The lead article in the second issue (dated August 1943) of the Armored Troops Newsletter tells the tale of team of anti-tank gunners who, in May of 1943, destroyed twenty-two Soviet tanks.
Fighting Tanks with the 75mm 97/38 Anti-Tank Gun
From an After-Action Report of an Anti-Tank Company
In the weeks before it moved into the new position, the company used every minute to acquire building material and construct positions. Thus, upon the occupation of the “Blue Line,” all positions, hides, and troop shelters were ready. A thick network of communication trenches connected them to each other. In the few days before the expected tank attack, the troops paid special attention to the improvement and camouflage of the communications that lead to the firing positions.
The position of the 75mm anti-tank gun, which would achieve many kills, lay on a forward slope looking over an open field. In the course of a multi-day defensive battle, the enemy proved unable to uncover this position (located some 250 meters behind the main battle line.)
Right behind the firing position, on the rear slope of the ridge, the anti-tank gunners built a “ready-to-fire shelter” [Feuer-Bereit-Schaft], which was oriented along a line perpendicular, more or less, to the direction of fire. The roof consisted of two thick rows of oak-tree trunks and two layers of packed earth, with a total thickness of one meter. During construction, observers looking from the enemy point of view ensured that the top of this bunker lay below the line of the low earthen walls of the firing position.
The firing position was dug so deeply that the barrel barely rose above the level of the ground. In order to prevent the kicking up of dust when the piece was moved or fired, the anti-tank crew covered both the firing position and the area within a radius of six to eight meters with pieces of sod.
They also made sure to remove all straight lines from the surface of the firing position and the gun shelter. To provide additional camouflage, the route from the firing position to the remainder of the anti-tank company was covered in nets, each five meters long and three meters wide, that were covered with suitable grass and underbrush. So that the gun could be deployed quickly, the track that ran from the gun shelter to the firing position was covered with wooden planks.
The anti-tank gunners also built positions like this for the other anti-tank guns of the company, to include the light [37mm] and medium [45mm-50mm] pieces.
The gun shelter also served as a storage area for the first 40 to 50 rounds of ammunition, and was wide enough to allow men to move along either side of the gun.
The roof of the gun bunker withstood several direct hits from heavy [120mm] mortars.
In the communications trenches [Lauf-Graben] that ran from the personnel shelter [Wohn-Bunker] to the firing position (some 40 meters away), many observation posts were built. These minimized movement within the firing position, thereby reducing the chances that it would be noticed.
The anti-tank gunners contemplated the building of an alternative position [Wechsel-Stellung] for the piece. However, they lacked the time to carry out such a project. On the basis of lessons learned in previous battles, they declined to establish an alternative position that lacked the same degree of protection as the primary position.
Immediately after the occupation of the Blue Line, the anti-tank gunners began to name landmarks and measure distances.
An order from the commander of the [2nd] company [of the 9th Anti-Tank Battalion] forbade all soldiers except those engaged in observation from moving through the communications trenches. However, when the alarm was sounded, or enemy tanks were gathering the crew of the anti-tank gun gathered in its ready-to-fire-shelter.
In the days between 6 and 9 May 1943, when enemy tanks assembled in a place one kilometer in front of the main battle line, the crew remained in the ready-to-fire-shelter from dawn until dusk. The piece was loaded, the sights attached.
Thanks to the work of the men of the headquarters of the company and platoon, the crew remained in continuous contact with the artillery observation post. Thus, in just about every attack, as soon as tanks came into view, it was possible to drop artillery shells upon them before opening fire with anti-tank guns. What was even more effective, the artillery often fired smoke on the assembly areas and observation posts used by the enemy, thereby preventing over-watching enemy tanks from supporting an attack with accurate fire.
When the ground was dry, a five-man gun crew could easily manhandle its gun up the path (with an incline of ten degrees) that led from the ready-to-fire shelter to the firing position.
To be continued …
Note: On 1 May 1943, the 2nd Company of the 9th Anti-Tank Battalion [Panzer-Jäger Abteilung] of the 9th Infantry Division possessed six light machine guns, one 81mm mortar, one heavy (75mm) anti-tank gun, two medium (45mm) anti-tank guns, and four light (37mm) anti-tank guns. The heavy anti-tank gun was a French field gun (Model 1897) that had been mounted on a German carriage. The medium anti-tank guns were of Soviet manufacture.
Sources:
“Fighting Tanks with the 75mm 97/38 Anti-Tank Gun: From an After-Action Report of an Anti-Tank Company” [“Kampf gegen Panzer mit der 7,5 Pak 97/38: Aus dem Erfahrungs-Bericht einer Panzer-Jäger-Kompanie”] Armored Troops Newsletter [Nachrichtenblatt der Panzertruppen] Volume 1 Number 2 (August 1943)
Organizational Chart for the 9th Infantry Division, 1 May 1943, Records of the 9th Infantry Division, US National Archives, Microfilm Series T-315 Roll 525 (Frame 110)
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Interesting: "In the course of a multi-day defensive battle, the enemy proved unable to uncover this position". I wonder, how come? There was fire when the gun fired, no?
Very interesting, in any case. I didn't realise this level of camouflage for one gun.
The unit commander clearly had a sufficient supply of that rarest of commodities on the battlefield- time.