Marine Infantry Regiments (1919-1932)
Marine Infantry Regiments (1919-1932)
Battalion: An Organizational Study of United States Infantry
The estate of the late John Sayen has graciously given the Tactical Notebook permission to serialize his study of the organizational evolution of American infantry battalions. The author’s preface and other previously posted parts of this book may be found via the following links:
The tables under which the Fourth and Fifth Brigades were to be organized were never officially published. However, a surviving verbal description of them shows that they differed considerably from contemporary Army peace-strength infantry brigades. An Army brigade consisted merely of two infantry regiments plus a small brigade headquarters and headquarters company (totaling six officers and 46 enlisted men). The Marine brigade, on the other hand, featured a much larger headquarters company, and a brigade supply company (the latter being motorized and including at least one truck for each of the brigade’s rifle companies and two for each machinegun company). This was in keeping with its intent to operate independently rather than as part of an infantry division.
Each Marine infantry regiment did include a headquarters company and three infantry battalions. However, the headquarters company comprised only the regimental staff, an orderly section, and the band (28 enlisted). A signal company (soon changed to a platoon) seems to have been authorized later but intelligence, 37mm gun, and Stokes mortar platoons were to be added only in wartime. Likewise, the regimental supply company (four officers and 96 men) would also be only a wartime augmentation. The three infantry battalions had no headquarters companies. In wartime, they could expect to get detachments from the regimental headquarters company as they had done in 1918.
The fighting element of each battalion would consist of only three rifle companies of two platoons each. Each platoon was to have six squads grouped into two sections. All machinegun companies in the Marine brigade would be concentrated into a brigade machinegun battalion. Since there had to be a machinegun company for each infantry battalion, the First Machinegun Battalion would have required three companies and Sixth Machinegun Battalion six. This arrangement imitated the British use of a specialized machinegun corps and would have facilitated training. The Marines considered it superior to the organizations used by the French and (after 1920) the United States Armies, which relied on having a machinegun company organic to each infantry battalion.
As with a Marine rifle company, a Marine machinegun company’s 125 men (plus officers) formed a company headquarters and two platoons with up to six squads in each. Extra men insured tactical mobility in the absence of the draft animals that the Marines could not always provide. The companies would use a transport cart that could employ mules if any were available or could be manhandled if they were not. A recently deceased Major Cole was the designer. The Cole cart consisted of a lead element, or “caisson,” to which the trails were attached. It carried a large cargo container designed for ammunition or water. A trailing element called the “trailer” could carry an identical cargo container (with signal equipment or medical supplies) or a machinegun, 37mm gun, or Stokes mortar in lieu of a container. Both caisson and trailer were single axle vehicles using disk wheels with rubber tires. They could traverse a wide variety of terrain.[1]
Naturally, Congress was not going to fund the manpower needed to make these organizations possible. Moreover, there was undoubtedly pressure on the Marines to more closely conform their organizations to Army patterns. Before the end of 1921 and before the Fourth or Fifth Brigades had even been fully assembled, their organizational tables were revised. Tentative tables dated 21 August 1921 were tested at Quantico and recommended for adoption in January 1922. While only strength summaries of these tables survive in the Commandant’s correspondence files, they show a brigade with a large headquarters company (118 officers and men), a depot detachment (58 officers and men), two infantry regiments, and no machinegun battalion. The regiments conform to Army standards except that the Marine regimental and battalion headquarters companies were slightly, and the Marine machinegun companies moderately, larger. The Marine service company was smaller by 39 men. This was largely accounted for by reductions in the regimental band and the motorized transportation platoon. However, the Marine service company probably included a regimental pay section for which there was no Army equivalent.[2]
These tables were soon revised again. Indeed, changes to the changes were part of a continuous process of minor adjustments. Not only were tables drawn up for units operating within a brigade organization but tables also existed for independent regiments, battalions, and even companies. These usually required some sort of infusion of service troops but an independent company was supposed to be augmented by a weapons platoon with a 37mm gun squad, a Stokes mortar squad, and a section of two machineguns.[3]
The new Marine rifle companies (see Appendix 3.15), established in 1922 and modified somewhat in 1923, would change very little until the formation of the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) in 1934. The company’s two rifle platoons were exactly the same as their Army equivalents except for some differences in their enlisted ranks and titles (certain Marine privates were ranked as lance corporals during 1920-23). Platoon sergeants in Army companies were just the most senior sergeants in their respective platoons, but Marine platoon sergeants ranked as gunnery sergeants. The company headquarters included four “other duty” privates. Unlike Army “spare” privates, their arms and equipment were officially carried on the books of their parent unit. In 1925, a company signal corporal replaced one of these men. He took charge of the company messengers and visual signalers.[4]
Besides three rifle companies and a headquarters company, each Marine infantry battalion would have one of the new Marine machinegun companies (see Appendix 3.15). A Marine battalion’s machinegun company, though similar in layout to an Army company incorporated additional men in order to assure its mobility when draft animals were unavailable. This organization would, however, change substantially during 1925-1926.[5]
The new Marine battalion and regimental headquarters and headquarters companies were practically the same as those of the Army (see Appendices 3.15 and 3.16). In the case of the howitzer company, however, the Marines believed it important to maintain that unit’s three-platoon structure in order that there be one platoon available for attachment to each battalion in the regiment. This meant, of course, that howitzer platoons could only be of minimal size. A Marine regimental service company also differed significantly from its Army counterpart (see Appendix 3.17).
The Marine service company commander, in contrast to Army practice, was also the regimental supply officer (R-4. Its transportation platoon was much smaller and (at least in theory) motorized. Its headquarters platoon had just the office section (equivalent to the Army personnel or staff section) and the regimental band. To carry out the functions of the Army service company’s supply section the Marines used a supply platoon, the Army section’s functions being divided between a quartermaster (QM) section and a depot section. The Marine platoon also included pay and PX sections, which had no counterpart in an Army service company.
The vehicles in the transportation platoon are not described in any primary source that this author has been able to discover however the estimate shown in Appendix 3.17 is probably in keeping with normal practice. Although a regiment included no draft or riding animals in its permanent equipment, riding horses for the officers and senior noncommissioned officers not in the rifle companies, pack animals, and draft animals for the Cole carts could be issued if circumstances permitted, typically for operations in Haiti or the Dominican Republic.[6]
Although in retrospect the Marines’ decision to motorize their operating forces and use animal transport only by exception seems very advanced, the vehicles they had to choose from were very unsatisfactory. The standard FWD (four-wheel drive) truck was mechanically unsound and used excessive amounts of fuel. The heavier “Class B” or “Liberty” truck was better mechanically but even less capable of off-road operations. Five-ton full-tracked Holt tractors towing cargo trailers were available for cross-country movement. However, they were slow (ten miles per hour), burned 2.5 gallons of gas per mile, needed refueling every 15 to 20 miles, were difficult to maintain, noisy and fatiguing to drive, and wore out their tracks quickly on paved roads. In the fleet maneuvers of 1922-23 and later in China in 1926-27, both the tractors and the FWD trucks proved too heavy for easy handling by the Navy’s troop transports. In China, the FWD trucks could not even negotiate city streets and only the Liberty trucks, of which there were only three in the entire 3rd Marine Brigade, were usable in downtown Shanghai or Tienstin.
During the Civil War reenactments, which were largely publicity stunts put on in the Shenandoah Valley by the Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Regiments, heavy rains left the dirt roads impassable for any vehicles but the tractors. Even with the tractors, supplemented by the use of most of the infantry to push the trucks (or pull them with hand-lines), any vehicular movement was painfully slow. Had this been actual combat, the troops would have found themselves totally stranded and bereft of supplies. Just as sobering was the thought of how much worse this might have been in a poorly developed and largely roadless district in Asia or Latin America. Nevertheless, the even bleaker prospect of having to ship horses and mules by sea and then get them ashore without port facilities left the Marines with no recourse but to redouble their efforts to make their motorized transport work. Some relief was in sight. Tests of a two-ton tractor, which would be much easier to handle than the older five-ton model, had been encouraging. However, there was little hope of finding a satisfactory truck anytime soon.[7]
Meanwhile, manpower shortages and the need to maintain troops in Haiti and the Dominican Republic soon forced a further reorganization of the Expeditionary Forces. In April 1922, the Fourth Brigade on the East Coast disbanded. Its Fourth and Fifth Regiments went to the Third Brigade. The First Regiment disappeared, leaving behind only its signal and engineer companies and platoon of light tanks (which became independent). In August, the Second Brigade in the Dominican Republic reconfigured itself in anticipation of the local Marine organized and trained constabulary shouldering a greater share of the burden of policing the country. The Brigade went from three regiments to two, losing its Fifteenth Regiment and re-designating its Third Regiment as the First.[8]
In April 1923, the Second Brigade (see Appendix 3.19) reported its strength and organization to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. This has given us a description of how Marine brigade and regimental organizations might be modified for a constabulary mission when only limited manpower was available. The brigade at this time consisted of the First (formerly the Third) and Fourth Regiments, besides brigade headquarters and service companies. Each regiment was cut back to two battalions, one with two rifle companies and the other with three. Battalion headquarters companies remained at full strength, as did the available rifle companies, but instead of machinegun companies there was only a reduced strength machinegun platoon within each regimental headquarters company.
The guns were intended to defend key fixed posts in the unlikely event of a mass uprising. The gun crews could be smaller because they would seldom have to move their guns anywhere. Despite manpower shortages, each regiment retained its band. Skeletal howitzer companies also survived as training units, not just for howitzer weapons but for all military skills. Presumably they trained members of the native constabulary or Guardia in addition to, or instead of Marine recruits. The Marine Commandant, Major General Lejeune, had written in August 1922 to the commander of the Second Brigade suggesting he get rid of his regimental howitzer companies and instead set up a brigade-level howitzer or machinegun company to serve as his training center. The men saved could form another machinegun platoon or an armored car unit. The Commandant had, however, left the exact organization of the brigade to the discretion of its commander who evidently chose not to take his chief’s advice.[9]
The Second Brigade did not suffer from a lack of officers. It had nearly a full complement despite its shallowness in the enlisted ranks. Extra officers were needed for liaison duties with the native government and constabulary and to lead any patrols of 15 or more men. However, the main reason for the extra officers was that although Congress was actually paying for only about two thirds of the 27,400 enlisted men it had authorized, it did pay for nearly all the officers that it had promised. The resulting officer surplus employed many First World War veterans and enabled an unofficial staff to be set up at Marine Corps Headquarters, despite the fact that the latter was (on paper) still operating at its 1817 establishment. Also, the surplus helped to create an officer reserve for a future war.[10]
Editor’s Note: The format of the many appendices to this work fit poorly with Substack. For that reason, I have placed them on a PDF file that can be found at Military Learning LibraryLejue.
[1] Ibid. See also “Professional Notes - The Marine Corps Machinegun Cart,” Marine Corps Gazette September 1920 pp. 317-318; “Professional Notes - The New Army Organization Tables,” Marine Corps Gazette March 1921 pp. 117-119.
[2] Letter from the Commanding General at Marine Base Quantico to the Major General Commandant 5 January 1922, found in Record Group 127 Ellsdran file number 2835-40, US National Archives Washington DC.
[3] Ibid; and see also Letter from the Major General Commandant to the Department of Medicine and Surgery 18 June 1924, Record Group 127, Ellsdran file number 2385-45 US National Archives Washington DC.
[4] US Army Table of Organization 28P “Rifle Company, Infantry Regiment” peace strength op cit; “Table of Distribution for the Second Brigade to be effective 1 May 1923” Enclosed in a letter from the Commanding General Second Brigade to the Major General Commandant dated 1 April 1923, Record Group 127 Ellsdran File 2385-45 US National Archives Washington DC.
[5] US Army Table of Organization 29P “Machinegun Company, Infantry Regiment” peace strength op cit; Letter from the Commanding General at Marine Base Quantico to the Major General Commandant 5 January 1922 op cit; and Letter from the Major General Commandant to Post and Station Commanders, 6 November 1923, enclosing tables of organization, including Table 21-P for a Marine Machinegun Company, Record Group 127 Ellsdran Fine 2385-45, US National Archives Washington DC.
[6] Letter from the Commanding General at Marine Base Quantico to the Major General Commandant 5 January 1922 op cit; and Letter from the Major General Commandant to Post and Station Commanders, 6 November 1923, enclosing tables of organization op cit.; see also regimental histories previously cited and Colonel Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller’s remarks about officers’ pack mules contained in United States War Office Fighting on Guadalcanal, (Washington DC USGPO 1943) which was a compendium of various “lessons learned” gleaned from statements of those involved in the Guadalcanal fighting; Puller refers to some of his earlier experiences.
[7] 1stLt Vernon E. Megree USMC “Motor Transportation for Expeditionary Units” (Quantico Virginia Marine Corps Gazette December 1928) pp. 271-276; Letter from the Commanding General at Quantico Virginia to the Major General Commandant dated 9 July 1926 about the need for additions to the tables of equipment for antiaircraft battalions due to excessive fuel use by the tractors, Record Group 127 Ellsdran File 2385-25/4 US National Archives Washington DC; and Buckner A Brief History of the Tenth Marines op cit pp. 27 and 39.
[8] Johnstone, A Brief History of the First Marines, op cit p 12; Frank, A Brief History of the Third Marines, op cit pp. 4-5; Letter from the Major General Commandant to the Brigade Commander, First Brigade USMC, Haiti, 25 April 1922, Record Group 127 Ellsdran Fine 2385-60, US National Archives Washington DC; and Letter from the Major General Commandant to Post and Station Commanders, 6 November 1923, enclosing tables of organization, op cit.
[9] Letter from the Major General Commandant to the Commanding General of the Second Brigade, 2 August 1922 and a table showing the distribution of the Second Brigade, dated at the Brigade Headquarters, Santo Domingo City on 7 April and to become effective 1 May 1923; both items in Record Group 127 Ellsdran folder 2385-45, US National Archives Washington DC.
[10] Ibid; and see Heinl op cit, pp. 255 and 611; on the officer surplus and enlisted shortage see Letter from the Director of the Division of Operations and Training to the Major General Commandant on the need to modify tables of organization (peace strength) 27 February 1928, Record Group 127 Ellsdran Files 2385-30 and 2385-25/5-3 US National Archives Washington DC.