If the target of a deception campaign, as part of a larger Information Operations strategy, is the mind of the enemy commander (or his staff?), then the UK effort here was most effective. The problem is that you would not know until afterwards if you really were successful, unless you had Intel sources inside the target commander’s HQ that can verify that. Observation and Assessment continuously.
Might be a lesson in there as well about not believing your own BS. When one looks to behavior in organizations those that flourish tend to have very open communication both ways. Up and down and down and up. It takes a lot for smart and experinced leaders to check their egos at the door of the briefing room. There was a guy named MacArthur who said the Chinese would never cross the Yalu River for example….how’d that work out?!?
Thanks for the tag, I was wondering where the hits on the blog were coming from.
First off, I would agree that Crüwell would have been a harder adversary in the first few days than Rommel. Most importantly, he would likely have acted quicker and more decisively.
Having said that, the whole of PR5 was in action on 19 December, to little avail, as they were stopped cold by a single British tank regiment without support (see my article in Scientia Militaria: http://rommelsriposte.com/2021/06/03/article-on-19-november-1941-battle-published/). Adding PR8 would likely have changed that, but in turn would have made concentrating both regiments against 7 and 22 Armoured Bdes to the west that much harder. There wasn't a free lunch here. And when the two regiments got into action together on 20 December, just that happened.
Where Crüwell's instincts would have paid off royally in my view is in the decision to launch the 'dash to the wire', which he strenuously argued against. Keeping control of the Sidi Rezegh battlefield with the main armoured force would have made a big difference. It would also have kept Cunningham in command of Eighth Army, rather than bringing Auchinleck into the frame as on-the-ground commander (acting through Richie, but still in control), and I doubt Cunningham would have been up to that challenge.
What Rommel was actually reading were reports in detail sent by telegram from Cairo by Gen. Feller US Army to Washington. The Italians had decrypted the codex. Feller sent almost daily if not weekly reports in exacting detail.
Rommel knew often before the Officers he faced what their orders were and what was coming. It was not until the Brits figured out what was happening that reports stopped, the Cairo telegrapher was shot I believe and Feller went home is disgrace.
Then the pendulum swung in favor of the Allies with ULTRA serving the British cause in Africa on a more regular basis that early in 1941.
It wasn't quite so dramatic. No blame attached to Bonner Fellers or any operational staff in Cairo. They couldn't know the code had been broken. The error was in Washington, where people should have thought of this. Having seen quite a few of the Bonner Fellers reports (here is one: http://rommelsriposte.com/2009/05/10/the-good-source/), while useful, they were not a readout of orders and assessments on a daily basis. The intel picture was made up of multiple snippets, gleaned from a mix of Bonner Fellers' reports, aerial recce, short-distance radio intercepts by 3./N56 and other sources. It wasn't as easy as reading a report in the evening. I have translated all the daily German intel reports for CRUSADER here: http://rommelsriposte.com/panzerarmee-intelligence-reports/
What are the books? And yes he was sent back, but not 'in disgrace'. It wasn't his fault, everyone knew it, and he was reassigned to doing quite important work in the PTO, including with the OSS. The much bigger problem for him continuing to work in Cairo was his scathing (rightly so) view of the British military performance at Gazala. Read his reports from the period May/June for some insight into that.
Fascinating. It's remarkable how close even the best deception plans come to failure, and how there's always someone who reads the situation correctly. Maybe targeting the commander's psychological biases will become increasingly important as the battlefield gets more transparent.
If the target of a deception campaign, as part of a larger Information Operations strategy, is the mind of the enemy commander (or his staff?), then the UK effort here was most effective. The problem is that you would not know until afterwards if you really were successful, unless you had Intel sources inside the target commander’s HQ that can verify that. Observation and Assessment continuously.
Might be a lesson in there as well about not believing your own BS. When one looks to behavior in organizations those that flourish tend to have very open communication both ways. Up and down and down and up. It takes a lot for smart and experinced leaders to check their egos at the door of the briefing room. There was a guy named MacArthur who said the Chinese would never cross the Yalu River for example….how’d that work out?!?
Hi Bruce,
Thanks for the tag, I was wondering where the hits on the blog were coming from.
First off, I would agree that Crüwell would have been a harder adversary in the first few days than Rommel. Most importantly, he would likely have acted quicker and more decisively.
Having said that, the whole of PR5 was in action on 19 December, to little avail, as they were stopped cold by a single British tank regiment without support (see my article in Scientia Militaria: http://rommelsriposte.com/2021/06/03/article-on-19-november-1941-battle-published/). Adding PR8 would likely have changed that, but in turn would have made concentrating both regiments against 7 and 22 Armoured Bdes to the west that much harder. There wasn't a free lunch here. And when the two regiments got into action together on 20 December, just that happened.
Where Crüwell's instincts would have paid off royally in my view is in the decision to launch the 'dash to the wire', which he strenuously argued against. Keeping control of the Sidi Rezegh battlefield with the main armoured force would have made a big difference. It would also have kept Cunningham in command of Eighth Army, rather than bringing Auchinleck into the frame as on-the-ground commander (acting through Richie, but still in control), and I doubt Cunningham would have been up to that challenge.
It's an interesting one though.
All the best
Andreas
What Rommel was actually reading were reports in detail sent by telegram from Cairo by Gen. Feller US Army to Washington. The Italians had decrypted the codex. Feller sent almost daily if not weekly reports in exacting detail.
Rommel knew often before the Officers he faced what their orders were and what was coming. It was not until the Brits figured out what was happening that reports stopped, the Cairo telegrapher was shot I believe and Feller went home is disgrace.
Then the pendulum swung in favor of the Allies with ULTRA serving the British cause in Africa on a more regular basis that early in 1941.
It wasn't quite so dramatic. No blame attached to Bonner Fellers or any operational staff in Cairo. They couldn't know the code had been broken. The error was in Washington, where people should have thought of this. Having seen quite a few of the Bonner Fellers reports (here is one: http://rommelsriposte.com/2009/05/10/the-good-source/), while useful, they were not a readout of orders and assessments on a daily basis. The intel picture was made up of multiple snippets, gleaned from a mix of Bonner Fellers' reports, aerial recce, short-distance radio intercepts by 3./N56 and other sources. It wasn't as easy as reading a report in the evening. I have translated all the daily German intel reports for CRUSADER here: http://rommelsriposte.com/panzerarmee-intelligence-reports/
All the best
Andreas
Once the Brits worked out it was his reports, Feller was sent back. That's a fact.
At least two books confirm the detail was significant. It was not about codes being cracked as much as a person working for the Germans.
What are the books? And yes he was sent back, but not 'in disgrace'. It wasn't his fault, everyone knew it, and he was reassigned to doing quite important work in the PTO, including with the OSS. The much bigger problem for him continuing to work in Cairo was his scathing (rightly so) view of the British military performance at Gazala. Read his reports from the period May/June for some insight into that.
Fascinating. It's remarkable how close even the best deception plans come to failure, and how there's always someone who reads the situation correctly. Maybe targeting the commander's psychological biases will become increasingly important as the battlefield gets more transparent.
Very interesting, thanks!