Großdeutschland 1942 (III)
Großdeutschland 1942 (III)
Liaison, Logistics, and Intelligence
Part III
11.) Cooperation with the Air Force.
The division has, on many occasions, successfully cooperated with many units of the Air Force. The essential precondition for this cooperation with the Air Force was a good air liaison officer [Fliegerverbingdungsoffizier] with a reliable communications link to the Air Force unit he represents.
During a rapid advance the situation changes so rapidly that a request [for close air support] that takes hours to fulfill is no longer practical. The most successful technique puts a forward air controller [Stukaleitoffizier] at either the division command post or the point of the attack.
In addition it is important for the planes to be able to visibly identify friendly troops. This requires continuous command attention. National flags and yellow panels belong on the vehicles at the point of the attack, not those of the combat trains [Troß.]. The best recognition signal is the red-orange smoke grenade, which, unfortunately, does not last long enough. Units must be instructed to only use these signals in the front line, though not in the vicinity of battalion or company command posts.
Smoke shells have proved themselves effective as a means of marking targets.
The troops must be instructed not to overvalue the effect of Stukas against an enemy in a fortified position and as a result, in the course of an attack, leave their own cover and thereby betraying their own position.
The troops should not place too much value on the results of air reconnaissance or let it lead to the neglect of ground reconnaissance. The Russian is a master of camouflage and rarely betrays himself to enemy reconnaissance aircraft.
Example.
On day before the taking of Voronesh a reconnaissance aircraft reported: “Voronesh free of the enemy! Troops seen retreating towards the north and the east.” The operations officer [Ia] of the division flew in a Fieseler Storch at an altitude of between five and twenty meters to a point 200 meters from the western and northwestern edges of the town. All seemed quiet. Nevertheless, the strong patrols that were subsequently sent forward took casualties from machine gun, mortar, antitank gun, and anti-aircraft gun fire as they approached the houses and a hill that lay 500 meters in front of the town.
12.) Traffic Control
The instructions contained in the pamphlet for march and traffic control have proven themselves effective. It is proposed that paragraph 28 of the pamphlet state that, lest the columns be too long, vehicles in units slowing down for a halt close up until there is ten meters or less between vehicles. In order to facilitate passing, there should be a gap of 50 meters between units (companies and batteries.) This 50 meter gap also applies on the march. In this way, there is less of a chance that adding a vehicle or two to the middle of a column will interrupt the integrity of a unit.
All marches are facilitated by clear road signs that have only one meaning. To this end, the road sign erection squad [Beschilderungstrupp] of the military police [Feldgendarmerie] must be at the very head of the column or, in the case of contact with the enemy, right behind the point of the attack [Angriffsspitze.]
Traffic control succeeds or fails according to the personality of the staff officer for march discipline [Stabsoffizier für Marschüberwachung.] Unless, as there is in the Infantry Division Großdeutschland, a good military police officer is available, an energetic unit leader must be assigned from within the division. It is better to have one battalion in the division less well led than to leave the traffic control of the entire division in disorder. The staff officer for march discipline must have a towing vehicle permanently assigned to him.
The division has carried out many river crossings. In these, it has often been seen the importance of a well-chosen control area [Ablaufstelle] in front of the bridge. Because experience has demonstrated that even the most beautiful crossing plan can be rendered useless by the insertion of out-of-order units, the march order of units should only be seen as a general guide.
An energetic officer, at least a major, must be made responsible for traffic control. This officer reports to the division headquarters, by radio or telephone, which unit has arrived and which has crossed. This allows the division commander to command a change in the order in which units cross in order to better deal with the [tactical] situation. During engagements, units must get into the habit of leaving their field trains [Troß II] on the other side of the river until all combat formations have crossed.
During river crossings, the chief sphere of action of the military police lies in the control area and on the far side of the river. In front of the marshaling and control area, columns must be broken down, with the leaders going to the control area and the men building protection against air attack. On the far side of the river, the military police must make provisions for the resumption of movement. In general, it has proven effective to place in charge of traffic control the commander of the anti-aircraft battalion whose batteries are charged with protecting the river crossing.
13. Supply.
a) The supply services functioned well, even in the Southern Sector where the combat situation made complicated supply operations. The division supply officer [Ib] must often push from be- hind. It has, however, often proved effective to have an ammunition officer and fuel officer in the [forward] divi- sion command echelon. A chemical testing team is to be attached to the fuel officer in order to quickly test and dis- tribute [captured] fuel.
b.) In winter, the establishment of “supply support points” in the vicinity of artillery fire positions located in the rear and not too far from main roads has proved effective. As long as weather and the roads permit, these units can stock up on supplies. When the weather or the roads go bad, the fighting troops can, because of the short distances, easily be supplied from these support points.
c.) Medical services.
During forward thrusts or marches, attaching a few ambulances and medical teams to the advanced forces has proved itself an effective means of providing for the timely care of the wounded.
During the employment [of the divi- sion] in the Middle Sector, the lack of space generally prevented the establishment of main collecting stations [Hauptverbandsplätze]. Instead, the wounded were sent to the medical units of the non-mobile divisions in the sector. To help with the additional work this caused, medical teams [from the Großdeutschland Division] were attached to these divisions.
In winter, it was particularly important to care for the wounded quickly, in order to preserve them from freezing. To this end, medical teams with ambulances were employed in the vicinity of regimental command posts and medical officers were assigned to vehicle repair areas.
During the evacuation of the wounded, it must be remembered that a single casualty does not require four stretcher bearers. That would lead to a quick reduction in the fighting strength of units.
d) The repair companies [Werkstattkompanien] were most effectively em- ployed when one was, insofar as possible, permanently established in the vicinity of the larger repair part depots of the army group (for example, in Smolensk). This method has proved itself effective. All too often, the repair effort has faltered because of a lack of spare parts.
In contrast to the Russians, German troops seem to lack a taste for the immediate utilization of captured weapons.
14.) Intelligence Work.
a) The importance of intelligence work [Ic Dienst] grew during service in the sector of Army Group Center. The rapidity of movement in the sector of Army Group South led units to pay little attention to achieving a clear picture of the enemy. Thus, in the fall, the regiments had to be required to collect impressions of the enemy and send prisoners to the division head- quarters [for interrogation.] Often prisoners were held at unit level and used as labor troops for hours or even days.
b) In December, the best reconnaissance means exploited by the division was an army-level radio intercept unit. Although this unit had not been placed in direct support of the division, the division intelligence officer [Ic] knew how to tap into this source and was able, by means of a land line (established by the communication troops of the Großdeutschland division), to immediately inform the division head- quarters of any development.
Because lower-echelon Russian units did not encrypt their radio messages and relied exclusively on code names, the division intelligence officer was soon able to establish which unit used which net. These were recorded on maps. After two or three days he was able to find out the names of units from prisoners and was therefore able to establish from radio traffic which attack direction the enemy was planning on using or whether the enemy was regrouping. The bulk of the enemy radio traffic was exploited within ten minutes of the transmission and passed on to the division command post.
This was a huge help in the defensive battle. In many cases, units were warned of upcoming artillery fire concentrations, tank attacks, aircraft strikes, etc. and thus able to take countermeasures. A continuous stream of reports, with all details and annotated maps were at these times sent to higher headquarters. (In the middle of December, this was the intelligence officer of the XXIII. Army Corps.)
Source: This is a verbatim translation of an after action report submitted by the operations officer (Ia) of the Infantry Division Großdeutschland. A typescript of the original German report can be found in the records of the Tank Officer with the Chief General Staff of the Army [Panzer Offizier beim Chef General Stabs des Heeres.], U.S. National Archives, Microfilm Series T-78, Roll 620, Frames 923-945. Words in italic type were underlined in the original document