I think what the Modern US Military lacks are those who are “brilliant in the Basics”. Especially for the US Army, there is little institutional training in what the day to day job is for an Officer, in garrison and the field.
For ROTC Specifically, we teach cadets infantry tactics and procedures for 4 years, and then send them to their officer schools where they learn theory but not application; unless you go into a combat field, your 4 years has little bearing on what your job actually is other than “conceptualizing your role in the battle”. It is expected that an officer learns on the job, which leads to almost random outcomes in knowledge, experience, and competency.
Brilliance in the basics is hard to come by even at the senior levels.
Aside, Russia likely will come out of the conflict with the most experienced armed force in the world for conducting LSCO, since they actually have conducted it and have real experience, where the US Military has virtually no experience in it and seniors are still accustomed to the COIN fight.
“It is expected that an officer learns on the job, “
I know. Personally, despite having prior enlisted.
We’re the only army that does this, every other army the officer candidates or junior officer is mentored on the job by a superior. A Platoon commander in the British army is a Captain, he has subalterns (Lieutenants) being trained working for him.
A company Commander is a Major, and so on.
In the German Army the Fahnrich (Cadet) Officer Candidates serve in the Platoon under the Platoon leader and yes in war.
What we do is toss people in and see who floats, sadly it’s often not the competent nor the brave.
It’s known and that it’s not corrected makes this error suspiciously look like policy.
Hackworth's entire corpus of writings on his time in Vietnam can be summed up by "superiors who thought they were still in Korea." Indeed, maybe the entire war could be characterized that way.
This has a point of experiences may vary, - however before we condemn breaking units in -
let’s compare that to the American individual replacement system of 1944 through Vietnam, where soldiers are treated as a commodity to be used up , turning in casualty ratios far above what most armies consider acceptable. This isn’t quite what you are saying… however… as the previous vicious practice I described existed for decades and indeed we see it now in our proxy in Ukraine , it is the real alternative. To simply feed units into the maw as they are mere numbers to echelons above is the default.
The fighting secret of the German army in WW2 was the German soldier was a rested soldier, at least until the end.
The American army horrified its contemporaries the way it drove its soldiers until they were used up. To those above we are a commodity by default, this must be checked by any means necessary, regardless of its drawbacks.
It may be true that slow wars create some bad habits, but at least they’re alive long enough to learn something.
Not really the military, they just saluted the flag and kept marching on.
The 90 division bet - meaning the absolute bare minimum of American Divisions- was forced on Marshall. He asked for 265 divisions. FDR said no , and FDR had a point, we needed a labor force. Remember that the balance between labor and meat to the front haunts the Germans and British in both wars. This was industrial warfare, it’s a hard choice. There’s absolutely something to be said for arming and fueling our allies (our biggest contributions to the USSR being trucks, jeeps, fuel). So keeping the others supplied and providing comparatively less ground forces is a powerful and winning argument. BARELY.
But the choice means no rotation of units. The results were visible immediately in 1944.
The issue persisted until Desert Storm, when stop loss was implemented.
The terrible part is this but symptom and not disease.
Sadly America is dominated by those who see people as a commodity. Not unique to America, not Capitalism…
… moreover they don’t know it’s wrong, either.
The best solution is forcing anyone who has any say or vote to fight or share the risk. That’s the disconnect you know…. And it’s far from just America or the military. Skin in the game or you are nothing.
Interesting comments, especially about how cohorts often apply their experiences and leadership/tactical knowledge under new conditions. I've observed how the rotation by brigade for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the dependence on Forward Operating Bases have degraded some of the field skills that continuous maneuver operations demand. Serving officers wrote about the degradation in field artillery unit skills for example.
I note the comment on individual replacement vs unit replacement. The US Army learned its lesson in both the Civil War and to a lesser extent, WWI, where regionally recruited units were decimated, leaving rural communities with little or no returning veterans to take up the plow and run the general store. We went to individual replacements after that, expecting that veterans in the unit would help mentor and train the new replacements. Two drawbacks to that -- when bulk replacements (more than 10-15% of unit strength) show up, there usually aren't enough NCOs remaining to do the mentoring and training. The second drawback was revealed in VN -- newbies were avoided because they made mistakes that endangered the unit and in many squads/platoons, the concept was if the newbie lasted six weeks, then he was worth establishing a relationship with.
Are you sure it wasn’t Marshal’s 90 Division bet in WW2?
Translation- 90 divisions were all that could be spared from the labor force in the USA, so unit rotations weren’t an option.
And there’s alternatives to regional recruiting and units, certainly with active duty troops.
The “don’t talk to the newbie’s” and the horrific results of individual replacements was known in the summer of 1944 in Europe. The German Officers were horrified at how the Americans misspent men.
Also to not rotate units but send replacements to the line is sociopathic indifference and incompetence, not humanitarian.
I will admit the regional men wiped out is a new angle I have not heard of before- however with a National Army this isn’t a factor. Not to mention if the replacements sent to the line system instead of rotating back and acclimating replacements is done it defeats the purpose. Still dead, gone or wounded.
I think we’re just a commodity managed by sociopath midwits, really. Or Mismanaged.
But that’s just experience.
I think we need to stick with tried and true, and nothing spoils armies like academia in uniform, not even war so…. misleads….
I think what the Modern US Military lacks are those who are “brilliant in the Basics”. Especially for the US Army, there is little institutional training in what the day to day job is for an Officer, in garrison and the field.
For ROTC Specifically, we teach cadets infantry tactics and procedures for 4 years, and then send them to their officer schools where they learn theory but not application; unless you go into a combat field, your 4 years has little bearing on what your job actually is other than “conceptualizing your role in the battle”. It is expected that an officer learns on the job, which leads to almost random outcomes in knowledge, experience, and competency.
Brilliance in the basics is hard to come by even at the senior levels.
Aside, Russia likely will come out of the conflict with the most experienced armed force in the world for conducting LSCO, since they actually have conducted it and have real experience, where the US Military has virtually no experience in it and seniors are still accustomed to the COIN fight.
“It is expected that an officer learns on the job, “
I know. Personally, despite having prior enlisted.
We’re the only army that does this, every other army the officer candidates or junior officer is mentored on the job by a superior. A Platoon commander in the British army is a Captain, he has subalterns (Lieutenants) being trained working for him.
A company Commander is a Major, and so on.
In the German Army the Fahnrich (Cadet) Officer Candidates serve in the Platoon under the Platoon leader and yes in war.
What we do is toss people in and see who floats, sadly it’s often not the competent nor the brave.
It’s known and that it’s not corrected makes this error suspiciously look like policy.
Hackworth's entire corpus of writings on his time in Vietnam can be summed up by "superiors who thought they were still in Korea." Indeed, maybe the entire war could be characterized that way.
Like superiors who still think they are in Iraq or Afghanistan.
This has a point of experiences may vary, - however before we condemn breaking units in -
let’s compare that to the American individual replacement system of 1944 through Vietnam, where soldiers are treated as a commodity to be used up , turning in casualty ratios far above what most armies consider acceptable. This isn’t quite what you are saying… however… as the previous vicious practice I described existed for decades and indeed we see it now in our proxy in Ukraine , it is the real alternative. To simply feed units into the maw as they are mere numbers to echelons above is the default.
The fighting secret of the German army in WW2 was the German soldier was a rested soldier, at least until the end.
The American army horrified its contemporaries the way it drove its soldiers until they were used up. To those above we are a commodity by default, this must be checked by any means necessary, regardless of its drawbacks.
It may be true that slow wars create some bad habits, but at least they’re alive long enough to learn something.
I assume that this tendency was a straightforward extension of Taylorism into military affairs.
😂🫡 sadly in a way yes.
Not really the military, they just saluted the flag and kept marching on.
The 90 division bet - meaning the absolute bare minimum of American Divisions- was forced on Marshall. He asked for 265 divisions. FDR said no , and FDR had a point, we needed a labor force. Remember that the balance between labor and meat to the front haunts the Germans and British in both wars. This was industrial warfare, it’s a hard choice. There’s absolutely something to be said for arming and fueling our allies (our biggest contributions to the USSR being trucks, jeeps, fuel). So keeping the others supplied and providing comparatively less ground forces is a powerful and winning argument. BARELY.
But the choice means no rotation of units. The results were visible immediately in 1944.
The issue persisted until Desert Storm, when stop loss was implemented.
The terrible part is this but symptom and not disease.
Sadly America is dominated by those who see people as a commodity. Not unique to America, not Capitalism…
… moreover they don’t know it’s wrong, either.
The best solution is forcing anyone who has any say or vote to fight or share the risk. That’s the disconnect you know…. And it’s far from just America or the military. Skin in the game or you are nothing.
Harsh but fair and effective.
We fought long hours, forcing soldiers into continuous cycles of unrest, in Iraq and Afghanistan. While our adversaries fought “Siesta Wars”.
Excellent point
Interesting comments, especially about how cohorts often apply their experiences and leadership/tactical knowledge under new conditions. I've observed how the rotation by brigade for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the dependence on Forward Operating Bases have degraded some of the field skills that continuous maneuver operations demand. Serving officers wrote about the degradation in field artillery unit skills for example.
I note the comment on individual replacement vs unit replacement. The US Army learned its lesson in both the Civil War and to a lesser extent, WWI, where regionally recruited units were decimated, leaving rural communities with little or no returning veterans to take up the plow and run the general store. We went to individual replacements after that, expecting that veterans in the unit would help mentor and train the new replacements. Two drawbacks to that -- when bulk replacements (more than 10-15% of unit strength) show up, there usually aren't enough NCOs remaining to do the mentoring and training. The second drawback was revealed in VN -- newbies were avoided because they made mistakes that endangered the unit and in many squads/platoons, the concept was if the newbie lasted six weeks, then he was worth establishing a relationship with.
Are you sure it wasn’t Marshal’s 90 Division bet in WW2?
Translation- 90 divisions were all that could be spared from the labor force in the USA, so unit rotations weren’t an option.
And there’s alternatives to regional recruiting and units, certainly with active duty troops.
The “don’t talk to the newbie’s” and the horrific results of individual replacements was known in the summer of 1944 in Europe. The German Officers were horrified at how the Americans misspent men.
Also to not rotate units but send replacements to the line is sociopathic indifference and incompetence, not humanitarian.
I will admit the regional men wiped out is a new angle I have not heard of before- however with a National Army this isn’t a factor. Not to mention if the replacements sent to the line system instead of rotating back and acclimating replacements is done it defeats the purpose. Still dead, gone or wounded.
I think we’re just a commodity managed by sociopath midwits, really. Or Mismanaged.
But that’s just experience.
I think we need to stick with tried and true, and nothing spoils armies like academia in uniform, not even war so…. misleads….