Fascinating ideas and an even more fascinating paper behind it. I am going to presume that the “trains battalion” in the organization chart would contain the medical and other sustainment units needed for the Infantry Division, as the discussion of the Cavalry Division does state that (the scan of the original paper is tough to read in spots and I could have missed it). Three other things stand out to me as a DAGB:
1. Patton either did not like, or completely forgot, about mortars as there are none of any flavor anywhere. The point made earlier by James Ackerman about von Schell and his dislike of mortars are valid here again. Patton must have agreed with him.
2. There is no provision for a communications unit of any kind that I can find. Any unit blessed with this amount of reconnaissance formations, ground and air, would want to know about enemy units, positions, dispositions and movements as rapidly as possible in order to see first and act first. Messengers alone would not sufficiently enable that in an already partly mechanized - motorized world.
3. The Artillery, both Field and Anti-aircraft, stops at the brigade or battalion level. There is no General Support Artillery battalion, no dedicated Anti-aircraft units and no Division Artillery HQ, unless it is contained in the Division HQ. This deprives the Division Commander the ability to protect his forces, immediately influence the close fight, coordinate with supporting artillery or to conduct any kind of a deep fight. You can’t always assume the Corps Artillery can support you.
Overall, this is a formation focused on mobility and the close fight at the expense of other issues. It would be at a severe disadvantage in open terrain (deserts, plains or steppes) or against a more motorized/mechanized opponent with more tanks, armored cars and artillery.
However, I can see how you could form an Operational Maneuver group for deep operations using the aviation unit, cavalry squadron, tank battalion and one the the brigade’s artillery battalions, but it would leave the rest of the division at a disadvantage unless it was really well dug in or in restricted terrain (I am assuming the engineer battalion could support the OMG’s mobility needs and the rest of the division’s counter mobility requirements).
Keeping in mind to fast forward, in 1940 the weakness was Command and IMHO the overclogged staffs.
This 2d point is sadly contemporary relating to us.
A good source for 1940 is Marc Bloc’s “Strange Defeat.” He was present and a Veteran of WW1.
The French moved at Garrison speed, and WW1 increments (moving HQ back 10-20 Kilometers in 1940 was futile in front of fast moving columns).
The phrase he used was “hardening of the arteries” as in too old leadership , but a general demoralization had already set in during the Phoney War. < this is also contemporary.
The Vickers tanks known to Patton would have been their 6 ton type which was widely exported - notably used by Poland (2 Vickers .303 machine guns or 1 short 37mm per tank) and that also formed the basis of the Soviet T-26 (which in later models mounted a 47mm gun with useful A/T capacity). P.S. I entirely agree with the earlier comments that note the lack of a Divisional field artillery battalion, and an AA/AT Bn, as a grave disadvantage, particularly in defence. Patton’s organisation seems more suited to an expeditionary force such as fielded by the USMC, where Brigades were expected to operate semi-independently chasing rebels round the jungle.
Fascinating ideas and an even more fascinating paper behind it. I am going to presume that the “trains battalion” in the organization chart would contain the medical and other sustainment units needed for the Infantry Division, as the discussion of the Cavalry Division does state that (the scan of the original paper is tough to read in spots and I could have missed it). Three other things stand out to me as a DAGB:
1. Patton either did not like, or completely forgot, about mortars as there are none of any flavor anywhere. The point made earlier by James Ackerman about von Schell and his dislike of mortars are valid here again. Patton must have agreed with him.
2. There is no provision for a communications unit of any kind that I can find. Any unit blessed with this amount of reconnaissance formations, ground and air, would want to know about enemy units, positions, dispositions and movements as rapidly as possible in order to see first and act first. Messengers alone would not sufficiently enable that in an already partly mechanized - motorized world.
3. The Artillery, both Field and Anti-aircraft, stops at the brigade or battalion level. There is no General Support Artillery battalion, no dedicated Anti-aircraft units and no Division Artillery HQ, unless it is contained in the Division HQ. This deprives the Division Commander the ability to protect his forces, immediately influence the close fight, coordinate with supporting artillery or to conduct any kind of a deep fight. You can’t always assume the Corps Artillery can support you.
Overall, this is a formation focused on mobility and the close fight at the expense of other issues. It would be at a severe disadvantage in open terrain (deserts, plains or steppes) or against a more motorized/mechanized opponent with more tanks, armored cars and artillery.
However, I can see how you could form an Operational Maneuver group for deep operations using the aviation unit, cavalry squadron, tank battalion and one the the brigade’s artillery battalions, but it would leave the rest of the division at a disadvantage unless it was really well dug in or in restricted terrain (I am assuming the engineer battalion could support the OMG’s mobility needs and the rest of the division’s counter mobility requirements).
That’s interesting!
Now do DeGaulle in the 1930s series.
Keeping in mind to fast forward, in 1940 the weakness was Command and IMHO the overclogged staffs.
This 2d point is sadly contemporary relating to us.
A good source for 1940 is Marc Bloc’s “Strange Defeat.” He was present and a Veteran of WW1.
The French moved at Garrison speed, and WW1 increments (moving HQ back 10-20 Kilometers in 1940 was futile in front of fast moving columns).
The phrase he used was “hardening of the arteries” as in too old leadership , but a general demoralization had already set in during the Phoney War. < this is also contemporary.
The Vickers tanks known to Patton would have been their 6 ton type which was widely exported - notably used by Poland (2 Vickers .303 machine guns or 1 short 37mm per tank) and that also formed the basis of the Soviet T-26 (which in later models mounted a 47mm gun with useful A/T capacity). P.S. I entirely agree with the earlier comments that note the lack of a Divisional field artillery battalion, and an AA/AT Bn, as a grave disadvantage, particularly in defence. Patton’s organisation seems more suited to an expeditionary force such as fielded by the USMC, where Brigades were expected to operate semi-independently chasing rebels round the jungle.