quoting again from Buddecke:
After we have gained a correct insight into the details of the problem, we get to the main task, which is to think ourselves completely into the spirit of the problem and to arrive at an estimate and decision for our future course.
By repeatedly and quietly reading the problem, paying due regard to the map in front of us, we gain, just as in focusing a telescope, a clearer and clearer conception of the situation. The more we succeed in placing ourselves mentally in the given situation and in recognizing all the details in their relation to the general problem; the more we succeed in thinking ourselves into the soul of the leader, in conceiving the magnitude of his task, and in sharing his responsibility, the more eager we shall become to take over his duties and play an active part in the operations.
The longer we 'brood' over the map, the clearer will be our conception of the measures which the situation demands. And in this it is important to hold and consider carefully; that is, to follow out, to their furthest effects, all the thoughts and ideas which come to us, often passing like lightning through our brains and suggesting various lines of action. Often it is precisely these fleeting thoughts which lead us to the right path.
But ideas which are not fully thought out and thoroughly weighed cannot have a decisive influence on our judgment and decision. A head which has a hundred thoughts, but which can neither hold fast nor think out a single one, will always remain undecided and irresolute in tactics. For those of limited experience in the solution of tactical problems, Von [sic] Litzmann, formerly director of the German War Academy, has set forth the following basic principles: 1
1. One must strive to exert a stronger will power than his opponent, i.e., must never allow himself to give up his own purpose or mission by reason of information received regarding the enemy, unless it becomes clearly evident that the premises on which his intention or mission was founded have become valueless. Furthermore, one should, as a matter of principle, try to thwart the intentions of the opponent as soon as they become apparent.
2. On the other hand, one must never stick stubbornly to the execution of every detail of previously made plans when difficulties become apparent; it is enough to accomplish the main purpose.
3. One must always assume that the enemy will adopt the course of action most disadvantageous to ourselves, and take measures accordingly.
4. If it becomes evident that the enemy, either on account of faulty orders or unfavorable circumstances, has been placed at a dis- advantage, we must naturally seek at once the best means of turning this to our own advantage, and no time must be left the enemy to improve his situation.
5. If our own situation impels us to employ forces in two different directions, we must bear in mind that a separation into two equal parts is nearly always a mistake. As strong forces as possible should be used in the main undertaking, the fewest numbers possible for minor purposes.
6. We must never take half measures, but in all cases arrive at a full and definite decision and express it definitely. An indefinite manner of expression, with a loophole for escape in case of unfavorable outcome, is inadmissible.
Whenever it is possible to solve the problem by attacking, this course should be followed, nor should we allow ourselves to be deterred by superior hostile forces or by the uncertainty of the situation. By taking every advantage of the terrain and by concentrating our forces at a decisive point, even weaker forces may gain a decision. In threatening situations, an attack is often the only means to safety; such an attack crosses the intentions of the enemy, prevents him from closing in the net about us undisturbed, and gains for our side the advantage of morale.
7. If the situation has actually changed we must endeavor to ascertain what kind of a new decision will best serve the advantage of the whole. This is always the main point, not the individual successes of the subordinate organizations. In fact, these latter must sometimes be sacrificed when demanded by the welfare of the larger organization. 
Bibliography
Albert Buddecke (Arthur L. Conger, translator) Tactical Decisions and Orders (Kansas City: Franklin Hudson, 1916)
Albert Buddecke Taktische Entschlüsse und Befehle (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1895)
H.B. Fiske Some Notes on the Solution of Tactical Problems (Fort Leavenworth: Press of the Army Service Schools, 1916)2
Hugo von Gizycki (C.H. Barth, translator) Strategic-Tactical Exercises with Solutions (Exercises 1-7) (Fort Leavenworth: Staff College Press, 1905)
Hugo von Gizycki (Henry L. Rocca and Spenser Wilkinson, translators) Exercises in Strategy and Tactics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1915)
Hugo von Gizycki Strategisch-taktische Aufgaben nebst Lösungen (Hannover : Helwing'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1884-1887)
Otto Griepenkerl (Karl von Donat, translator) Letters on Applied Tactics (London: H. Rees, 1912)
Otto Griepenkerl Taktische Unterrichtsbriefe (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1905)
Helmuth von Moltke (Karl von Donat, translator) Moltke’s Tactical Problems (London: W.H. Allen, 1894)
Helmuth von Moltke Moltkes Taktische Aufgaben (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1892)
United States Infantry Association Minor Tactics from the Infantry Journal (Washington: United States Infantry Association, 1920)
The anonymous author of this introduction presumed that the former director of the Kriegsakademie he was quoting, Karl Litzmann, bore a surname preceded by ‘von’. He then compounded that error by capitalizing the preposition.
This lecture, delivered by Captain Fiske at Fort Leavenworth before the entry of the US into the First World War, seems to be the place where the author of the introduction to Minor Tactics found the quotation from Major General Litzmann that he used. Alas, I have not been able to find the source used by Fiske.