The Heavy Company of a Grenadier Battalion
The Volksgrenadier Division of 1944
The heavy (Schwere) company of a Grenadier battalion of a Grenadier regiment of a Volksgrenadier Division of the 32nd Mobilization Wave consisted of a headquarters and four platoons. The first and second platoons were identical heavy machine gun platoons, each of which wielded four MG42 heavy machine guns. The third (infantry gun) platoon operated four 75mm infantry guns The fourth (medium mortar) platoon served six 81mm mortars.
The heavy company was much more than a collection of heavy weapons. It was a unit in every sense of the word -a team that fulfilled a single mission. In cases where a battalion main effort (Schwerpunkt) had been designated, the heavy company focused its own fires in support of that unit. If no such concentration of fires was needed, the heavy company established a framework of long range fires within which the other companies fought their short range battles.
These roles for the heavy company were no different from those of the machine gun companies and heavy companies of the early years of the war. Indeed, the chief difference between the heavy company of the Volksgrenadier battalion and its predecessors had less to do with weapons than with devices that improved the ability of officer commanding the unit to keep in touch with his superiors, the commanders of the Grenadier companies, and the leaders of his (frequently far-flung) platoons. Many of these devices were portable radios of the kinds that started to pour out of German factories in 1942. Another was the Kettenrad, a hybrid vehicle that might well be described “half-track motorcycle.”
In keeping with this new emphasis on communications, most of the men in the headquarters of the heavy company were signalers of one sort or another. That is, they were either radiomen, telephone operators, or messengers. Strange to say, while communications was clearly the chief function of the company headquarters, there was no single individual responsible to the company commander for coordinating the action of his three separate groups of signalers. Instead, and in keeping with the German tradition of training officers extensively in the art of formulating and giving orders (Befehlstechnik), this task was left to the company commander. It is also worth noting that, as subordinate platoons and superior echelons possessed communicators of their own, the communications troops were able to devote all of their attention to the communications needs of the company commander. This was an arrangement that differed from the practice of many contemporary armies, which tended to concentrate infantry communications specialists at battalion level or higher and then parcel them out as needed.
As with other German companies of the period, administration was in the hands of a first sergeant (Hauptfeldwebel). This worthy senior NCO was assisted in his work by NCOs in charge of equipment, pay and supplies, medical care, and weapons maintenance. Since the men that these NCOs supervised were located in the four platoons of the company all, except the NCO in charge of the company headquarters troops, were provided with bicycles.
The headquarters of the fourth (medium mortar) platoon had two related functions, communications and the massing of fires. The former was the province of a squad of six radiomen. The latter was the work of the platoon commander himself and three NCOs. One of these commanded the gun position, allowing the platoon commander to occupy a separate observation post. The other two operated aim- ing circles, surveying instruments that allowed them to precisely align the six mortars of the platoon so that the firing data computed for one could be used by all.
This ability to fire as a unit did not deprive the mortar platoon of its inherent flexibility. The fact that mortar platoon consisted of three identical mortar squads allowed it to be employed in one of three ways.
The platoon could be employed as a single unit, with all six mortars firing from the same position, responding to the same commands, and firing on the same target.
The squads could be located in separate positions and yet, by virtue of radio communications, still respond, as a unit, to the voice of the platoon commander.
The squads could be sent on separate missions. For example, one could be paired with a machine gun platoon while another could be attached to a Grenadier company.
In keeping with the German fondness for decisive concentration, the third possibility would be an exception rather than the rule. Most German commanders would accept such a dilution only out of necessity. If, for example, a high ridge or great distance separated the he battalion into two separate columns, it might be necessary to split the mortar platoon between those detachments. For these reasons, each mortar squad was organized for employment as an autonomous unit, with the ability to carry its own baggage, as well as a supply of ammunition, rations, and other consumables. Moreover, rather than relying on a platoon-level maintenance section, each squad possessed its own armorer.
Source: General der Infanterie beim Chef Generalstabs des Heeres, Nr. 3160/ 44g vom 5.9.44, microfilmed at the U.S. National Archives, Captured German Records , Series T-78, Reel 763.