Update. Just had a go at Pattern of War. Tuker a great guy and all but it's rambly and incoherent so far. Sticking with it. I'm worried about the quote too. "The extraordinary ambivalence of our commanders and their inability to seize upon the occasion can only have been due to the training..." Tuker assumes ambivalence, which isn't there in orders (get into the war diaries, orders usually very focused) and slow responses usually a function of force design problems not training. It's like he's blaming the training of the captain of an oil tanker for not turning as quickly as a jet ski jockey.
Industrial armies that bureaucratize have this tendency.
Helmuth von Moltke, the Chief of the Prussian General Staff during the Franco-Prussian War, defined Auftragstaktik as the actions a subordinate took in the absence of orders that supported the senior commanders intent. Well trained armies that trust subordinate leaders can achieve miraculous success given clear intent.
The Germans were brilliant until their premature death in Barbarossa in Russia in the summer of 1941. It took the Prussian zombie four years to finally die at the hands of the Russians. The employment of German martial practice harnessed to American logistical magic would have made short but hard work of communist Russia.
The American forces are now the most expensive paper tiger in Earth's history.
I like Tuker but haven't made my mind up about him. He has a reputation as a solid divisional commander (not sure if deserved, James Holland adores him, which is a bad sign). That rep is something of a standout in Eighth Army, which really didn't have many great commanders for most of the time it was fighting. Think of Gott (never a tank battle I did win), Messervy (I am the only commander able to lose two armoured divisions inside six months), Norrie (what's the rush with opening our supply route at Halfaya?) Richie (Let's discuss our best CoA, agree on it, and then everyone does whatever they want and I won't say a thing), Lumsden (Hey, how about an appointment as meaningless and far away as possible?), Cunningham (how about some rest in Cairo?).
What has been puzzling me for a while is how much the development of a combined arms approach to dealing with the constant mini wars on the NW Frontier conditioned men such as Tuker, Reid (GOC 10 Indian after escaping captivity, rose from Major at the start of the war), and indeed Wavell and Auchinleck. There's a PhD in there somewhere.
Also...
- Me: Hey Siri, show me a dig at Monty.
- Siri: Here's a dig at Monty: "The diagrammatic rigidity of the 1918 artillery governed battle, and minds became conditioned by it."
Update. Just had a go at Pattern of War. Tuker a great guy and all but it's rambly and incoherent so far. Sticking with it. I'm worried about the quote too. "The extraordinary ambivalence of our commanders and their inability to seize upon the occasion can only have been due to the training..." Tuker assumes ambivalence, which isn't there in orders (get into the war diaries, orders usually very focused) and slow responses usually a function of force design problems not training. It's like he's blaming the training of the captain of an oil tanker for not turning as quickly as a jet ski jockey.
“The Pattern of War.” Thanks.
Sir Francis Tuker did not kill himself.
A. Yes.
B. But they can certainly be mis-taught through an overly procedural tick-box system.
C. Did I miss the sarcasm / rhetorical bit again? 🤣🌟
Industrial armies that bureaucratize have this tendency.
Helmuth von Moltke, the Chief of the Prussian General Staff during the Franco-Prussian War, defined Auftragstaktik as the actions a subordinate took in the absence of orders that supported the senior commanders intent. Well trained armies that trust subordinate leaders can achieve miraculous success given clear intent.
The Germans were brilliant until their premature death in Barbarossa in Russia in the summer of 1941. It took the Prussian zombie four years to finally die at the hands of the Russians. The employment of German martial practice harnessed to American logistical magic would have made short but hard work of communist Russia.
The American forces are now the most expensive paper tiger in Earth's history.
I am a firm believer in this way of thinking. You either have it, or you dont.
I like Tuker but haven't made my mind up about him. He has a reputation as a solid divisional commander (not sure if deserved, James Holland adores him, which is a bad sign). That rep is something of a standout in Eighth Army, which really didn't have many great commanders for most of the time it was fighting. Think of Gott (never a tank battle I did win), Messervy (I am the only commander able to lose two armoured divisions inside six months), Norrie (what's the rush with opening our supply route at Halfaya?) Richie (Let's discuss our best CoA, agree on it, and then everyone does whatever they want and I won't say a thing), Lumsden (Hey, how about an appointment as meaningless and far away as possible?), Cunningham (how about some rest in Cairo?).
What has been puzzling me for a while is how much the development of a combined arms approach to dealing with the constant mini wars on the NW Frontier conditioned men such as Tuker, Reid (GOC 10 Indian after escaping captivity, rose from Major at the start of the war), and indeed Wavell and Auchinleck. There's a PhD in there somewhere.
Also...
- Me: Hey Siri, show me a dig at Monty.
- Siri: Here's a dig at Monty: "The diagrammatic rigidity of the 1918 artillery governed battle, and minds became conditioned by it."
All the best
Andreas