This is the ninth post in a multi-part series. To find previous installments and those that follow, please consult the following guide.
I saw two platoons throw themselves on the ground as one man, but some men soon got up again, and the captain hurrying up, succeeded in forming a single rank in close order, which, although not more than twelve or fifteen strong, marched bravely forward under the ensign whom the proverbial luck of youth had preserved.1
‘Halt! Stand fast!’ I heard a lieutenant command his platoon, when the first men who had been rallied wanted to rush forward. ‘If you are in such a hurry that you cannot wait for the others, I will put you through the manual exercise, here under fire until you are quiet.’
That told: the officer’s bearing showed clearly that his threat was not an empty boast. The platoon closed rapidly and stood still, although several men fell wounded.
‘Without step … quick march,’ commands the leader quietly. He did not allow his men to break into the double till they were all marching quietly. I found myself obliged to confess that these methods of maintaining order and coolness were different from those of the dispersed fighting tactics.
The trial had succeeded magnificently. The losses had been considerable at some points. There was now no regular line, for each platoon, as soon as it had rallied, moved on without waiting for the others. But these little detachments were moving in close order on the object of the attack. What a picture of order only a few seconds after the horrible scene of destruction. The victims of the enemy’s shells were not a few. Some were lying on the ground. Others were trying to reach the protection of the wood.
What would have happened to one of the old extended firing lines in such a case? Under the influence of this murderous fire how many of the ‘individual warriors’ would have hid themselves in the wood, how many would have hurried back to it? And even, if, under the leadership of the few remaining officers, a small part had gone forward, what could a few scattered groups have effected against the united fire of the enemy?
Any one who has never been under fire may find instruction on this point on many a page of history. How many of the reserve would it have been necessary to bring into action in order to push forward men enough to reach the enemy at last with a united firing line? What a mixing up there would have been. How much time would have been lost? Moreover, even the losses would have been greater, because the time during which we should have been exposed to the enemy’s fire, without the possibility of returning it, would have been greater.
Yes, Hallen. The close order insures, not only order, thorough control, and the greatest use of your power, but means also economy of strength and time.
The supports crossed the brook and the wooded ground just in the same way that the firing line had done. The supports of the flank companies, each consisting of two platoons, passed through by platoons, and closed in on leaving the wood. The commanders of companies were still riding; one of them had already been wounded. The enemy’s guns greeted the supports with a lively fire, but the shrapnel shells were not so numerous nor so well aimed as before.2
The supports, therefore, advanced without any great loss, and with a great speed as the others. The unaccustomed sight of the many dead and wounded was not without some effect. But, when the ranks had closed up, when the drums began to beat, and a loud hurrah went through the entire line, every one took heart and marched resolutely forward.
The Colonel did not allow the battalion reserves to pass over the hill till the supports were attracting the attention of the enemy’s guns. The reserve then followed at a distance of about 600 yards, and only lost a few men by infantry fire in crossing the hill. I was astonished to see how easily and quickly such a large body of troops passed the difficult ground about the brook - no hesitation, no loss of time.
Some companies advanced platoon by platoon. Each platoon moved the best way it could. Sometimes the platoons extended or advanced by four deep or filed off, etc. Other companies extended. The rally was by platoons. The company formation was regained during the advance. I did not know which to admire most, the dexterity shown in moving over such difficult ground, or the certainty of the rally.
‘I do not know any company that could do that,’ I shouted. ‘If I took the four best company commanders in the army, and let them and their four companies go through such a place as this together, it would be a good fifteen or twenty minutes before they stood in ordered ranks on the other side. In their anxious efforts to keep their companies together they would first try to find some path or some spot where they could collect the company, and then pass the densest part of the ground in files or in sections. Then the whole company would cross the brook one by one at the best place. Then in order to assemble the company out of its Indian file, another point would be required for the rally.
Considering that their men have been taught the dispersed order tactics, I must own that they would be right to keep them together. If they extended their companies in this wood, with bullets and shrapnel whizzing and screeching overhead, they would most likely never get their men together again.
You can only use the temporary extended order with close order troops. As these troops have been strictly trained to close together on all occasions, you can now rely on their rallying quickly. Only such troops can ever arrive at perfection in crossing any kind of country in huge bodies in close order.
The battalion reserves, which had continued without hesitation their onward march, had not to sustain a heavy artillery fire. This was partly because the energy of the enemy’s artillery was for the time exhausted, partly because it was otherwise employed. Only a few shells fell, enough to show that the arrival of these companies had not been unobserved.
Infantry bullets whistled continuously and thickly, but did little damage; for the enemy’s firing line was already engaged in paying attention to our firing line. Let us return to these latter. Marching briskly and finally doubling, they had reached the cover at the foot of the height held by the enemy. Their advance was greatly assisted by our artillery, which was once more directing a very heavy fire on the village. Our well aimed shrapnel was evidently annoying and disquieting the troops in the shelter trenches. Though they rained their bullets continuously over the front of attack they could not stop the advance of our firing line and its supports.
Having secured the flanks against surprise by pushing out patrols, a halt was called to recover breath and to prepare for the commencement of the fire period. The supports hastened to fill up the gaps in the firing line.
According to their regulations each company now decreased the interval between firing line platoons to four yards. They closed in on the battalion flanks, so that the consequent gap was in the center of the firing line. If there had been a third company in the firing line the instructions provided that it would have closed on its center platoon; in order that the inevitable gap might always be between companies, not between platoons of the same company.
At this moment the gap in the center of each battalion firing line, which had been caused by the closing in and by the losses during the advance left more than enough room for two fresh platoons. The interval between battalions always remained twenty-five yards.
Properly, as Hallen had explained to me, this central gap in the firing line should have been filled up by a third company brought up from the battalion reserve. Each company would then have in its support the necessary reserve force for the fire period. In the present case, it did not appear to be wise to commence the attack with only the weakened platoons of the firing line; nor yet to await the arrival of the battalion reserve before opening fire. Therefore, a deviation was made from the usual custom, and each company of the fighting line reinforced the firing line with the fresh platoon.
During the advance the company leaders had already directed these reinforcing platoons towards the central gap in the firing line. They themselves now dismounted and joining the firing line took over the command of a platoon, whenever it seemed most necessary. The buglers remained with them.
In one company, two platoons had suffered such heavy losses that they were combined for the further advance. The company leader placed himself at the head of this platoon. No fresh distribution took place. Each section remained under its leader or his substitute even if its members had decreased to three or four men. No difference was made because of the relative strength of the two platoons. The right-hand man of the left platoon was now the guide of the double platoon.
All this, being a matter of custom, was carried out very quickly. Afterwards, during the fight, I more than once saw two platoons of a company form as one without any friction.
Just as the first detachments of the reserve emerged from the edge of the wood the firing line was ready for the fight and began to mount the slope.
To be continued …
Soon after an installment of this series appears in the pages of The Tactical Notebook, a link to it will appear on the following guide.
The term ‘ensign’ refers to a Fähnrich, a senior officer candidate who might also be described as a ‘third lieutenant’.
Formed in close order, ‘supports’ remained behind the firing line until called forward to reinforce it. They also provided a unit that had deployed most of its men into a firing line with a means of dealing with emergencies, opportunities, and other unforeseen circumstances.