Großdeutschland 1942 (II)

Artillery, Tank Hunters, and Pioneers

Part II

6.) Cooperation with the Artillery

The cooperation with the artillery was exemplary. As always, the practice of affiliating light [105mm gun-howitzer] artillery battalions with infantry regiments worked well. Particularly in the defense, the key to success lay in the concentrated fire of the battalion and the regiment, which, at all times, was delivered quickly and flexibly. Our motto: Many tubes, a few shots, quickly on one target. The reports which came from the artillery were the most trustworthy. Time and again, the infantry had to be reminded not to request battalion concentrations or a box barrage when they were not needed.

The cooperation between artillery and tanks (tank battalions) requires special training, which not all artillerymen have received. In this respect, the 2nd Battalion, led by an experienced armored artilleryman, particularly distinguished itself. In the attack against, and particularly in the defense of Rshev, large numbers of radios and telephone lines were destroyed. The use of the Assault Gun Battalion to bridge this gap was proposed. The battery commander of an assault gun battery has a 30-watt transmitter, another [30-watt transmitter] is set up at the field artillery battalion. With the help of a map marked with registration points [Zielpunktkarte], the assault gun battery commander, who is often an experienced artilleryman and can (from his position at the front) best see the combat situation, directs the fire of the field artillery battalion.

In general, it must be added that radio and telephone operators of the artillery can never be well trained enough. An appropriate reserve of telephone and radio equipment, as well as telephone wire, must be on hand. This also applies to the communications platoons and echelons of the infantry.

Armored and motorized artillery stand or fall according to their radio equipment. The existing equipment is still too weak. The artillery must have a radio whose range is double that of the maximum range of its guns. The firing positions of the artillery must be more than ever be organized from the point of view of antitank defense and included in the antitank plan!

Shooting a mixture of smoke and high explosive, particularly against enemies in undergrowth or woods, has proved itself effective. Result: panic among the enemy.

7.) Employment of antiaircraft guns.

In the attack, the enfilade fire of heavy and light [antiaircraft gun] batteries, with the focus of the fire [Schwerpunkt] on crossing points and defiles has proved itself effective. As a rule, an 88mm gun battery is to be attached to the advanced guard [Vorausabteilung]. In the defense the focus [Schwerpunkt] of the light batteries is forward, while the heavy batteries must be distributed in triangular firing positions to protect the area in which the artillery has its firing positions.

Mixed antiaircraft sections, with at least two 88mm guns and two or three 20mm guns, when properly employed, have proved themselves effective. Some mixed antiaircraft sections, attached to other divisions, have been reduced to two guns, as they have been used to support raids or otherwise employed in the front lines.

8.) Employment of Tank Hunter [Panzerjäger] Units

During the employment [of the division] in Army Group South, the Tank Hunter Battalion (one company with self-propelled 76.2 mm guns and two companies with towed 50mm guns) did not, with the exception of occasional protection of flanks, come into action. [When the division was assigned to] Army Group Center, the commander of the Tank Hunter Battalion was in charge of antitank defense within the entire division sector.

In that case, the following method proved itself effective. Use of the anti- tank guns of the infantry [regiments and battalions] in the front line. Against tank concentrations, [these were] reinforced by antitank guns of the Tank Hunter Battalion. Behind it, create a tank-trapping line [Panzeranfangslinie] with the anti-tank guns of the Tank Hunter Battalion, mixed antiaircraft sections, and artillery. In addition, improvise an antitank reserve.

The 76.2 mm antitank gun has proved itself effective as a gun, however, the self-propelled carriage suffered heavy losses because its high profile made difficult the hiding of gun position or sneaking up on the enemy. The 50mm antitank gun shot up [enemy tanks at ranges] between 400 and 800 meters, however at ranges, between 100 and 400 meters, the shots usually bounced off [the armor of enemy tanks.]

9.) Pioneers.

The Pioneer Battalion and the infantry pioneer platoons are in a division such as ours particularly important. During attacks and associated forward movement the chief assignments were mine clearing and the building of routes and bridges. A properly organized employment was only possible when pioneer reconnaissance patrols [Pionier-Erkundungskommandos] were employed at the point of the attack [Angriffsspitzen] and the pioneer companies and platoons were employed as far forward and as close to the action as possible.

The infantry pioneers must be able to independently undertake the improvement of small bridges and roads by using the labor of prisoners and the civil population. The pioneers of the Pioneer Battalion must be employed by the division at particularly important points [Schwerpunkten.]

In the defense, the pioneers had two assignments:

a) Strengthening of the position,

b) Maintaining themselves as a counter-attack reserve [Stossreserve.]

While the division pioneers fulfilled these requirements in an excellent manner and often used flamethrowers and grenade bundles to help the infantry capture fortified positions, the infantry did not make good use of its pioneers. The infantry pioneer platoons were used mostly for the building of headquarters bunkers and were soon so longer useful for their intended functions. Having infantry pioneers work at night on improving positions and spending the day resting [and available for use] as an attack and counter-attack reserve in the neighborhood of the headquarters proved itself effective. The commanders can thus dispose of a fresh reserve.

Needless to say, the [infantry] pioneer platoons should be trained as assault engineers [Sturmpioniere] for “storm troop operations” [Stosstruppunternehmungen.] This training was carried out in October and November [of 1942] by the Pioneer Battalion, which, as the first assault engineer battalion of the army could make use of its special experience.

Unfortunately, the division has only one armored pioneer platoon equipped with armored carriers. The equipping of a full company with armored carriers would be useful for cooperating with the tank battalion or the distribution [of armored engineers] to advanced detachments. The terrain in the East makes necessary the attachment of pioneers to the tanks.

10.) Organization.

Proposals for change not mentioned in other places:

a) Equipping one battalion of both the Grenadier and Füsilier Regiments with armored personnel carriers.

b) Strengthening the tank regiment with an additional battalion.

c) Reorganizing the artillery into two direct support battalions [105mm gun-howitzers], a battalion of heavy [150mm] gun-howitzers and a mixed heavy artillery battalion consisting of a 100mm gun battery, a Nebelwerfer battery, and a [210mm] mortar battery.

d) Equipping the entire Tank Hunter battalion with heavy [75mm] antitank guns and prime movers, unless an improved self-propelled mount can be found.

e) Dissolution of the Armored Observation Battery [Panzerbeobachtungsbatterie], whose demonstrated usefulness (particularly in the defense) is not proportionate to its cost in men (ten officers), equipment, and motor vehicles. I propose that a balloon battery take its place. One of these proved itself effective when attached to the division at Rshev.

Source: This is a verbatim translation of an after action report submitted by the operations officer (Ia) of the Infantry Division Großdeutschland. A typescript of the original German report can be found in the records of the Tank Officer with the Chief General Staff of the Army [Panzer Offizier beim Chef General Stabs des Heeres.], U.S. National Archives, Microfilm Series T-78, Roll 620, Frames 923-945. Words in italic type were underlined in the original document.