Perhaps… “failure to know exactly where battalion, brigade, and Division headquarters were greatly contributed to the confusion”
Perhaps the 62d army HQ at Stalingrad being across the Western river and within 1km or less of the front line trace contributed to their holding the line.
There’s nothing that says communications can’t be parallel along with command to the front trace, and if seen much easier to find.
We’re going to run into this problem because we became not just a colonial army but sort of a Raj NGO, and very bureaucratic once the war of movement stopped and the war of Public Relations began.
Nothing is essential to a command post except the Commander and Communications.
The 3ID Commander’s CP in the 2003 push to Baghdad was his HUMMV, a map and radio in his hand.
I mean essential to fighting, not the vast multiplicity of reports essential to rear echelon career relevance.
Perhaps… “failure to know exactly where battalion, brigade, and Division headquarters were greatly contributed to the confusion”
Perhaps the 62d army HQ at Stalingrad being across the Western river and within 1km or less of the front line trace contributed to their holding the line.
There’s nothing that says communications can’t be parallel along with command to the front trace, and if seen much easier to find.
We’re going to run into this problem because we became not just a colonial army but sort of a Raj NGO, and very bureaucratic once the war of movement stopped and the war of Public Relations began.
Nothing is essential to a command post except the Commander and Communications.
The 3ID Commander’s CP in the 2003 push to Baghdad was his HUMMV, a map and radio in his hand.
I mean essential to fighting, not the vast multiplicity of reports essential to rear echelon career relevance.
Swish! Thanks for sharing.