Anti-Tank Aces (May 1943) (Part II)

Armored Forces Newsletter

This is the second post in a two-part translation of the lead article in the second issue (dated August 1943) of the Armored Troops Newsletter. The first part of this translation can be found at the other end of the following link:

Anti-Tank Aces (May 1943)

Upon the appearance of the first Soviet tank, the deployment of the anti-tank gun was timed to allow it to shoot at the forward tank at the most favorable range (five hundred meters.) A large number of tests, conducted at night, had established the time needed to move the gun into its firing position. If the tanks retreated out of sight or the fire fight ended, the gun was returned to its ready-to-fire shelter [Feuerbereitschaft].

Obstructed loading, which happened three times over the course of 150 shots, were removed in the ready-to-fire shelter. Obstructed loading happened when part of the propellant charge remained in the barrel, thereby preventing the hollow-charge shell from fitting into the chamber. On 8 May 1943, during the resolution of such an obstruction, the ready-to-fire shelter received a direct hit from a heavy (120mm) mortar. However, as this failed to penetrate, the crew removed the obstacle in record time.

The crew used every pause in the fire fight to clean out the barrel.

The modest muzzle flash of the 75mm anti-tank gun (Model 97/38) (French) proved to be an advantage.

The company [2nd Company, 9th Anti-Tank Battalion] was organized into battle groups [Kampfgruppen]. The 75mm anti-tank gun was combined with a Soviet 45mm piece that had been pushed forward and a 37mm gun that was quickly knocked out. On the basis of careful consideration, the 45mm anti-tank gun would often open fire, thereby distracting the enemy from the 75mm anti-tank gun, which would later do the heavy lifting. As long as this sort of cooperation was possible, the 75mm anti-tank gun received little in the way of artillery fire. Indeed, it was only on the fourth day that we were able to establish, beyond a doubt, that the enemy had located the position of the 75mm anti-tank gun.

To deal with a tank attack, it proved necessary to keep at least fifty rounds of ammunition in the ready-to-fire shelter. A hundred or so meters away, in a place that was completely camouflaged and accessible by means of a communication trench, the anti-tank gunners built an ammunition bunker which, at the very least, contained an equal number of rounds. The job of maintaining contact between the ammunition bunker and the firing position, as well as the delivery of rounds to the firing position, was given to soldiers who were not assigned to the crew of an anti-tank gun. They were instructed to keep tabs on the consumption of ammunition, so that they would not have to wait for a request before making a delivery.

Sergeant Volk [in command of the 75mm gun] invariably found that the middle of the turret provided the most favorable aiming point. In the absence of tracer rounds, the number one gunner found it nearly impossible to observe the strike of the round. Thus, the platoon commander controlled the fire, giving exact corrections for each shot that was fired.

Most tanks were shot up at distances of five hundred meters. Light tanks (mostly M3 General Stuart, with smaller numbers of T-26 and BT) usually caught fire with the first shot. Mark III [British-made Valentine tanks] were much harder to set alight.

T-34 tanks also proved vulnerable: out of three [such vehicles] engaged, two brewed up after the first or second shot. Two T-34 were shot up at distances of a thousand meters. (In one of these two tanks, the entire turret flew into the air.)

A KV I proved the most difficult to deal with. It was probably provided with extra armor, as many shots, which failed to stop the tank from moving, caused big pieces of steel to fly into the air. Hits on the turret seemed to have no effect. After eight to ten hits on the side of the hull, the tank burst into flames.

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The Inspector General of Armored Troops added the following comment:

“This after-action report provides especially valuable lessons. It reminds us, in a powerful way, of the value of:

• careful building of positions and good camouflage

• systematic preparation

• thorough training

The success of Sergeant [Kurt] Volk, of the 2nd Company of the 9th Anti-Tank Battalion, in destroying twenty-two enemy tanks with one 75mm anti-tank gun (Model 97/38) becomes more impressive when we remember that this piece has the combat value [Kampf-Wert] of a medium anti-tank gun. It reminds us that hollow-charge ammunition is much more powerful than many German soldiers think.”

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Sources:

“Fighting Tanks with the 75mm 97/38 Anti-Tank Gun: From an After-Action Report of an Anti-Tank Company” [“Kampf gegen Panzer mit der 7,5 Pak 97/38: Aus dem Erfahrungs-Bericht einer Panzer-Jäger-Kompanie”] Armored Troops Newsletter [Nachrichtenblatt der Panzertruppen] Volume 1 Number 2 (August 1943)

Organizational Chart for the 9th Infantry Division, 1 May 1943, Records of the 9th Infantry Division, US National Archives, Microfilm Series T-315 Roll 525 (Frame 110)

Announcement of the Award of the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross to Sergeant Kurt Volk, 11 May 1943, Records of the 9th Infantry Division, US National Archives, Microfilm Series T-315 Roll 525 (Frame 492)

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For Further Reading:

Depicting Anti-Tank Guns

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