A Summer Night's Dream
The Old Open Order
This post follows the first two installments of this series:
'Have we, at present, the old extended order—I mean that created during the memorable wars of the French Republic and the First Empire, and afterwards introduced into all disciplined armies? No, it exists no longer.’
'The extended order was an accompaniment of the close order formation, but the less important of the two for battle. Indispensable as the extended order was, still it was never more than an auxiliary to the close order. The battle was only prepared by the fight in extended order, but not carried out by it. Either the fire of lines, or the bayonet charge of columns, decided the battle. The masses in close order surrounded themselves with skirmishers as with a cloud of smoke. These skirmishers hid from the enemy the movements of the closed bodies. They kept away the mosquito-like fire of the enemy’s sharpshooters, and pressing forward up to the enemy’s very noses and eyes, they blinded, confused, and shook him. Such, was in those days, the task of the skirmishers.’
'Only a small portion of the infantry was given up to the skirmishing fight. In France, the skirmishers consisted of a company to the battalion; in Prussia, generally of a sixth to a third of the whole force. The most active and dependable marksmen were picked for this purpose, and specially trained. The work of these marksmen was inseparable from that of the masses in close order, to which all their movements had to be subordinated.'
'Today the so-called “extended order” rules the infantry battle entirely. The modern fighting-line unites in itself both the old preparatory fire of the skirmishers and the decisive massed fire of the line. It even takes the place of a portion of the shock power of the old columns. It has passed from dependence to command.1 This decisive, all grasping force dictates the movements of the reserves. These latter are now no more than reinforcements for the fighting line. Their real work only consists in moving up sooner or later into it.'
'The present “extended order” demands not only portions of the infantry, not merely specially instructed men, but the entire infantry. Formerly, when extension began, by far the larger portion of the troops were retained in close order. In this way you preserved the certainty of having united and concentrated force for the decisive moment. The bodies in close order always gave a rallying point to the skirmishers. The extension was always only for a fixed time, and had a fixed object. As necessity arose, the skirmishers were withdrawn and absorbed again into the masses in close order. Thus, for instance, when the line in close order began to fire, the skirmishers fell into the ranks. They were again thrown out when the enemy had to be followed. And so arose a continual alternation between extension and close order.'
'This alternation has now disappeared. There is now only the extended order, which increases in volume up to the end of the fight. The reformation, which is practiced during peace, appears to be almost impossible in actual fighting. If a man knows where his company is, it is easy for him to reform. When companies and battalions dissolve and intermix with other troops, on what is the individual to reform? Attempts enough were made on our battlefields to collect the masses of stragglers, but how seldom were they successful. How pitiful was the result of such attempts generally, in comparison with the thousands and thousands of the stragglers who covered the battlefield? Even when officers suc- ceeded in collecting a number of men of different regiments, and in bringing them up again to the front, it always happened that as soon as they were again extended under fire, the mob, without union in itself, promptly lost all cohesion.'
'Am I not right? Am I painting matters too black? What you, I, and many of our friends know about this was sometimes even worse than I have described. The extension of masses is the evil soil in which the poisonous plant, the men’s habit of hiding themselves away, flour- ishes so luxuriantly, and unfolds its ugly flowers.'
'What then were the advantages of the original extended fighting formation?'
'One advantage was that the enemy had only a few men to fire at. This advantage has disappeared. The present thick firing lines give masses to aim at. The second advantage was that each man’s shots could be better delivered. Fire was then at short distances. At 100 to 150 paces, our marksmen could choose the proper moment for each shot; when, for instance, one of the enemy’s skirmishers exposed himself incautiously, when a bead could be drawn on one of the enemy’s leaders. To do this, it was necessary to allow the skirmisher a free hand in firing; otherwise, the best chances would be lost. It was then quite right that he should select the best cover, and so creep up to the enemy. The only limit to his freedom was the rule that he was not to interfere with the fires of the others. The skirmisher was then a really independent warrior.'
'Today, the fire begins at 600 yards, and sometimes even at greater distances. The skirmisher sees nothing more of the enemy than a line of little clouds of smoke. Can he aim at any individual, or pick off the officers? He can only aim at the mass, and success can only be attained by the fire of the mass, not by that of the individual. If, however, nowadays, you are so near the enemy as to be able to aim at individuals, this approach signified either that the battle is already decided, or that it will be decided in a very short time. There cannot possibly, with aimed fire at distances under 250 years, be a fight of any long duration in extended order. When that time arrives, the only prospect of success lies in a short but intense fire of masses, followed up by the bayonet charge. Again, it often happens that in calm weather the smoke completely envelopes a thick firing line. When that occurs, what becomes of the special advantage of extended order in the more convenient delivery of each separate shot?'
'It is quite proper that nowadays skirmishers should be to some extent deprived of their former freedom in opening fire, and in using independent firing. The leader endeavors to keep the control of the fire as long as possible in his own hands.'
'If, after the order “Lie down!” has been given, a skirmisher discovers, two paces in front of him, a favorable cover for himself, may he make use of it? No; because, with the present density of the firing-line, he would hinder the fire of the men alongside of him. What then remains distinctive of the old skirmisher? Nothing. Our present skirmisher is something very different from the skirmisher of the original dispersed order. The former was really a man fighting independently; ours is a man fighting in close order.'
'The advantages presented by the original dispersed order have been lost. The only point which our extended order has in common with its predecessor is its irregularity. Formerly we had the irregular order for individuals, and there was a reason for its existence, in its association with the main body in close order; but now we have the irregular order for masses, a thing for which there never has been any justification since disciplined troops first existed.'
'You say ‘all the advantages of the dispersed order have been lost', I interposed. 'Surely you have forgotten to mention a great advantage - apparently not lost. I refer to the use of cover.'
'Quite right', said Hallen. 'I should have mentioned that before. Formerly this advantage was a great one, as on the one hand, the individual skirmisher could seek cover for himself within certain limits; on the other, the masses in close order scarcely knew anything about utilizing cover. Neither of these conditions exists today. The skirmisher, placed in a dense line, has in reality no more freedom in choice of cover than the man in close order. He may not leave the line either to go forwards or backwards to seek cover, and he can’t go to either side on account of his comrades.'
'We have, however, made great progress in discovering cover for formations in close order. The best way of avoiding the effect of the enemy’s fires is to lie down, and troops in close order can do this as easily as firing lines. Our company columns are skilled in the art of utilizing natural features of the ground to approach the enemy unseen. Close country, bushes, woods, vineyards, are indeed no longer obstacles to supports.
[The term 'supports' refers to bodies of men kept in reserve a short distance behind the firing line. They consisted of smaller units - usually platoons - and were posted further forward than the battalion that usually constituted the regimental reserve. ]
I do not assert that there is not still room for considerable improvement in these matters, but we are on the right road. The formation in close order, which I believe to be the best for the firing line, is 'platoons' in single rank and close order, which will fire lying down. What disadvantage has such formation in the use of cover, in comparison to the present extended order formation, always more out of hand and seldom less dense?'
'You continually speak of the density of the firing line as if this density was one of its constituents', said I. 'But you don’t always have dense firing lines. As the Regulations say, you can begin the infantry attack or defense with skirmishing lines, and as the battle becomes hotter gradually increase their density.'
'I do not dispute', answered my friend, 'the value of thin lines of skirmishers where no serious engagement is intended, or where you only wish to throw out a veil either for observation or security from surprise; though in such a case I should prefer using patrols. But if you are going to commence your attack with so thin a firing line as to have five or six paces interval between files, your skirmishers will indeed have smaller losses, but your troops in close order greater losses.’
‘The enemy who opposes you with a dense firing line will have, with an equal front, twice or thrice the number of rifles in action. Your reinforcements, on their way up, will be insufficiently protected by the firing line, and will be annihilated. You will not, therefore, lessen your losses by such a course, and this great extension of the firing line will render fire discipline difficult from the outset. The worst of such an attack would be that “crowding” would become the rule, the mixing of units a system, and the “mob” - the deadliest enemy to leadership, and the greatest friend of skulkers - would be permanently established and habitual.'
'I have no liking for such business as this; besides, old man, you know, you yourself do not care for this organized disorder.'
'Finally, the object of such an attack is to reach the deadliest range with as dense a firing line as possible. Why is it', continued Hallen, 'since we enjoy none of the benefits originally introduced by the dispersed fight, that we still remain faithful to it and its defects?'
'It seems', I replied, ‘as if your chief objection was to the name “extended or dispersed order.” I quite agree that it is no longer a good fighting formation for skirmishers. Remember the musketry regulations recommend the keeping together of platoons, in the firing-line, and tacticians wish now to have always the section or half-platoon regarded as the ‘fire unit.’'
'You mean that the whole matter is a mere question of splitting hairs, and that after all we only call the small thing by different names?' asked my friend, in his usual quiet way. 'Now you astonish me. I thought to meet with the strongest opposition, and you tell me there is nothing new in what I say. According to the tactical views generally accepted, you can only hope for success by adopting the extended order when under hot fire. I, on the contrary, say you must use close order. Is there really no difference between the two?'
'Certainly, there is a tremendous difference', said I, dryly.
'I do not wish to be misunderstood in my use of the word “close order”, which seems to me the keyword of our future fighting formation. I do not wish to use columns, as we did till very lately, against the modern rapid fire. Neither have I any wish to encounter the fire of an enemy by taking over, with the old line. The old line was too clumsy to utilize ground, and too proud to lie down. My close order system is to have engrafted upon it all the artifices for gaining cover which we have learnt from skirmishing. These must be unceasingly perfected. That is, in fact, the great service which skirmishing has rendered to the development of tactics.'
'Excuse my interrupting you. But you say our skirmisher is a man fighting in mass formation. That flatly contradicts everything on the subject in the Regulations and also the views of our most distinguished writers on tactics. Even if the influence of the leader at point blank ranges has often no effect on the mass of individuals, and if success depends solely on what the firing line may itself resolve to do, still the man is not fighting in mass. He must be taught to act independently, or when the time comes he will be found wanting.'
'Yes', answered my friend, seriously. 'I know that accepted theories, and the views of those in authority are against me and this fact has caused me many a sad hour. I agree that there are times when the best disciplined troops get out of hand, but I cannot agree that it is impossible to overcome such moments of weakness, if the leaders only do their duty thoroughly.
'When such a fit of madness seizes the firing line, where, I ask, is the leader’s whistle; and if he has fallen, where is his successor’s; and if even he also has bitten the dust, where are the sergeants and section leaders?2 Where again, I ask, are the leaders of the companies on either side of the company in question?
'They cannot all be killed, or so indifferent to their duty as to allow wild shoot- ing in their immediate neighborhood. If there are men who are stupid enough not to pay attention to the repeated shrill whistling, and to go on firing, what are the platoon leaders about if they do not knock the rifles out of the hands of such men? Are there not everywhere brave men who will prevent such conduct on the part of timid comrades? Finally, where is the officer’s sword, which, when other means fail, must enforce the necessary prompt obedience?
'I believe a thorough fire-control to be such that it can insure the cessation of fire, necessary to allow smoke to clear away, to keep the men cool and to al- low of their hearing orders whether to resume the firing or to advance. We have now the means of permanently creating such a control, if only men are strictly trained to it.
'The regulations and views in opposition to men are founded on the experiences of the last war, where the means of controlling fire were insufficient, and ideas on the subject were less clear than they now are.
'At that time that invaluable aid to a real fire-control - the whistle - has not yet been introduced. The order, the signal and call of the leader perished in the unsuspected severity of the din of the firing line. I once shouted with all my might in the ear of a man in the firing line alongside of me without making myself understood. The man was to advance a pace, at a moment when he had the muzzle of his rifle dangerously close to a comrade’s ear. As neither words nor gestures availed, I finally dragged him forward by the collar.
'As it was impossible to insure pauses in the fire, every shot increased the general confusion and the smoke. If an officer sprang forward, at most the two or three men in his immediate neighborhood followed him. The others saw and heard nothing, and continued firing. And so the poor lieutenant and his few trusty followers had shamefacedly to fall back, or endure a fire from both sides.
'More often than not, the firing line consisted of a mixture of men from many different regiments. I have even seen men with yellow and red shoulder straps mixed up together in the same firing line.3 In such a case, the leader does not know what men he commands: the men, whom they are to obey. Certainly the present means of enforcing fire discipline are most satisfactory!
'A way out of the difficulty, which arises from the mixing up of firing lines, may be seen at peace maneuvers. It consists in distributing the men afresh among the leaders actually present. This would be impracticable under a hot fire. Even if, under exceptionally favorable circumstances, such a process were carried out, it seems extremely doubtful if it would be thoroughly successful. A strange leader will not have the same influence over the men as the officer they know.
'Is, then, the retention of dispersed order tactics, with its inevitable admixture of units, desirable? If so, people are justified in thinking that a thorough fire-control is impossible. I contend that, under certain conditions, a permanent fire control is possible. These conditions are: the firing line to consist of platoons in single rank, the strength of the platoon being not greater than fifty men.
'The platoon must be taught always to close in to the center so as to make mixing impossible. You cannot crowd into a closed platoon. Finally, when a leader falls, his place must be instantly taken by a successor. I have thought out this idea thoroughly, and can find no flaw in it.’
To be continued …
As soon as each installment of this series rolls of the press, a link to it will appear on the following guide.
In present-day parlance, we might render this sentence ‘It has passed from exception to default’.
Here, the British translator uses ‘section’ to render the German word Gruppe, a unit of eight or so men that an American would call a ‘squad’.
At this point in time, the base color of the shoulder straps of Prussian infantrymen indicated the army corps to which they belonged.