In the summer of 1918, the US War Department sent two regiments of the pre-war Regular Army to Vladivostok, the chief port on the Pacific coast of Russia and the eastern terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. One of these, the 27th Infantry had been serving with the American garrison in the Philippines. The other, the 31st Infantry, had been stationed in Hawaii.
Both outfits had been organized in accordance with a table of organization adopted in May of 1917. Thus, each was authorized twelve modest rifle companies, a small machine gun company, a tiny headquarters company, and a minuscule supply company.
The ideal strengths of the component companies of the two regiments sent to Siberia paled in comparison to those of their counterparts that were then serving in Europe. Thus, while a rifle company of either the 27th or the 31st Infantry rated a captain, two lieutenants, and a hundred and fifty men of lower ranks, a rifle company of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) was supposed to enjoy the services of six officers and two hundred and fifty enlisted men. Likewise, while each of the machine gun companies of the Siberia-bound regiments made do with six tripod-mounted machine guns, a unit of the same name fighting in France was supposed to go to war with sixteen weapons of that type.
To add administrative insult to organizational injury, neither the 27th Infantry nor the 31st Infantry could muster the meagre number of soldiers allowed to them in May of the previous year, let alone the tables of organization for units of the AEF.
To remedy this deficiency, the War Department provided the force sent to Siberia with five thousand additional soldiers. These, which disembarked at Vladivostok in the course of September of 1918, provided the means of converting those understrength outfits into close copies of the American infantry regiments then serving (or preparing to serve) in Europe.
Indeed, once every empty billet in the old regiments had been filled, the American force in Siberia had enough officers and men left over to form a ‘replacement battalion’. Composed of six officers and two-hundred and fifty men, this depot provided the means of improving the skills and attitudes of the many men among the replacements who yet to receive a proper course of basic training.
As the American force assembled in Vladivostok, the War Department took pains to provide it with the latest in pedestrian ironmongery. Thus, the old Regulars traded their Benet-Mercié pieces for Browning Automatic Rifles, their Colt ‘diggers’ for new Browning machine guns, and their Maxim ‘pompoms’ for 37mm (one-pounder) infantry guns.
These new weapons would prove themselves effective in a wide variety of situations. The tables of organization for the AEF called for units optimized for the practice of an idiosyncratic tactical system in a unique time and place. Thus, each platoon consisted of a collection of highly specialized elements, a Lego set that allowed its leader to design a bespoke solution to the problem of taking (or defending) a particular piece of the Western Front.
In particular, the authors of the establishments for the AEF called for rifle companies made up of four large platoons, each of which broke down into:
three four-man hand-grenade teams
three three-man rifle grenade teams
two seven-man automatic rifle squads
two eight-man rifle squads
The two American infantry regiments assembled in Siberia in September of 1918 would remain in that corner of Russia for eighteen months. During that period, they performed a wide variety of duties. None of these, however, resembled the work that their counterparts in France and Flanders had carried out, or, at the very least, had been prepared to do.
With that in mind, I find myself suspecting that the leaders of the 27th and 31st Infantry Regiments did what their contemporaries, whether soldiers or Marines, did in places other than the Western Front. That is, they organized most of their infantrymen into interchangeable rifle squads, each with a strength of eight men or so. (The pre-war proportion of corporals to privates in infantry units presumed that the ideal rifle squad would take the form of a ‘corporal’s guard’, that is, a unit composed of a corporal and seven privates.)
That said, I have only found one description of the interior organization of an American rifle platoon serving with the Siberian expedition, that of C Company of the 31st Infantry. In July of 1919, the commander of this unit organized each of his rifle platoons into five standard rifle squads and two automatic rifle squads. (Each of the latter consisted of six men, two of whom carried Browning Automatic Rifles.)
Sources
William S. Graves America’s Siberian Adventure, 1918-1920 (New York: Jonathan Cape and Harrison Smith, 1931) pages 34 and 36 (Internet Archive)
John M. House Wolfhounds and Polar Bears: The American Expeditionary Force in Siberia, 1918-1920 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2016) page 135
Related Reading
Lord help me find that book on exactly this expedition at my parents basement, hopefully still there after 40 years 🙏🏻
Many primary sources, little red book. 📕
I recall some martinets were upset that the soldiers were given Vodka to keep the Browning MG water jackets unfrozen and were indulging themselves on watch in the Siberian cold.
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Come the great reckoning the rear shall be front if necessary in Penal Battalions.