I admit that I thought the Ruski's we're trying to take Kiev and deliver a knockout punch. But in the end they did get what they wanted, didn't they? A land bridge to Crimea.
When thinking of leading from the front, one image that is conjured up fast is the US Marine Corps, William Leftwich, Jr. Trophy awarded each year since 1979 to a captain that meets the leadership characteristics exemplified by Lt. Colonel Leftwich who was killed in action in the Republic of South Viet Nam in 1970. It was a big deal when the first recipient Captain Clyde “Sam” Brinkley was awarded the trophy, those of us young infantry officers in 2nd Marines at that time, had yet another example to look up to, though there was no shortage of great leadership in the regiment. Lt. Colonel John “Dong Ha bridge” Ripley was CO of 1/2 and Captain Jim Conway CO of Kilo 3/2, to name a few. Fast forward to todays flag officers, they wouldn’t be caught dead leading from the front. Perhaps one of the best examples of today’s technocrat politically correct generals is Kenneth McKenzie, General, USMC (ret) knowing full well and it’s been soundly documented that he knew and advised the Biden Administration that their plans or lack thereof would be disastrous, just blithely went along to get along with his “foot on the gas” to “retrograde” out of Afghanistan. Leading from the front he would have resigned as CentCom CG, whether he chose to become more outspoken after resigning and retiring would be up to him, but the statement regarding the exit plans would have been unambiguous. The Russian military may well be an undisciplined mess, and their flag officers qualified or not at least appear to give enough of a damn to lead from the front. It might be better to remind that troop leaders need to place themselves in the best possible position to direct the attack or defense, which isn’t necessarily in front. But General O.P Smith’s leadership of the attack in another direction by the First Marine Division in November and December of 1950, seems a great example to study and replicate. Agreed the fat lady has yet to sing, hope her voice can hold up, as there are a lot of operas that need a finale.
Re the looting, my primary thought at the time, reading the reaction of people who were apparently shocked, was that they clearly hadn’t read the memoirs of the late Sir Harry Flashman, or else hadn’t taken them as seriously as they deserved. I doubt there has ever been an army that didn’t loot at least a *little*.
To be fair, explaining the truth of the Ukraine war is not really what the media gets paid to do. They are propagandists for oligarchs and deep state. In a related way I found Viveks interview with Tucker quite fascinating.
I’m in no position to comment on the substance of this analysis, but I heartily agree with your “procedural” critique. We need analysts to offer a clear sense of the the sources they’re using. I know journalists can’t be expected to provide detailed footnotes, but they could provide some indication of whether they’re using foreign language sources, non-US intelligence officers and so on.
The Russian army remains a complete train wreck. Indeed, Russia has lost every war but one in the last 150 years (two, if you count the 2nd Chechen War). Two of those defeats ended in revolution. The one victory was a demographic catastrophe from which the country never recovered. Russia spent ten years preparing for that war, including a crash industrialization program. Contrast that with 20 years of de-industrialization under Putin.
Without the iron fist of the Soviet security services, the Russian army has reverted to the mean: apathy, alcoholism, and abuse (except for a few specialist units). Corruption (always a problem) is now at unimaginable levels. Indeed, to keep the loyalty of his officer corps Putin legalized theft in "unfriendly countries." Corruption is the very lifeblood of Putin's kleptocracy.
Yes, railroads move a lot of freight. Railheads, however, are immobile and easy targets. Russian railroads are also electric, and transformer stations are fixed targets, as well. Ukrainian drones and missiles have forced the Russians to use railheads much farther away than they ever planned. They have neither to trucks nor forklifts to make up the difference. And, it's hard to make more trucks and forklifts when you're dependent on Western machine tool technology.
Russian Telegram accounts make the shortage of food evident. I'm guessing that those bodegas are cleaned out by now.
I *love* your work, but the Fat Lady has yet to sing. Maybe it's a bit premature to start casting stones.
Western Pundits don't study history. Therefore, they know nothing about Russia or the soldier's soul.
I admit that I thought the Ruski's we're trying to take Kiev and deliver a knockout punch. But in the end they did get what they wanted, didn't they? A land bridge to Crimea.
When thinking of leading from the front, one image that is conjured up fast is the US Marine Corps, William Leftwich, Jr. Trophy awarded each year since 1979 to a captain that meets the leadership characteristics exemplified by Lt. Colonel Leftwich who was killed in action in the Republic of South Viet Nam in 1970. It was a big deal when the first recipient Captain Clyde “Sam” Brinkley was awarded the trophy, those of us young infantry officers in 2nd Marines at that time, had yet another example to look up to, though there was no shortage of great leadership in the regiment. Lt. Colonel John “Dong Ha bridge” Ripley was CO of 1/2 and Captain Jim Conway CO of Kilo 3/2, to name a few. Fast forward to todays flag officers, they wouldn’t be caught dead leading from the front. Perhaps one of the best examples of today’s technocrat politically correct generals is Kenneth McKenzie, General, USMC (ret) knowing full well and it’s been soundly documented that he knew and advised the Biden Administration that their plans or lack thereof would be disastrous, just blithely went along to get along with his “foot on the gas” to “retrograde” out of Afghanistan. Leading from the front he would have resigned as CentCom CG, whether he chose to become more outspoken after resigning and retiring would be up to him, but the statement regarding the exit plans would have been unambiguous. The Russian military may well be an undisciplined mess, and their flag officers qualified or not at least appear to give enough of a damn to lead from the front. It might be better to remind that troop leaders need to place themselves in the best possible position to direct the attack or defense, which isn’t necessarily in front. But General O.P Smith’s leadership of the attack in another direction by the First Marine Division in November and December of 1950, seems a great example to study and replicate. Agreed the fat lady has yet to sing, hope her voice can hold up, as there are a lot of operas that need a finale.
Re the looting, my primary thought at the time, reading the reaction of people who were apparently shocked, was that they clearly hadn’t read the memoirs of the late Sir Harry Flashman, or else hadn’t taken them as seriously as they deserved. I doubt there has ever been an army that didn’t loot at least a *little*.
To be fair, explaining the truth of the Ukraine war is not really what the media gets paid to do. They are propagandists for oligarchs and deep state. In a related way I found Viveks interview with Tucker quite fascinating.
I’m in no position to comment on the substance of this analysis, but I heartily agree with your “procedural” critique. We need analysts to offer a clear sense of the the sources they’re using. I know journalists can’t be expected to provide detailed footnotes, but they could provide some indication of whether they’re using foreign language sources, non-US intelligence officers and so on.
The Russian army remains a complete train wreck. Indeed, Russia has lost every war but one in the last 150 years (two, if you count the 2nd Chechen War). Two of those defeats ended in revolution. The one victory was a demographic catastrophe from which the country never recovered. Russia spent ten years preparing for that war, including a crash industrialization program. Contrast that with 20 years of de-industrialization under Putin.
Without the iron fist of the Soviet security services, the Russian army has reverted to the mean: apathy, alcoholism, and abuse (except for a few specialist units). Corruption (always a problem) is now at unimaginable levels. Indeed, to keep the loyalty of his officer corps Putin legalized theft in "unfriendly countries." Corruption is the very lifeblood of Putin's kleptocracy.
Yes, railroads move a lot of freight. Railheads, however, are immobile and easy targets. Russian railroads are also electric, and transformer stations are fixed targets, as well. Ukrainian drones and missiles have forced the Russians to use railheads much farther away than they ever planned. They have neither to trucks nor forklifts to make up the difference. And, it's hard to make more trucks and forklifts when you're dependent on Western machine tool technology.
Russian Telegram accounts make the shortage of food evident. I'm guessing that those bodegas are cleaned out by now.
I *love* your work, but the Fat Lady has yet to sing. Maybe it's a bit premature to start casting stones.
Russia is just two weeks away from taking Kiev! Western analysts and Russian Strelkovites just don't understand this, sadly.
We have that many Flag Officers along too ! One per Battalion?
In Bosnia it was one per rifle company.
They just never seem to get hurt, unless it’s that rare suicide bomber at the meeting.
At a meeting.
Not meeting engagement, no.
The Command HQ can be dangerous, mind you, with more Flag Officers than PFCs.