Patton auf Deutsch

Letter of Instruction Number 2

Introduction to the translation of Patton’s Letter of Instruction Number 2

On 4 February 1945, an intelligence unit of the German Air Force made a translation of Letter of Instruction Number 2, a circular that Lieutenant General George S. Patton had sent to the officers commanding the army corps, divisions, and separate units of the Third Army. To be more precise, the Evaluation [Auswertestelle] of the Foreign Air Forces West division of the Intelligence [Ic] department of Air Force Headquarters [Luftwaffenführungsstab] translated a letter of instruction, promulgated by Major General Leonard T. Gerow, then the commanding general of V Corps, on 17 April 1944. The latter document contained both the full text of Patton’s original letter and an introduction which admonished readers to pay close attention to the counsels that it gave.

The introduction to the German translation does not indicate when, or where, the letter sent out by V Corps had been found. The late date of the translation, however, suggests the possibility that it was captured by German forces during the Ardennes Offensive.

The copy of the translation preserved by the Federal military archive at Freiburg contains of a number of marks made in blue pencil. While a few of these are words (which, alas, I have not been able to decipher) and punctuation marks, most underline specific statements. In most instances, underlining merely draws attention to a word, phrase, or statement. When, however, underlining is combined with an exclamation point, a question mark, or a marginal comment, it seems to suggest disagreement.

The material that follows is a verbatim copy of the English-language text of Patton’s original Letter of Instruction Number 2. Material that was underlined in the German version is printed in italic type. In cases where underlining was accompanied by a punctuation mark, that mark is shown in brackets.

I. General

1. This letter stresses those tactical and administrative usages which combat experience has taught myself and the officers who have served under me to consider vital.

2. You will not simply mimeograph this and call it a day. You are responsible that these usages become habitual in your command.

II. Discipline

1. There is only one sort of discipline; perfect discipline. Men cannot have good battle

discipline and poor administrative discipline.

2. Discipline is based on pride in the profession of arms, on meticulous attention to details, and on mutual respect and confidence. Discipline must be a habit so ingrained that it is stronger than the excitement of battle or the fear of death.

3. The history of our invariably victorious armies demonstrates that we are the best soldiers in the world. This should make your men proud. This should make you proud. This should imbue your units with unconquerable self confidence and pride in demonstrated ability.

4. Discipline can only be obtained when all officers are so imbued with the sense of their awful obligation to their men and to their country that they cannot tolerate negligences. Officers who fail to correct errors or to praise excellence are valueless in peace and dangerous misfits in war.

5. Officers must assert themselves by example and by voice. They must be preeminent in courage, deportment, and dress.

6. One of the primary purposes of discipline is to produce alertness. A man who is so lethargic that he fails to salute will fall an easy victim to an enemy.

7. Combat experience has proven that ceremonies, such as formal guard mounts, formal retreat formations, and regular and supervised reveille formations are a great help and, in some cases, essential to prepare men and officers for battle, to give them that perfect discipline, that smartness of appearance, that alertness without which battles cannot be won.

8. In the Third Army, when troops are not in the actual combat zone nor engaged in tactical exercises, or range firing, etc., Corps and separate Division commanders will see:

a. That regular reveille formations be held, in attendance at which there will be a minimum of one officer per company or similar unit, and in addition thereto when practicable, a minimum of one field officer per regiment or separate battalion.

b. That it shall be customary for all organizations to hold formal retreat under arms. Attendance, in addition to the prescribed enlisted men, shall be all officers of company grade. In the case of regiments and separate battalions, a minimum of one field officer.

c. That in the case where music is available and it is practicable from a billeting standpoint, frequent regimental and battalion retreat parades and similar ceremonies will be held.

d. That unit and organizational guard shall be performed strictly in accordance with FM 265. When music is available, formal guard mounts will be held frequently.

e. That officers in formation wear a uniform analogous to that worn by the enlisted men, and that all officers participate in all drills and marches at all times with their organizations or units. This includes marching to and from training areas and ranges.

9. Officers are always on duty and their duty extends to every individual, junior to themselves, in the U. S. Army, not only to members of their own organization.

10. Americans, with arms in their hands, are fools as well as cowards to surrender. If they fight on, they will conquer.

11. Cases of misbehavior before the enemy will be brought before General Court Martial and tried under the 75th Article of War. It has been my experience that many Courts Martial are prone to view this most heinous offense, for which the punishment of death may be inflicted, in too lenient a manner. They should realize that the lives of troops are saved by punishment of initial offenders. Cowardice is a disease and must be checked before it becomes epidemic.

III. Tactical Usages

1. General

a. Combat Principles:

(1) There is no approved solution to any tactical situation.

(2) There is only one tactical principle which is not subject to change. It is, “To so use the means at hand to inflict the maximum amount of wounds, death, and destruction on the enemy in the minimum of time.”

(3) In battle, casualties vary directly with the time you are exposed to effective fire. Your own fire reduces the effectiveness and volume of the enemy's fire, while rapidity of attack shortens the time of exposure. A pint of sweat will save a gallon of blood!

(4) Battles are won by fighting the enemy. Fear is induced by inflicting death and wounds on him. Death and wounds are produced by fire. Fire from the rear is more deadly and three times more effective than fire from the front, but to get fire behind the enemy, you must hold him by frontal fire and move rapidly around his flank. Frontal attacks against prepared positions should be avoided if possible.

(5) “Catch the enemy by the nose with fire and kick him in the pants with fire emplaced through movement.”

(6) Hit hard soon, that is with two battalions up in a regiment; or two divisions up in a corps, or two corps up in an army; the idea being to develop your maximum force at once before the enemy can develop his.

(7) You can never be too strong. Get every man and every gun you can secure, provided it does not unduly delay your attack. The German is the champion digger.[?]

(8) The larger the force and the more violence you use in an attack, whether it be men, tanks, or ammunition, the smaller will be your proportional losses. [?]

(9) Never yield ground. It is cheaper to hold what you have than to retake what you have

lost. Never move troops to the rear for a rest or to reform at night, and in the daytime only where absolutely necessary. Such moves may produce a panic.

(10) Our mortars and our artillery are superb weapons when they are firing. When silent, they are junk. See that they fire!

b. Tactical Rules in Particular Subjects:

(1) Use roads to march on; fields to fight on. In France we will find roads mined or demolished in many places, certainly when we approach the enemy. When that happens, get off the roads and keep moving. But when the roads are available for use, you save time and effort by staying on them until shot off.

(2) Troops should not deploy into line until forced to do so by enemy fire.

(3) When you are advancing in broken country against possible tank attacks and using the leap frog method described in my Sicilian Notes, be sure to keep the antitank guns well up.

(4) In mountain country secure the heights. This is best done by daylight reconnaissance followed by night attack of a platoon reinforced at dawn twilight.

(5) In forcing a pass secure the heights first. There are always trails leading to the rear of hills. Remember that inviting avenues of approach are invariably defended, and an advance by such lanes, without securing the heights covering them, is suicidal.

(6) The effect of mines is largely mental. Not over 10 percent of our casualties come from then. When they are encountered they must be passed through or around. There are not enough mines in the world to cover the whole country. It is cheaper to make a detour than to search; however, the engineers should start clearing the straight road while the advance elements continue via the detour. See that all types of troops have mine detectors and know how to use them. You MUST, repeat, MUST get through!

(7) Never permit a unit to dig in until the final objective is reached, then dig, wire, and mine. [indecipherable word in margin]

(8) Slit trenches in artillery will be placed within ten yards of guns. They will not be placed under trees as these induce air bursts. Camouflage nets must be rigged so that when they catch fire they can immediately be pulled off.

(9) Take plenty of time to set up an attack. It takes at least two hours to prepare an infantry battalion to execute a properly coordinated attack. Shoving them in too soon produces useless losses.

(10) In battle, small forces (platoons, companies, and even battalions) can do one of three things; go forward, halt, or run. If they halt or run, they will be an even easier target. Therefore, they must go forward. When caught under fire, particularly of artillery, advance out of it; never retreat from it. Artillery very seldom shortens it's range.

(11) Security detachments must get out further, and must stay out at night. One radio car well off the road, but where it can see the road, or where a member of the crew can observe the road from close quarters, can send information which will be vital.

(12) We are too slow in putting out minefields and in wiring in positions for all around defense. More training should be devoted to mine laying and mine removal.

(13) A battalion of 4.2 chemical mortars, when available, should be attached to an infantry division. An infantry regiment in combat should have a 4.2 chemical company attached.

c. General Training

(1) More emphasis will be placed on the hardening of men and officers. All soldiers and officers should be able to run a mile with combat pack in ten minutes and march eight miles in two hours. [!] When soldiers are in actual contact with the enemy, it is almost impossible to maintain physical condition, but if the physical condition is right before they gain contact, it will not fall off sufficiently during contact to be detrimental.

(2) Much time is wasted in mounting and dismounting mortars and machine guns. Standing gun drill will be practiced so that the operation will be automatic and can be accomplished in the dark. The ladder method of ranging with mortars is recommended.

(3) Our ability to fight at night, as opposed to moving into position at night for a dawn attack, is pitiably bad. We must learn to execute the attack in the dark.

(4) Sharpen axes, pickaxes, and shovels now and keep them sharp.

(5) Battles are fought by platoons and squads. Place emphasis on small unit combat instruction so that it is conducted with the same precision as close order drill. A good solution applied with vigor NOW is better than a perfect solution ten minutes later.[!]

(6) In instruction from the squad to the regiment, sand tables should be used, and the officer or noncom being instructed should give the actual orders he will give in combat. Sand tables need not be complicated. A piece of ground in the lee of a building is just as good and much simpler.

(7) Officers and men must know their equipment. They must train with the equipment they intend to use in battle. Equipment must be in the best operational condition when taken to the Theater of Operations.

d. Guides for Officers

(1) Officers must possess self confidence and the confidence of their men. Two of the best ways of producing this is meticulously conducted close order drill, conducted by officers, and platoon marches of 48 to 60 hours during which the platoon is wholly on it's own.

(2) In the first actions, new troops must receive aggressive leadership by all grades, including general officers who must be seen in the front line during action.

(3) The Adjutant General or Secretary to the General Staff must keep for the immediate information of the Commanding General a list showing casualties, materiel losses, prisoners of war, captured materiel, and replacements of both men and materiel received. Two lists are necessary. The first one based on rumor; the second one corrected by data. The first one will be found surprisingly close to the second one.

(4) Note the time of your requests for, and time of arrival of, all artillery and air support missions called for. If support fails to arrive, so note.

(5) There is a universal failure to repeat oral orders back. This failure is certain to result in grave errors.

(6) Messages and orders must use concise, military verbiage.

(7) Push wire communications to the limit. A wire phone is worth three radios for both speed and security.

(8) Battalion and company commanders fail to use runners and “walki–talki” radios. They frequently fail to have runners with or near them.

(9) Military Police at road junctions must have a map or diagram showing the points to which various roads lead and the units to be found on them.

(10) Don't place large radio sets near CP's if the CP's are to be in position more than six hours. If radios must be used for longer periods, put them well away, scatter them, and use remote control.

e. Prisoners

German prisoners over 40 talk more easily than the younger ones. They must be examined, separately, and not returned to the cages where the young ones are. Prisoners other than Germans usually talk freely and inaccurately. They, too, should be examined out of the hearing of, and later separated from, the young Nazis.

f. Needless Firing

The needless firing of artillery will be checked by the senior artillery officer.

g. Needless Requirements

There is a tendency for the chain of command to overload junior officers with excessive requirements in the way of training and reports. You will alleviate this burden by eliminating non essential demands.

2. Infantry

a. Infantry must move in order to close with the enemy. It must shoot in order to move. When physical targets are not visible, the fire of all infantry weapons must search the area probably occupied by the enemy. Use marching fire. It reduces the accuracy of his fire and increases our confidence. Shoot short. Ricochets make nastier sounds and wounds. To halt under fire is folly. To halt under fire and not fire back is suicide. Move forward out of fire. Officers must set the example.

b. The heavy weapons set the pace. In the battalion the heavy weapons company paces the battalion. In the regiment the cannon company paces the regiment, but it is the function of the rifles and light machine guns to see that the heavy weapons have a chance to move. In other words, the rifles and machine guns move the heavy weapons in to do the killing.

c. Mortars use great quantities of ammunition. The 81mm will fire 800 rounds and a 60mm 500 rounds in 24 hours. To provide this ammunition, transport of all kinds must be utilized, and infantry riflemen in the vicinity of the mortars should each carry one round which they can dump at a pre-designated spot on going into the fire fight. When not on the move, all mortars, machine guns, and antitank guns of the infantry must be emplaced to fire.

d. Antitank guns should be placed where they cannot see or be seen beyond their lethal antitank range unless they are being used in the role of light artillery.

e. Few men are killed by the bayonet; many are scared of it. Bayonets should be fixed when the fire fight starts. Bayonets must be sharpened by the individual soldier. The German hates the bayonet and is inferior to our men with it.[?] Our men should know this.

f. The M1 rifle is the most deadly rifle in the world. If you cannot see the enemy, you can at least shoot at the place where he is apt to be. g. Flat trajectory fire against machine guns must be delivered near and parallel to the axis of enemy fire. This pins him down until the grenadiers with bomb and bayonet can kill him from behind.

h. Fire distribution is practically nonexistent in our army, with the result that those portions of the enemy who are visible receive all the fire, while those portions who are not visible, fire on our men with perfect impunity. This defect will be corrected.

i. The infantry battalion is the smallest unit which can be sent on a separate mission. When so used, it always is desirable to reinforce it with artillery, antitank guns, AA guns, and if possible, tanks and engineers.

j. Armored infantry should not attack mounted, it should use it's vehicles to deploy mounted and also to assemble from deployed formation.

k. Night attacks mean attacks during darkness or by moonlight. On moonless nights the attack should start two and a half hours before dawn twilight; on moonlight nights with the moon. Night attacks must be preceded by careful day reconnaissance and ample warning. Limited objectives must be sought and must be easily recognizable in the dark. Attack formation is in column or line of columns. Distances and intervals are reduced. Depth is necessary.

l. Supporting fires must be arranged first to attack the enemy after our infantry has been discovered, and second to destroy counter attacks at dawn. Assaulting columns are preceded by a security detachment, which in turn is preceded by a patrol. The security detachment and patrol are absorbed when contact is made. In addition to the assaulting columns, a reserve should be available for exploitation after daylight. Countersign and challenge and identification marks on helmet or sleeve are necessary. Land marks and compass bearings to objective are necessary. Offensive grenades should be used. When discovered, open rapid fire and make as much noise as possible, while rushing in to use the bayonet.

m. The defense will consist of mutually supporting small groups arranged in depth and completely wired in. Mines will be placed.

n. All infantry officers must be able to observe and direct artillery fire.

3. Artillery

a. 65 to 75 percent of all artillery targets are provided by forward observers. The same percentage of tactical information originates with these observers, but much of the information of both characters the observers get, comes from the infantry. Therefore the forward observer must be in intimate association with the infantry. He must be under the control of the artillery liaison officer with the battalion. Artillery officers with infantry do not return to their batteries at night.

b. As soon as a position is captured, the forward observer must report through the liaison officer which of the possible channels of hostile counter attack he is in a position to cover with observed fire. This information must go to the infantry battalion commander.

c. Observers must be able to operate both by day and night. Use any caliber of gun at any time to hit any target of opportunity. For this reason forward observers for large calibers must be up.

d. Artillery observers on their own initiative will bring fire on enemy weapons firing on our infantry. Infantry officers are equally responsible to call for such fire.

e. Machine guns giving local protection to artillery must be sufficiently far out to prevent small arms fire from bothering the battery.

f. Construct dummy batteries. In choosing sites for them, avoid places where fire directed at them will adversely effect other arms.

g. Tank attacks can be stopped by artillery concentrations of white phosphorus and high explosives.

h. Artillery will be emplaced as far forward as possible and will move forward at every opportunity.

4. Armor

a. The primary mission of armored units is the attacking of infantry and artillery. The enemy's rear is the happy hunting ground for armor, use every means to get it there.

b. The tactical and technical training of our armored units is correct. Added emphasis should be put on tank crew training with a view to hitting the enemy first.

c. Against counter attacks, the offensive use of armor striking the flank is decisive. Hence, a deep penetration by infantry, whose rear is protected by armor, is feasible and safe.

d. There is no such thing as “tank country” in a restrictive sense. Some types of country are better than others, but tanks have to and can operate anywhere.[!]

e. The integrity of armored divisions should be preserved through the use of GHQ tank battalions for special close supporting missions with infantry.¹ On such missions the tanks should advance by bounds from cover to cover in rear of the infantry. They will only be exposed when the situation demands their intervention. In such cases they will attack in close association with the infantry.

5. Reconnaissance

a. Reconnaissance, particularly on the part of the infantry must be stressed, especially at night. It is necessary to secure information every night through the capture of prisoners and the observation of hostile actions. Good men must lead these patrols. Mechanized observation units should not be employed for security except in cases of dire emergency.

b. Junior officers of reconnaissance units must be very inquisitive. Their reports must be accurate and factual. Negative information is as important as positive information. Information must be transmitted in the clear by radio and at once. The location of the unit giving the information should, where possible, be in a modified code. The enemy should be located by a magnetic azimuth and range from the point of observation. All members of a reconnaissance unit should know what they are trying to do. The results of all reconnaissance obtained in front of one division must be transmitted to adjacent units.

c. Reconnaissance must not lose contact. At night, when not in contact, listening posts should be at least six miles in front of our lines. Day reconnaissance must be pushed until contact is made. The use of light tanks in night reconnaissance usually induces the enemy to fire and display his position.

IV. Anti-Aircraft and Anti-Tank

1. Anti-Aircraft

a. At least one, preferably self propelled, AA weapon should be attached to each company or battery of artillery, infantry, or tanks. There should be two at headquarters from the division up. The 155 and larger guns should have at least two AA mounts per battery. Owing to our air superiority, AA should never open fire until attacked. AA is also good for antitank.

2. Anti-Tank

a. Towed antitank guns should be well to the front and located to cover likely avenues of enemy tank approach. They must be emplaced so that they cannot see or be seen beyond their lethal antitank range. Self propelled antitank weapons should be held in reserve to intervene against enemy armored attacks. They should locate routes to and firing positions from probable sites of future activities. All antitank guns should be trained to fire as artillery and be provided with a large proportion of high explosive shells.

V. Maintenance

1. Weapons will be kept in perfect order.

2. Preventive maintenance will be enforced. Particular attention should be given to tire pressure, lubrication, battery voltage, and water in radiators. Vehicles will be serviced and made operational before their crews rest. Vehicles will be marked in accordance with paragraph 614, AR 850-5.²

VI. Care of Men

1. Officers are responsible not only for the conduct of their men in battle, but also for their health and contentment when not fighting. An officer must be the last man to take shelter from fire, and the first to move forward. Similarly, he must be the last man to look after his own comfort at the close of a march. He must see that his men are cared for. The officer must constantly interest himself in the rations of the men. He should know his men so well that any sign of sickness or nervous strain will be apparent to him, and he can take such action as may be necessary.

2. He must look after his men's feet, see that they have properly fitting shoes in good condition, and that their socks fit; loose or tight socks make sore feet. He must anticipate change of weather and see that proper clothing and footgear is asked for and obtained.

3. Field and evacuation hospitals must be kept as close to the front as enemy fire permits. The shorter a haul of the wounded man to the hospital the better his chances for recovery.

4. Hospitals should be placed in the open and clearly marked. Do not permit liaison planes or groups of vehicles to park near them. Such action gives the enemy an excuse for attacking.

5. The successful soldier wins his battles cheaply so far as his own casualties are concerned, but he must remember that violent attacks, although costly at the time, save lives in the end. He must remember that replacements need special attention and he must see that they get acclimatized to their new units as quickly and harmoniously as possible.

Source: The German translation was found on the website of Federal Military Archive (BA/MA), RH 2/1839. The English-language text was derived from a comparison of texts found on various websites. (The most accurate of these texts was the one posted by the Patton Society.)

1. GHQ = General Headquarters GHQ tank battalions were units that, rather than being permanently assigned to divisions, were attached to formations for short periods of time.

2. AR = Army Regulation Army Regulation 850-5 mandated both the painting of white stars on US motor vehicles and the use of a combination of letters and numbers to indicate the unit to which truck, tank, car, or motor carriage belonged.