I will skip the first, for the answer comes from the school solution/ the original textbook.
Technological advancements contribute to breakdowns in manoeuvrer or "styles of warfare." For instance, machine guns and artillery formed a part of the Western Front deadlock.
I wasn't familiar with the term methodical battle, but Google clarified that matter. (I was a kid when the original textbook and exam were circulated).
But manoeuvrer warfare relies on implementing Mission Command and trusting subordinate commanders to employ their initiative and modify plans as situations warrant.
So, static forces designed for fixed-piece battles will fall under a centralised command and control system. Moreover, senior commanders are the decision-makers under that inflexible system.
Also, the tempo of operations is driven by logistics.
The essence of manoeuvrer warfare is to place forces where they are in a position to win engagements. Yet the pendulum shifting on the manoeuvrer warfare spectrum or deliberate doctrinal choices might reduce battlefield mobility, and that is where methodical battle returns.
Firepower, in conjecture with mobility, offers the possibility of carving up battlefields. That might consist of mutually supporting units employing fire and movement or infantry working alongside armour to destroy defences. But that approach is built upon adequate communications and Mission Command.
Concerning the generational table, since few concepts in the history of warfare are new or "revolutionary," I presume it is a product of the courseware. In short, the reader will already know the answers to questions five and six.
Lastly, I would have the weapons platoon cover the minefield from 466 to prevent the enemy from conducting mine clearance operations. Moreover, the Dragoon is deployed to 612 in an ambush position, so they are placed to attack enemy vehicles.
The remaining infantry either supports those two platoons or is on 484. All those platoons are also mutually self-supporting. (The role assigned to the combat engineers depends on whether landmine operations are ongoing and if the ambush site is mined).
The main effort is an attempt to direct the enemy to the ambush site. I summarise the commander's intent is to confine the enemy to a narrow area and subject them to firepower. (The availability of air and artillery support is unknown).
The reader will know the answer to question nine.
Combining elements of [military] capabilities in a cooperative or sequenced arrangement is at the heart of combined arms. So, the combat engineers and infantry are like bacon and eggs. One just is better with the other, rather than apart.
To stop being an useless wiseacre [keeping in mind I'm just off work and tired] and you deserve a bit better -
assuming 3 platoons, 1 Eng and 2 AT sections:
For the bridge problem I'm putting the main effort and 1st platoon with the 1 dragon section on hill 612 orienting east to the crossrds of the unimproved and the improved rd to bridge.
2d plt on Hill 484 facing North with the 2d dragon section.
1st/2d plt main EA is the curve in unimproved road and engages enemy there.
3d plt and Eng section on 484 facing east, yes minefield between Hill 466 and 484.
It appears the enemy main effort is to get to the fording site so the AT and 1st/2d plt facing there, Eng section and minefield deny enemy the bridge.
Our main effort is the S curve bend on unimproved rd between H612 and H484.
If [Intelligence?] is wrong and the enemy makes his main effort on the paved road direct for the bridge, then 2d plt reorients and moves from Hill 484 north side to east side to reinforce effort of 3d plt and Eng to hold the bridge.
At that point if 1st plt and the Dragon team with them on H612 can range the crossroads they do if any targets there, if not they are reserve and if the enemy isn't even a prescence on dirt road they can be reserve and reinforce our shifted main effort with 3d plt and the east side of Hill 484.
If I'm allowed more than one minefield the next minefield is the north side of the river before the Ford.
Assuming enemy main effort is the dirt road to the Ford.
The enemy may indeed get past the EA at the S curve between H612 and H484.
At that point we're into them getting past the EA between H484 and H612 hopefully attritted by our fires.
Assuming the Dragons are in action still 1st and 2d plts are pressing now the rear of the enemy as he hits the minefield before the Ford and continue to attrit him, in particular as he's now held up at the Ford.
“FORT MEADE, Md. – Marines assigned to Marine Forces, US Cyber Command (MARFORCYBERCOM) are refining their technical and epicurean skills with a contest to eat the most microchips, and challenging other Devil Dogs to follow their example.”
I will skip the first, for the answer comes from the school solution/ the original textbook.
Technological advancements contribute to breakdowns in manoeuvrer or "styles of warfare." For instance, machine guns and artillery formed a part of the Western Front deadlock.
I wasn't familiar with the term methodical battle, but Google clarified that matter. (I was a kid when the original textbook and exam were circulated).
But manoeuvrer warfare relies on implementing Mission Command and trusting subordinate commanders to employ their initiative and modify plans as situations warrant.
So, static forces designed for fixed-piece battles will fall under a centralised command and control system. Moreover, senior commanders are the decision-makers under that inflexible system.
Also, the tempo of operations is driven by logistics.
The essence of manoeuvrer warfare is to place forces where they are in a position to win engagements. Yet the pendulum shifting on the manoeuvrer warfare spectrum or deliberate doctrinal choices might reduce battlefield mobility, and that is where methodical battle returns.
Firepower, in conjecture with mobility, offers the possibility of carving up battlefields. That might consist of mutually supporting units employing fire and movement or infantry working alongside armour to destroy defences. But that approach is built upon adequate communications and Mission Command.
Concerning the generational table, since few concepts in the history of warfare are new or "revolutionary," I presume it is a product of the courseware. In short, the reader will already know the answers to questions five and six.
Lastly, I would have the weapons platoon cover the minefield from 466 to prevent the enemy from conducting mine clearance operations. Moreover, the Dragoon is deployed to 612 in an ambush position, so they are placed to attack enemy vehicles.
The remaining infantry either supports those two platoons or is on 484. All those platoons are also mutually self-supporting. (The role assigned to the combat engineers depends on whether landmine operations are ongoing and if the ambush site is mined).
The main effort is an attempt to direct the enemy to the ambush site. I summarise the commander's intent is to confine the enemy to a narrow area and subject them to firepower. (The availability of air and artillery support is unknown).
The reader will know the answer to question nine.
Combining elements of [military] capabilities in a cooperative or sequenced arrangement is at the heart of combined arms. So, the combat engineers and infantry are like bacon and eggs. One just is better with the other, rather than apart.
To stop being an useless wiseacre [keeping in mind I'm just off work and tired] and you deserve a bit better -
assuming 3 platoons, 1 Eng and 2 AT sections:
For the bridge problem I'm putting the main effort and 1st platoon with the 1 dragon section on hill 612 orienting east to the crossrds of the unimproved and the improved rd to bridge.
2d plt on Hill 484 facing North with the 2d dragon section.
1st/2d plt main EA is the curve in unimproved road and engages enemy there.
3d plt and Eng section on 484 facing east, yes minefield between Hill 466 and 484.
It appears the enemy main effort is to get to the fording site so the AT and 1st/2d plt facing there, Eng section and minefield deny enemy the bridge.
Our main effort is the S curve bend on unimproved rd between H612 and H484.
If [Intelligence?] is wrong and the enemy makes his main effort on the paved road direct for the bridge, then 2d plt reorients and moves from Hill 484 north side to east side to reinforce effort of 3d plt and Eng to hold the bridge.
At that point if 1st plt and the Dragon team with them on H612 can range the crossroads they do if any targets there, if not they are reserve and if the enemy isn't even a prescence on dirt road they can be reserve and reinforce our shifted main effort with 3d plt and the east side of Hill 484.
If I'm allowed more than one minefield the next minefield is the north side of the river before the Ford.
Assuming enemy main effort is the dirt road to the Ford.
The enemy may indeed get past the EA at the S curve between H612 and H484.
At that point we're into them getting past the EA between H484 and H612 hopefully attritted by our fires.
Assuming the Dragons are in action still 1st and 2d plts are pressing now the rear of the enemy as he hits the minefield before the Ford and continue to attrit him, in particular as he's now held up at the Ford.
Marines prep for Cyber war , per the Duffel Blog.
“FORT MEADE, Md. – Marines assigned to Marine Forces, US Cyber Command (MARFORCYBERCOM) are refining their technical and epicurean skills with a contest to eat the most microchips, and challenging other Devil Dogs to follow their example.”
I only graciously accepted the open invitation,
Your Humble Servant
TLW