Sending all available Hornets into action, which is often requested, is a bad idea. At least one platoon should remain in the hands of the company commander. Once, in response to a temporary crisis [Brennpunkt] caused by an attack by ten or fifteen enemy tanks, eight or more Hornets were ordered to move forward into defensive positions. As things turned out, the sector in question could only accommodate [a platoon of] four Hornets, which would have been sufficient to deal with this problem.
Example: Of forty-seven attacking tanks, twenty-two were knocked out over the course of twenty-two minutes, with no friendly losses. One Hornet shot up fourteen tanks, another six, and the third two.
A half-platoon [of two Hornets] attacking out of firing positions, most of which were located in neighboring sectors, against the flank [of an enemy attack], has worked particularly well. This method allows the Hornets to avoid being seen by enemy tanks and, at the same time, keeps them out of the zone covered by enemy artillery.
The employment of Hornets demands, more than anything, careful examination of the ground. This often reveals that the most favorable firing- and ambush positions [Feuer- und Lauerstellungen] can be found outside of the sectors of the regiments and divisions in question. The necessity for this is not well understood. Frequent changes of position are required in order to confound enemy counter-measures and, most of all, disguise the main effort [Schwerpunkt] of the defense.
In division sectors, the anti-tank defense is rarely conducted in a holistic [einheitliche] manner. Anti-tank guns of all calibers are jumbled together near crisis points. For example, heavy [75mm] anti-tank guns are placed within the main line of resistance while medium [50mm] anti-tank guns are located well to the rear. Heavy anti-tank guns are put in places with limited fields of fire. Medium anti-tank guns are employed at long ranges.
In hot spots where Tigers, Hornets, assault guns, and self-propelled anti-tank guns were employed together, the leaders of these heavy weapons were not brought together, and thus opportunities for effective cooperation in the defense, and, what is worse, the optimum fulfillment of the mission, were missed. Frequently, neither Tigers, nor Hornets, nor assault guns sought cooperation with each other. Employment of this sort is particularly dangerous when, at dawn or dusk, Hornets in overwatch positions mistake distant friendly tanks on their flanks for enemies and, in many cases, are only prevented from firing upon them at the last minute.
I wonder if these errors in tactics and usage are late war ill experienced, lowly trained officers, NCO's etc ? Or an inability to conceive of ideal tactical usage?