Staff, Signals, and Transportation
Staff, Signals, and Transportation
Battalion: An Organizational Study of United States Infantry
The estate of the late John Sayen has graciously given the Tactical Notebook permission to serialize his study of the organizational evolution of American infantry battalions. The author’s preface and the previous section of this book may be found via the following links:
Instead of cobbling together battalion headquarters detachments from men seconded from the regimental headquarters company (and elsewhere) as the Superior Board had proposed (and as had been done by the AEF) the Special Committee chose to accommodate the same people in battalion-level headquarters companies (see Appendix 3.3). Such a move would insure their administrative independence from the regimental headquarters companies. Technically, the six officers that made up the battalion headquarters would not belong to the new headquarters company, though they would still be maintained and administered by it.
As recommended by the Superior Board, the battalion commander would be a lieutenant colonel but he would only have an executive officer (a major) during wartime). First lieutenants headed his four staff sections. Of these the Bn-1, or adjutant, also commanded the headquarters company. With the assistance of the communication platoon commander, he was also responsible for establishing the battalion command post and ensuring that communication was maintained with the regimental command post, adjacent battalions, and any supporting artillery. He was also in charge of prisoners and stragglers and the distribution of replacements. The Bn-2 or intelligence officer also headed the intelligence section of the battalion headquarters company. The Bn-3 of course dealt with plans and training. He was also expected to be the tactical specialist who wrote and distributed the orders, arranged troop movements and security measures.
The Superior Board had not recommended the inclusion of a Bn-4 or supply officer because supply officers were supposed to come from the supply (now renamed the service) company. However, the Special Committee decided that battalion supply officers should be members of the respective battalions that they served rather than of the service company. This was probably not only because their battalions should have their first loyalty but also because a Bn-4 would be coordinating the efforts of his own battalion’s company cooks, supply and mess sergeants, horseshoers, stable orderlies, and so forth, in addition to vehicles and personnel that the service company would furnish.
The headquarters company headquarters included the usual company administrative and support personnel but since it had no tactical functions its members also formed the headquarters company’s rear echelon. Together with the rear echelons from the rifle and machinegun companies, it constituted the rear echelon of the battalion. During combat, the rear echelon remained in the battalion bivouac area together with any attached field kitchens and supply vehicles. It is worth noting that a staff sergeant (with horse) served as battalion sergeant major. Mere sergeants acted as first sergeants and platoon sergeants in all the companies. For duty with battalion headquarters the company headquarters provided an automobile driver (or chauffeur T5) although no automobile had yet been procured for him to drive. One cook (a T4) was provided for the officers’ mess in wartime only.
The Intelligence section operated under the Bn-2 while being under headquarters company administration. It was essentially the same organization proposed by the Superior Board. It would man battalion observation and listening posts and conducted limited patrolling. It would also send men to accompany the larger patrols drawn from the rifle companies so they could impart the benefits of their expertise and also make reports directly back to the Bn-2.
The battalion communication platoon replaced the old regimental signal and orderly detachments and the divisional telephone detail. The officer platoon leader and his platoon sergeant/signal electrician shared responsibility for battalion communications with the adjutant. The message center dispatched, coded, decoded, and recorded all messages. It also determined the priority of each message and the manner in which it would be transmitted. The section also handled the battalion’s carrier pigeons.
The courier section was a messenger pool working under the close control of the message center. All of its members had horses or mechanical transportation, though travel on foot was the norm in forward areas. For situations such as crossing an area subject to heavy shellfire, or where unusually rapid movement was required, a system of runner posts, under which different runners relayed a message from post to post, would be established. The visual signal section operated lamps, semaphores, and signal pistols. The wire section employed a reel cart with five miles of wire, two four-line switchboards, and five telephones one of which was for line maintenance. The section primarily served the phone lines between battalion headquarters and regiment. It did not normally include the rifle or machinegun companies within its network. In addition to voice traffic, the section’s wire lines could carry Morse signals sent through buzzer phones.[1]
The radio and panel section requires more discussion. The panels were visual signals used to communicate with aircraft. They were given to the radio section as an additional duty since radios and panels were used only intermittently. Radios at this time were heavy but delicate affairs. Even the lighter ones had to move in carts similar to those used for machineguns.
By the middle of the 1920s, three types were in use by the infantry. Although voice radios (called radiotelephones) existed, the infantry radios were all radiotelegraph systems, meaning that they were key operated and employed Morse code (or CW).
The heavy SCR (Signal Corps Radio)-130, with a range of 60 miles served brigade headquarters. The lighter SCR-79A, with a transmission range of about 30 miles, replaced the unsuccessful SCR-105 during the mid-1920s as the regimental radio. The SCR-77 was the battalion-level radio. Light enough for two men to carry over short distances, it was supposed to have a five-mile range, though it often did not reach much beyond a mile.
All three of these systems drew their electric power from unreliable storage batteries that only the division signal company could recharge. CW transmissions were relatively easy to encrypt but the process of composing, sending, and receiving them could be even slower than transmission by messenger. Hence, radio communication tended to be regarded as merely supplementary to other means.[2]
The headquarters and headquarters company of the infantry battalion’s parent infantry regiment (see Appendix 3.4) was in many respects just an enlarged version of its battalion counterpart. One major in the regimental headquarters served as regimental machinegun officer. His task was to supervise the training of the regiment’s three machinegun companies and to advise the Colonel on how they should best be used. A second lieutenant (in wartime only) assisted him. Captains filled the principal staff positions. The Special Committee also placed the R-4, with a lieutenant munitions officer to assist him in the regimental headquarters and not in the service company.
The regimental intelligence “platoon” was actually smaller than a battalion intelligence “section” but it included an “office force” that could provide topographical drafting, interrogation and translation services.
The regimental pioneer platoon was the only combat support platoon that the Special Committee left within the regimental headquarters company. Though it was much smaller than its 1918 counterpart, its duties remained essentially unchanged. Since it no longer had to furnish signals detachments to the battalion headquarters, the regimental communication platoon was much smaller than in 1918. It resembled a larger version of the communication platoons that the Special Committee had organized within the battalion headquarters companies.[3]
The new regiment’s howitzer company was substantially as prescribed by the Superior Board (see Appendix 3.5). The War Department stated that the company’s organization would be provisional, pending the adoption of an infantry howitzer. Each of its platoons could employ one gun and one mortar. Company headquarters held three additional mortars in reserve (with the service company presumably providing the transportation for them). How those mortars were to be used is uncertain. Perhaps the War department or the Special Committee believed that the mortar sections could man two mortars each in situations where ammunition could be stockpiled at the gun positions and tactical movement was not required. Unlike in the AEF, the mortars had carts of their own, similar to machinegun carts. The gun and mortar (complete with their carriages) each weighed about 340 pounds. Each round of mortar ammunition, packed, weighed nearly 15 pounds and the two mortar carts carried 72 of them. About twice as many rounds of 37mm ammunition were carried for the gun. These ammunition allowances were considered minimal and ammunition conservation was stressed. The mortar and gun sections would each man only one weapon (one mortar per howitzer platoon was also kept in reserve) with a gun crew of ten.[4]
In the regimental service company the headquarters platoon was just an umbrella for the regimental staff, supply and band sections. The staff section mainly supported the regimental adjutant (R-1) but also did clerical work for the R-3. The supply section manned an office for the R-4 but it also provided a repair group, a distributing point group, and a procurement group. The R-4 office (a lieutenant, a master sergeant, and several clerks) maintained records, submitted required reports, forwarded requisitions, and maintained a journal and a situation map. The repair group operated a shoe repair machine and included a wheelwright to repair regimental vehicles. The distributing point and procurement groups supervised the handling all classes of supply except ammunition. The procurement group (a lieutenant and a master sergeant) received supplies on behalf of the regiment at the division supply point and then arranged for its transportation to the regimental supply point. There, the distributing point group (a lieutenant, a supply sergeant, and a couple of storekeepers) would supervise the receipt, storage and issue of incoming supplies.
The transportation platoon held the bulk of the service company’s manpower. Like its AEF predecessor it incorporated a transportation section for each battalion and the regimental headquarters and howitzer companies. The platoon’s vehicles constituted the regiment’s trains and, just as in the AEF, served interchangeably between the combat train (mainly carrying ammunition) and the field train (carrying almost everything else). The transport platoon’s standard vehicles were its four-mule combat (ammunition) and R&B (rations and baggage) wagons. The normal payload for each of these vehicles was 2,500 pounds (though loads of up to 4,500 pounds were occasionally carried). In order to allow for relief drivers each four-mule wagon had two wagoners (drivers).
Despite the fact that the United States was already the world’s premier manufacturer and user of motorcars and trucks, the transportation of its infantry regiments continued to rely almost entirely on draft (or pack) animals. However, the greater efficiency of motor transportation was recognized and better ways of utilizing it were being explored. Trucks saw increasing use in moving supplies at all levels above the regiment. On the other hand, (as in 1918) the available trucks were underpowered and offered only a very poor level of cross-country mobility. They thus depended heavily on trafficable road networks with stiff traffic and circulation control. Animal transport was still superior off the roads or on bad roads or roads that had to be shared with foot troops. Under extreme road or cross-country conditions, only pack mules would be able to move but pack transportation demanded a significant increase in men and animals (over draft transportation) to ferry the same pad.
Animal transportation could cover up to 30 miles a day for limited periods. Trucks could cover 100 to 140 miles a day and were considered at least three times as efficient as draft animals (much more so in the case of pack animals) in terms of the men and materiel required to move a given payload a given distance. Along with rail, or water transport they would push supplies far enough forward so that animal transportation units would not have to move it more than a day’s journey to get it to the troops. The Special Committee calculated the transportation requirements of an infantry regiment based on what it believed that the regiment’s routine daily unit requirements would be. The Special Committee planned to deal with extraordinary requirements (such as those imposed by heavy combat) by reinforcing the regiment’s transportation platoon with transportation units from higher echelons.[5]
As a result of combat experience, the regimental medical detachment in 1921 was now nearly twice as large as it had been in 1918 even though it supported a significantly smaller regiment. It could now assign two medical officers to a battalion section. As in 1918 it operated as four sections (one regimental and three battalion). Appendix 3.7 shows an arrangement that was probably typical. Each battalion section would provide two medical aidmen per rifle or machinegun company plus an aid station and up to three stretcher teams. One aidman would follow each rifle company’s two forward platoons, giving emergency aid to wounded men as they fell out. He would then direct “walking wounded” to the aid station while tagging the others for pick-up by stretcher parties. In battle members of the regimental band would act as additional stretcher-bearers.[6]
In a 1921 infantry division two of these infantry regiments would constitute an infantry brigade. Brigade headquarters had twice as many officers (ten rather than five) as its AEF counterpart plus a full headquarters company similar to that of an infantry regiment (but with its own transport section and no pioneer platoon).[7]
Of course, the reader should remember that this entire organization was largely notional and (except for experiments) would actually exist only in time of war. In peacetime, most regiments would be manned under peacetime tables that would only allow enough men for training purposes and for operational requirements short of actual war. These tables actually appeared in November 1920, or before the details of the wartime tables had actually been worked out. They did, however, resemble the war tables manned at about 50% of their full strength. In terms of their size these peacetime units tended to resemble the organization tables used by the Army prior to 1917.[8]
Peace strength rifle companies would get only two platoons each. Each platoon would still have two sections but a section would get only two squads. Company, platoon and section headquarters were all cut back (see Appendix 3.8) and of course there were no executive officers. The company supply sergeant would have to double as gas sergeant. Interestingly, however, company headquarters kept four of its six spare privates.[9]
Though each machine gun squad lost four men, the machinegun company kept both of its platoons. (It could hardly afford not to.) Platoon headquarters were sharply reduced. Company headquarters absorbed the company trains but lost its reconnaissance officer and reconnaissance sergeant and many other members.[10]
Battalion headquarters and headquarters company was reduced even more sharply. The staff would consist of just the battalion commander himself (who could be a major or lieutenant colonel) and one luckless first lieutenant who was supposed to cover all the staff positions and act as headquarters company commander and battalion communication officer. In practice, he functioned as the adjutant, leaving most communication matters to the platoon sergeant of the communication platoon.
Logistical matters could be referred to the service company and the commanding officer himself would deal with operational and intelligence issues. Since the headquarters company headquarters had lost its cooks, its personnel would have to mess with one of the rifle or machinegun companies. However, since the rifle and machinegun companies had lost their barbers, tailors, and cobblers those in the headquarters company would provide these services for the entire battalion. Despite all these cuts, the intelligence section remained relatively large. The communication platoon combined its couriers and message center sections.[11]
The regimental headquarters and headquarters company, although reduced in similar proportion to its battalion counterpart did retain a small staff, including a machinegun officer (Appendix 3.9). One officer would assume both R-2 and R-3 functions, while another performed additional duty as regimental gas officer. The headquarters company did have a company commander who was also the communication platoon leader but was not considered a regimental staff officer. He had a small “housekeeping” staff of enlisted men to assist him. The communication platoon itself remained relatively large. The intelligence platoon retained much of its office force but lost its “field force” except a corporal and three privates, each of whom could act as a trained scout for one of the battalion’s rifle companies. The pioneer “platoon” became just a squad (led by a corporal) but was armed with pistols rather than rifles.[12]
At peace strength, the howitzer company retained all its equipment (some of which had to be placed in storage) but lost one of its three platoons. One of its two remaining officers served as company commander while the other could take charge of any detached platoon.[13]
Though severely reduced both the regimental service company[14] and medical detachment retained their basic wartime structures and functions.[15]
Editor’s Note: The format of the many appendices to this work fit poorly with Substack. For that reason, I have placed them on a PDF file that can be found at Military Learning Library, a website that I maintain.
[1] Tables of Organization” op cit Table 27W “Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Infantry Battalion” 15 April 1921; Wheeler op cit pp. 13-16; and FSR 1923; pp. 28-31; “Notes From the Chief of Infantry - Signal Communication Equipment” Infantry Journal October 1925 pp. 429-430. Note that all sergeants and above, the driver, cobbler, cooks, and most of the communication personnel carried service pistols.
[2] Ibid. See also The Infantry School’s “Signal Communication” reference text (revised) published in the Infantry School Mailing List, Fort Benning Georgia, 1927.
[3] “Tables of Organization” op cit Table 24W “Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Infantry Regiment” 15 April 1921; and Wheeler op cit p. 26; Notes From the Chief of Infantry - Signal Communication Equipment” Infantry Journal October 1925 pp. 429-430; and Maj W. J. Tack, Infantry “Radio in the Infantry” Infantry Journal November 1927 pp 470-472.
[4] Tables of Organization” op cit Table 30W “Howitzer Company, Infantry Regiment” 15 April 1921; see “Accompanying Arms for Infantry” Infantry Journal June 1925 pp. 544-45,; this was a review (unsigned) of a book recently published on guns and mortars by a Maj Biswang of the French Army; and ”Notes From the Chief of Infantry - Experimental Howitzer Company” Infantry Journal April 1929 p 415.
[5] FSR 1923 op cit pp. 134-137; see also Infantry School Reference Text, “The Supply of an Infantry Regiment in Campaign” published in the Infantry School Mailing List 1926-27 issue (Fort Benning GA) pp. 16-17 and 36-37. Tables of Organization” op cit; Table 25W “Service Company, Infantry Regiment” 15 April 1921; and see “Notes from the Chief of Infantry - Experimental Escort Wagon” Infantry Journal January 1927 (Washington DC) pp. 64-65.
[6] Tables of Organization” op cit; Table 23W “Infantry Regiment (consolidated table)” 15 April 1921; Wheeler op cit pp. 16-17 and 28-29; and FSR 1923 p. 146; see also Harry C. Ingles, Signal Corps, “The New Division” Infantry Journal November 1939 (Washington DC, The Infantry Association) p 525.
[7] Tables of Organization” op cit; Table 22W “Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Infantry Brigade” 15 April 1921.
[8] Instructions from the Adjutant General, “The New Tables of Organization, Peace Strength” published in the Infantry Journal January 1921 (Washington DC) pp. 63-74.
[9] US Army Table of Organization 28P “Rifle Company, Infantry Regiment” peace strength (Washington DC 23 Nov 1920).
[10] US Army Table of Organization 29P “Machinegun Company, Infantry Regiment” peace strength (Washington DC 23 Nov 1920).
[11] US Army Table of Organization 27P “Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Infantry Battalion” peace strength (Washington DC 23 Nov 1920).
[12] US Army Table of Organization 24P “Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Infantry Regiment” peace strength (Washington DC 23 Nov 1920).
[13] US Army Table of Organization 30P “Howitzer Company, Infantry Regiment” peace strength (Washington DC 23 Nov 1920).
[14] It should be noted that each battalion train section provided four field kitchens and four baggage wagons for sharing among five companies. Two of the combat wagons in each battalion section were for the machinegun company. The third would support all three rifle companies. The howitzer and headquarters companies shared the same train section
[15] US Army, Table of Organization 24P “Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Infantry Regiment” peace strength; and Table of Organization 25P “Supply Company, Infantry Regiment” peace strength (both Washington DC 23 Nov 1920).