Can We Revive Auftragstaktik?
In the early 1990s, the typescript for an article on the subject of mission command circulated among one of the networks of American military men interested in the maneuver warfare tradition. Struck by the value of the piece, I wrote to the author, Franz Uhle-Wettler, for permission to publish it in the original (ink-and-paper) version of The Tactical Notebook. Shortly thereafter, Lieutenant General Uhle-Wettler replied to my request, graciously granting both permission to publish the piece and, in the course of doing so, Americanize its prose. Alas, I was not able to do this before the little ‘zine that John Sayen and I published ran aground on the rocks and shoals of an increase in postal rates. On a happier note, a few weeks ago, while digging in one of the 144 three-ring binders that hold the flotsam and jetsam of my professional life, I found both the article and the letter authorizing its publication.
What is Auftragstaktik? And Can We Revive It?
Franz Uhle-Wettler
In the 1970s, Trevor N. Dupuy argued that, in the years between 1807 and 1945, the command system employed by German armies allowed them to outperform their opponents.1 Soon thereafter, Martin Van Creveld published a study that confirmed the findings of Colonel Dupuy.2 Before long, a number of other writers had begun to recommend the adoption of this method, which they often described as Auftragstaktik.3
Obviously, if there is any substance to the claim of superior battlefield performance on the part of German armies, we will gain much from the discovery of its cause. We can begin this quest by dismissing any presumption of superior courage on the part of German soldiers. After all, many nations, not least of which is Russia, have fielded forces full of exceptionally brave men.
In much the same way, we should set aside any notion of inborn efficiency. History, repeatedly reminds us of the speed with which well-run armies degenerate into gormless mockeries of their former selves. In the middle years of the eighteenth century, the armies of Prussia and other German states proved more than a match for their French counterparts, even when the latter enjoyed the advantage of superior numbers. Nonetheless, in 1806 and 1807 the French repeatedly defeated the Prussian armies sent against them. Less than a decade later, in the War of Liberation against Napoleon (1813 and 1815), Prussian forces in the field reliably turned the tables on their erstwhile conquerors (unless, that is, Napoleon was leading them in person.)
Roots of Battlefield Effectiveness
It seems that any nation's forces will fight courageously when a few basic conditions are fulfilled: a valid cause, unit cohesion, trust in leaders, and tolerable weaponry. So much for what makes an army fight. But that does not mean that it will fight effectively.
When, in 1941, a German task force invaded the island of Crete, it enjoyed air superiority. The British and Greek defenders, however, enjoyed several more powerful advantages. They controlled the seas, outnumbered the attackers, and fought from prepared positions.
Moreover, while British and Greek forces possessed lots of heavy equipment, to include tanks and armored personnel carriers, the attackers were limited to lighter ordnance. Indeed, during the three days that passed between the landing of the first paratrooper and the capture of an airfield, the Germans made do with hand-held weapons, light mortars, and a handful of radio sets.4
The defenders of Crete also enjoyed the advantage of ‘Ultra’, which gave them the ability to read German codes. Thus, they knew where, and when, the German airborne forces planned to land. Nonetheless, the German assault force managed to capture an island of strategic importance and, in the course of doing so, inflict losses that greatly exceeded their own.5
As German forces fighting on Crete consisted of small, isolated units fighting desperately to survive, we cannot credit German success to tactics of the sort practiced by divisions or regiments. Rather, we must look for a factor other than superior plans for coordinating the actions of batteries and battalions.
Michael Carver, who saw much fighting between British and German units during the Second World War, observed that, time and again, German forces destroyed their opponents within sight of British commanders, who, lacking orders from their superiors to take action, declined to come to the aid of their countrymen. In other words, while German leaders often engaged in self-directed action, even if it required them to contravene direct orders, their British counterparts frequently failed to display a similar degree of initiative.6
The benefits of initiative stem directly from the nature of war, the domain of uncertainty, friction, and chaos; an arena rich in danger and death where wills clash and minds collide, thereby creating situations so well supplied with surprises that they defy both prediction and planning. In such situations, leaders who can act in the absence of orders benefit from a powerful advantage, one akin to the edge enjoyed by chess players permitted to move two pieces in every single turn.
To be continued …
What is Auftragstaktik? And Can We Revive It?
Related Reading
Martin Van Creveld Fighting Power: German and US Army Performance 1939-1945 (New York: Praeger, 1982) (Thrift Books)
Trevor N. Dupuy A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff 1807-1945 (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977) (Thrift Books)
Richard Simpkin Race to the Swift. Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare (London: Brasseys, 1984) (Thrift Books)
John Vermillion Tactical Implications of the Adoption of Auftragstaktik for Command and Control on the Airland Battlefield (Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1985) (Defense Technical Information Center)
John T. Nelsen II Where to Go from Here? Considerations for the Formal Adoption of Auftragstaktik by the US Army (Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1986) (Combined Arms Research Library)
Martin Van Creveld ‘On Learning from the Wehrmacht and Other Things’ Military Review (January 1985) pages 62-81 (Combined Arms Research Library)
The defending force consisted of some 42,000 British, Greek, Australian, and New Zealand troops. On the first day of the attack, 5,500 German airborne troops landed. In the days that followed, reinforcements brought German troop strength to 18,000 or so.
The Germans lost 2,071 killed, 1,888 missing (almost all killed), 2594 wounded. Of the forces of the British Commonwealth in (or around) the island, 3,723 (2,011 from the Royal Navy) were killed, 1,737 were wounded, and 11, 856 were taken prisoner. Greek losses: about 1,500 killed, about 500 prisoners; 149 German aircraft destroyed; 3 cruisers and 6 destroyers of the Royal Navy sunk.
Michael Carver Dilemmas of the Desert War: A New Look at the Libyan Campaign (1940-1942) (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986) (Thrift Books)
One of the stupidly frustrating things about Army operations is that there is a lack of trust in subordinate leaders. I think that is one reason why OPORDs are so voluminous, overly detailed and restrictive - not to mention poorly written and confusing.
Embracing this concept, as well as changing leader education and development, would surely help make the U.S. Army more lethal and effective.
We can absolutely channel our own American nature to accomplish the same things as Auftragstaktik at any moment with the very words “Figure it out” and “Get it done.” We only do this every day for 418 years… we may indeed centuries in be born this way.
IF THE BOSS SAYS SO, and he takes responsibility.
But; As a system? Caeruleum* primum delendum est.
Because the spirit of the USSR economy survived inside a 5 sided ring. 💍
And at large in society in our schools.
The bureaucracy must be gone or these are wishes, indeed last wishes.
A Will and Testament.
And to think this can be done through education…
*Blue