A thrilling vision, but the Russian cavalry in the first world war did not strike the mighty blows predicted here. I wonder why not? I’m not asking that sarcastically. Did this author completely fail to understand the Russian capabilities? Was he imagining this?
A quick review of the literature suggests that the Cossack cavalry of 1914 fell short of the expectations of Lieutenant Swift. In the months to come, The Tactical Notebook will publish some of the war games Count Schlieffen set in East Prussia.
He makes it sound like they could almost have been a combination of mounted shock troops, and a blitzkrieg breakthrough arm. The vividness of his writing makes it convincing. You can picture swarms of autonomous companies of Cossacks ranging deep behind enemy lines, disrupting communications, cutting telegraph wires, pouncing on lightly defended headquarters and supply depots, and generally raising holy hell in the rear areas of the enemy army. Yet in reality, the Russian cavalry was blocked by even the inadequate, Austro-Hungarian artillery and machine guns. My guess is that the author was not adequately predicting the range and lethality of the fire power that would be sweep the battlefield, even in the broad reaches of Eastern Europe, by 1914. It also may be that the Russian cavalry was trained and employed in ways that were far less ambitious than this. The Russian senior leadership probably saw its cavalry as a scouting force for the infantry and artillery juggernaut, and lacked the imagination to employ it in this fashion.
A thrilling vision, but the Russian cavalry in the first world war did not strike the mighty blows predicted here. I wonder why not? I’m not asking that sarcastically. Did this author completely fail to understand the Russian capabilities? Was he imagining this?
This is a splendid question. I have already begun the search for answers. Please stay tuned to this channel.
A quick review of the literature suggests that the Cossack cavalry of 1914 fell short of the expectations of Lieutenant Swift. In the months to come, The Tactical Notebook will publish some of the war games Count Schlieffen set in East Prussia.
He makes it sound like they could almost have been a combination of mounted shock troops, and a blitzkrieg breakthrough arm. The vividness of his writing makes it convincing. You can picture swarms of autonomous companies of Cossacks ranging deep behind enemy lines, disrupting communications, cutting telegraph wires, pouncing on lightly defended headquarters and supply depots, and generally raising holy hell in the rear areas of the enemy army. Yet in reality, the Russian cavalry was blocked by even the inadequate, Austro-Hungarian artillery and machine guns. My guess is that the author was not adequately predicting the range and lethality of the fire power that would be sweep the battlefield, even in the broad reaches of Eastern Europe, by 1914. It also may be that the Russian cavalry was trained and employed in ways that were far less ambitious than this. The Russian senior leadership probably saw its cavalry as a scouting force for the infantry and artillery juggernaut, and lacked the imagination to employ it in this fashion.