If you liked this article, you may be interested in a much longer piece on the subject published by Pacem magazine some years ago. The journal has, alas, gone the way of the longship. The article, however, can be found at the Military Learning Library
Never been in uniform, so I only know about these things from books and personal anecdote. But it seems odd that doctrine would not be structured with a modicum of flexibility, at least to the extent of taking the enemy's responsive capabilities into consideration. Siting water-cooled, crew-served machine guns on a forward slope against, say, an enemy equipped with assegais and knobkerries is one thing. Siting the descendants of such machine guns in full view of an enemy with modern artillery seems crazy to the non-specialist. Are not all such decisions regarding the employment of weapons necessarily situation-specific -- and more particularly, enemy-specific? How can they not be?
This brings to mind the stupidity of the 8th Air Force daylight bombing campaign planners who relied on bomber defensive weaponry to get the bombers through to target. This didn't work and hundred if not thousands of crew members were lost to the lethality of the Luftwaffe.
This could have all been prevented had the planners used some ingenuity and applied the concept of escort, which was available with the early P38 models that could travel long ranges.
However, so convinced were these planners that they kept sending bombers out without escorts only to be continually maimed and destroyed in the air.
I suspect that near mutiny among aircraft had to occur before the planners would give up on their hopes of an invincible bomber formation that could get to target on its own...
On the question of flexibility. I would like to suggest two books, one new and the other a little dated, but by the same author, of which our host and administrator of this website is mentioned.
1. Read The Maneuver Warfare Handbook, dated around 1985/86 by William S Lind. 2. Read the relatively updated version - 2023? titled The New Maneuver Warfare Handbook, by the same author. BOTH OF THESE BOOKS ADVANCE theory, and yes, if applied and trained can and do work. With that said, a lot of people disagreed with Lind on a lot because of his emphasis on Generational Warfare. What they really should be looking at his content instead of getting wrapped around the axel on the plausibility of his definitions of generational warfare.
Also, on the question of flexibility. My experience in Afghanistan is that the US Marine Corp and the US National Guard Units that were Federalized for deployment were the most flexible and adaptive, although that flexibility was always under fire by ISAF. BECASUE they frequently adjusted the TTPs and response to the desired outcome. In essence ISAF and senior Combatant Commanders talked the talk but did not know how to walk the walk. ISAF was mostly about kinetic Ops.
In an historical work completed by Robert Doughty, Retired General and former Chief of the US Army Center of Military History wrote a book titled "The Breaking Point" and defied convention when he stated that the Germans did so well in France because of training, leadership and flexibility/initiative. In essence he said that the French were well equipped and trained and did everything right - but - it was always too late because they could not adapt to the situation as fast as the German Commanders- even in despite of Hitlers meddling.
And on Korea? My personal favorite is "This kind of War by T.R. Fehrenbach. And in my humble opinion, the blame for Korea falls squarely on that arrogant pos McArthur for ignoring his Presidential orders on the Yalu and the 38th Parallel
If you liked this article, you may be interested in a much longer piece on the subject published by Pacem magazine some years ago. The journal has, alas, gone the way of the longship. The article, however, can be found at the Military Learning Library
https://tinyurl.com/4zz2xntp
Another instance of map not territory.
Never been in uniform, so I only know about these things from books and personal anecdote. But it seems odd that doctrine would not be structured with a modicum of flexibility, at least to the extent of taking the enemy's responsive capabilities into consideration. Siting water-cooled, crew-served machine guns on a forward slope against, say, an enemy equipped with assegais and knobkerries is one thing. Siting the descendants of such machine guns in full view of an enemy with modern artillery seems crazy to the non-specialist. Are not all such decisions regarding the employment of weapons necessarily situation-specific -- and more particularly, enemy-specific? How can they not be?
This brings to mind the stupidity of the 8th Air Force daylight bombing campaign planners who relied on bomber defensive weaponry to get the bombers through to target. This didn't work and hundred if not thousands of crew members were lost to the lethality of the Luftwaffe.
This could have all been prevented had the planners used some ingenuity and applied the concept of escort, which was available with the early P38 models that could travel long ranges.
However, so convinced were these planners that they kept sending bombers out without escorts only to be continually maimed and destroyed in the air.
I suspect that near mutiny among aircraft had to occur before the planners would give up on their hopes of an invincible bomber formation that could get to target on its own...
On the question of flexibility. I would like to suggest two books, one new and the other a little dated, but by the same author, of which our host and administrator of this website is mentioned.
1. Read The Maneuver Warfare Handbook, dated around 1985/86 by William S Lind. 2. Read the relatively updated version - 2023? titled The New Maneuver Warfare Handbook, by the same author. BOTH OF THESE BOOKS ADVANCE theory, and yes, if applied and trained can and do work. With that said, a lot of people disagreed with Lind on a lot because of his emphasis on Generational Warfare. What they really should be looking at his content instead of getting wrapped around the axel on the plausibility of his definitions of generational warfare.
Also, on the question of flexibility. My experience in Afghanistan is that the US Marine Corp and the US National Guard Units that were Federalized for deployment were the most flexible and adaptive, although that flexibility was always under fire by ISAF. BECASUE they frequently adjusted the TTPs and response to the desired outcome. In essence ISAF and senior Combatant Commanders talked the talk but did not know how to walk the walk. ISAF was mostly about kinetic Ops.
In an historical work completed by Robert Doughty, Retired General and former Chief of the US Army Center of Military History wrote a book titled "The Breaking Point" and defied convention when he stated that the Germans did so well in France because of training, leadership and flexibility/initiative. In essence he said that the French were well equipped and trained and did everything right - but - it was always too late because they could not adapt to the situation as fast as the German Commanders- even in despite of Hitlers meddling.
And on Korea? My personal favorite is "This kind of War by T.R. Fehrenbach. And in my humble opinion, the blame for Korea falls squarely on that arrogant pos McArthur for ignoring his Presidential orders on the Yalu and the 38th Parallel