Anti-Tank Aces (May 1943)

Armored Troops Newsletter

Vehicle marking for the 9th Infantry Division proposed in December of 1942

The lead article in the second issue (dated August 1943) of the Armored Troops Newsletter tells the tale of team of anti-tank gunners who, in May of 1943, destroyed twenty-two Soviet tanks.

---

Fighting Tanks with the 75mm 97/38 Anti-Tank Gun

(From an After-Action Report of an Anti-Tank Company)

In the weeks before it moved into the new position, the company used every minute to acquire building material and construct positions. Thus, upon the occupation of the “Blue Line,” all positions, hides, and troop shelters were ready. A thick network of communication trenches connected them to each other. In the few days before the expected tank attack, the troops paid special attention to the improvement and camouflage of the communications that lead to the firing positions.

The position of the 75mm anti-tank gun, which would achieve many kills, lay on a forward slope looking over an open field. In the course of a multi-day defensive battle, the enemy proved unable to uncover this position (located some 250 meters behind the main battle line.)

Personnel shelters, communications trenches, and ‘ready-to-fire’ shelters of an anti-tank position on the ‘Blue Line’

Right behind the firing position, on the rear slope of the ridge, the anti-tank gunners built a “ready-to-fire shelter” [Feuer-Bereit-Schaft], which was oriented along a line perpendicular, more or less, to the direction of fire. The roof consisted of two thick rows of oak-tree trunks and two layers of packed earth, with a total thickness of one meter. During construction, observers looking from the enemy point of view ensured that the top of this bunker lay below the line of the low earthen walls of the firing position.

The firing position was dug so deeply that the barrel barely rose above the level of the ground. In order to prevent the kicking up of dust when the piece was moved or fired, the anti-tank crew covered both the firing position and the area within a radius of six to eight meters with pieces of sod.

They also made sure to remove all straight lines from the surface of the firing position and the gun shelter. To provide additional camouflage, the route from the firing position to the remainder of the anti-tank company was covered in nets, each five meters long and three meters wide, that were covered with suitable grass and underbrush. So that the gun could be deployed quickly, the track that ran from the gun shelter to the firing position was covered with wooden planks.

The anti-tank gunners also built positions like this for the other anti-tank guns of the company, to include the light [37mm] and medium [45mm-50mm] pieces.

The gun shelter also served as a storage area for the first 40 to 50 rounds of ammunition, and was wide enough to allow men to move along either side of the gun.

The roof of the gun bunker withstood several direct hits from heavy [120mm] mortars.

In the communications trenches [Lauf-Graben] that ran from the personnel shelter [Wohn-Bunker] to the firing position (some 40 meters away), many observation posts were built. These minimized movement within the firing position, thereby reducing the chances that it would be noticed.

The anti-tank gunners contemplated the building of an alternative position [Wechsel-Stellung] for the piece. However, they lacked the time to carry out such a project. On the basis of lessons learned in previous battles, they declined to establish an alternative position that lacked the same degree of protection as the primary position.

Immediately after the occupation of the Blue Line, the anti-tank gunners began to name landmarks and measure distances.

An order from the commander of the [2nd] company [of the 9th Anti-Tank Battalion] forbade all soldiers except those engaged in observation from moving through the communications trenches. However, when the alarm was sounded, or enemy tanks were gathering the crew of the anti-tank gun gathered in its ready-to-fire-shelter.

In the days between 6 and 9 May 1943, when enemy tanks assembled in a place one kilometer in front of the main battle line, the crew remained in the ready-to-fire-shelter from dawn until dusk. The piece was loaded, the sights attached.

Thanks to the work of the men of the headquarters of the company and platoon, the crew remained in continuous contact with the artillery observation post. Thus, in just about every attack, as soon as tanks came into view, it was possible to drop artillery shells upon them before opening fire with anti-tank guns. What was even more effective, the artillery often fired smoke on the assembly areas and observation posts used by the enemy, thereby preventing over-watching enemy tanks from supporting an attack with accurate fire.

When the ground was dry, a five-man gun crew could easily manhandle its gun up the path (with an incline of ten degrees) that led from the ready-to-fire shelter to the firing position.

Upon the appearance of the first Soviet tank, the deployment of the anti-tank gun was timed to allow it to shoot at the forward tank at the most favorable range (five hundred meters.) A large number of tests, conducted at night, had established the time needed to move the gun into its firing position. If the tanks retreated out of sight or the fire fight ended, the gun was returned to its ready-to-fire shelter [Feuerbereitschaft].

Obstructed loading, which happened three times over the course of 150 shots, were removed in the ready-to-fire shelter. Obstructed loading happened when part of the propellant charge remained in the barrel, thereby preventing the hollow-charge shell from fitting into the chamber. On 8 May 1943, during the resolution of such an obstruction, the ready-to-fire shelter received a direct hit from a heavy (120mm) mortar. However, as this failed to penetrate, the crew removed the obstacle in record time.

The crew used every pause in the fire fight to clean out the barrel.

The modest muzzle flash of the 75mm anti-tank gun (Model 97/38) (French) proved to be an advantage.

The company [2nd Company, 9th Anti-Tank Battalion] was organized into battle groups [Kampfgruppen]. The 75mm anti-tank gun was combined with a Soviet 45mm piece that had been pushed forward and a 37mm gun that was quickly knocked out. On the basis of careful consideration, the 45mm anti-tank gun would often open fire, thereby distracting the enemy from the 75mm anti-tank gun, which would later do the heavy lifting. As long as this sort of cooperation was possible, the 75mm anti-tank gun received little in the way of artillery fire. Indeed, it was only on the fourth day that we were able to establish, beyond a doubt, that the enemy had located the position of the 75mm anti-tank gun.

To deal with a tank attack, it proved necessary to keep at least fifty rounds of ammunition in the ready-to-fire shelter. A hundred or so meters away, in a place that was completely camouflaged and accessible by means of a communication trench, the anti-tank gunners built an ammunition bunker which, at the very least, contained an equal number of rounds. The job of maintaining contact between the ammunition bunker and the firing position, as well as the delivery of rounds to the firing position, was given to soldiers who were not assigned to the crew of an anti-tank gun. They were instructed to keep tabs on the consumption of ammunition, so that they would not have to wait for a request before making a delivery.

Sergeant Volk [in command of the 75mm gun] invariably found that the middle of the turret provided the most favorable aiming point. In the absence of tracer rounds, the number one gunner found it nearly impossible to observe the strike of the round. Thus, the platoon commander controlled the fire, giving exact corrections for each shot that was fired.

Most tanks were shot up at distances of five hundred meters. Light tanks (mostly M3 General Stuart, with smaller numbers of T-26 and BT) usually caught fire with the first shot. Mark III [British-made Valentine tanks] were much harder to set alight.

T-34 tanks also proved vulnerable: out of three [such vehicles] engaged, two brewed up after the first or second shot. Two T-34 were shot up at distances of a thousand meters. (In one of these two tanks, the entire turret flew into the air.)

A KV I proved the most difficult to deal with. It was probably provided with extra armor, as many shots, which failed to stop the tank from moving, caused big pieces of steel to fly into the air. Hits on the turret seemed to have no effect. After eight to ten hits on the side of the hull, the tank burst into flames.

---

The Inspector General of Armored Troops added the following comment:

“This after-action report provides especially valuable lessons. It reminds us, in a powerful way, of the value of:

• careful building of positions and good camouflage

• systematic preparation

• thorough training

The success of Sergeant [Kurt] Volk, of the 2nd Company of the 9th Anti-Tank Battalion, in destroying twenty-two enemy tanks with one 75mm anti-tank gun (Model 97/38) becomes more impressive when we remember that this piece has the combat value [Kampf-Wert] of a medium anti-tank gun. It reminds us that hollow-charge ammunition is much more powerful than many German soldiers think.”

---

Sources:

“Fighting Tanks with the 75mm 97/38 Anti-Tank Gun: From an After-Action Report of an Anti-Tank Company” [“Kampf gegen Panzer mit der 7,5 Pak 97/38: Aus dem Erfahrungs-Bericht einer Panzer-Jäger-Kompanie”] Armored Troops Newsletter [Nachrichtenblatt der Panzertruppen] Volume 1 Number 2 (August 1943)

Organizational Chart for the 9th Infantry Division, 1 May 1943, Records of the 9th Infantry Division, US National Archives, Microfilm Series T-315 Roll 525 (Frame 110)

Announcement of the Award of the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross to Sergeant Kurt Volk, 11 May 1943, Records of the 9th Infantry Division, US National Archives, Microfilm Series T-315 Roll 525 (Frame 492)

---

For Further Reading:

Depicting Anti-Tank Guns

To Subscribe, Support, or Share:

Note: On 1 May 1943, the 2nd Company of the 9th Anti-Tank Battalion [Panzer-Jäger Abteilung] of the 9th Infantry Division possessed six light machine guns, one 81mm mortar, one heavy (75mm) anti-tank gun, two medium (45mm) anti-tank guns, and four light (37mm) anti-tank guns. The heavy anti-tank gun was a French field gun (Model 1897) that had been mounted on a German carriage. The medium anti-tank guns were of Soviet manufacture.

Sources:

“Fighting Tanks with the 75mm 97/38 Anti-Tank Gun: From an After-Action Report of an Anti-Tank Company” [“Kampf gegen Panzer mit der 7,5 Pak 97/38: Aus dem Erfahrungs-Bericht einer Panzer-Jäger-Kompanie”] Armored Troops Newsletter [Nachrichtenblatt der Panzertruppen] Volume 1 Number 2 (August 1943)

Organizational Chart for the 9th Infantry Division, 1 May 1943, Records of the 9th Infantry Division, US National Archives, Microfilm Series T-315 Roll 525 (Frame 110)

To Subscribe, Support, or Share:

Making the Most of The Tactical Notebook