The Fleet Marine Force (1936-1938)
The Fleet Marine Force (1936-1938)
Battalion: An Organizational Study of United States Infantry
The estate of the late John Sayen has graciously given permission to the Tactical Notebook to serialize his study of the organizational evolution of American infantry battalions. The author’s preface, as well as previously posted parts of this book, may be found via the following links:
In July 1936, the Fourth Marines, still in Shanghai, reorganized itself. For the most part, the new structure was the one called for by the tables of organization adopted in November of 1934. However, because it was operating as an independent regiment, it also formed units to perform services that would normally have been carried out by the service units of a brigade: a regimental headquarters company, a motor transport company, and a service company. (The latter included both a post exchange and a bakery.)
In the following year, in response to the Japanese invasion of China, the United States government sent additional Marines to Shanghai. These reinforcements consisted of the headquarters of the Second Brigade of the Fleet Marine Force, the Sixth Marines, a battery of .50 caliber anti-aircraft machine guns, and the elements (ranging in size from platoons armed with .30 caliber machine guns to a complete battalion) needed to bring the Fourth Marines up to its authorized strength.
The reinforcements arrived in time to protect the international settlement in Shanghai from the fighting that took place in, and around, that city in the second half of 1937. Once, however, the Japanese won the battle for Shanghai, and took full control of the city and its environs, the need for such a large force went away. Thus, in the spring of 1938, most of the Marines units sent to China in 1937 returned to the United States.
In July of 1936, the Marine Corps promulgated a set of wartime establishments for the units of the Fleet Marine Force (FMF.) These called for a wartime brigade of more than 8,000 men that would have two infantry regiments, a two-battalion field artillery regiment (75mm pack howitzers), an engineer battalion, a medical battalion, two motor transport companies, and a company each of service, signal, light tank, military police, and chemical (actually 4.2-inch mortar) troops.
The rifle companies of the wartime brigade were to consist of a substantial headquarters (of three officers and twenty men) and three rifle platoons. Each rifle platoon, in turn, was to have a headquarters (of one officer and eight men) and four eight-man rifle squads. (As before, each rifle squad was armed with a Browning automatic rifle, a Thompson submachine gun, a rifle fitted with a grenade launcher, and five rifles.)
The machine gun and howitzer company would become just a machine gun company when its howitzer platoon, having doubled in size to two sections of two guns or mortars each, moved over to the battalion headquarters company. Within the machine gun platoons, the squads increased to nine men each. Company headquarters carried six spare machine guns for issue to the platoons in “defensive” situations. The service company received its own transportation platoon, which could employ either trucks (shown above) or light tractors.
The quartermaster and depot section in the supply platoon performed the same functions (supply office and receiving and distributing) as the supply section did in the peacetime organization. Like the 1929 wartime organization that this one replaced, it was never actually used and it existed only in war plans. It is interesting to note that the Marine Corps built its peacetime organizations first, and then constructed its wartime tables based on peacetime experience. The Army’s approach was exactly the opposite. It built its wartime organizations first and then incorporated what it could afford into its peacetime structure.
The Marine Corps, however, would soon reverse its policy of building peacetime units first. No sooner had the organization of the FMF infantry battalions been finalized in November 1934 that General Russell, ordered the Commanding General at Quantico Virginia to organize an experimental rifle company (see Appendix 4.18). This unit would test how peacetime rifle companies could best be organized to facilitate expansion to their wartime strengths while minimizing the loss of efficiency caused by the need to use incompletely trained reservists and/or raw recruits.
The concept behind the experiment was that in war, the organizational structures of combat units generally remained constant (barring some catastrophe or voluntary reorganization) but the individual strengths of those structures constantly fluctuated. Thus, basic peacetime and wartime unit structures could remain the same. Only their strength levels would have to change.
In the case of the experimental rifle company, it was based on nine rifle squads that would each increase from eight men in peacetime to thirteen in war. Company and platoon headquarters would also expand. A wartime squad would be led by a sergeant, assisted by two corporals, and carry two Browning automatic rifles (in lieu of one automatic rifle and one Thompson). The squad could split into two elements if desired, although no such subdivision was formalized.
Company headquarters would gain an executive officer and additional enlisted personnel. Gunnery sergeants would serve as platoon sergeants but the platoon guides (corporals) would disappear. The experimental company greatly facilitated training and mobilization because existing combat elements merely got larger. Key leaders were already in place. New squads or platoons would not have to be hastily formed and trained.
Unfortunately, talking about the concept was easier than actually testing it. Manpower was so tight in 1934 that the combined requirements of recruit training, annual rifle practice, and the ongoing amphibious exercises at Culebra (Puerto Rico) made the formation of an experimental rifle company impossible for almost a year after the original instructions for it were issued.
New tables incorporating the experience gained did not appear until June 1938. These tables also incorporated new weapons, such as the M1 rifle, the M1 81mm mortar and the M3 37mm antitank gun. They abandoned any use of separate war or peacetime organizations. Instead, the principal of varying strength rather than structure would be applied across the board. The war tables would be used in peacetime but they would not be fully manned. In fact the current allowance of 20 officers, a warrant officer, and 457 men per infantry battalion would continue and this tended to minimize the reorganization’s practical impact.
When it came to adopting new weapons, the Marines tended to be more deliberate than the Army. It was certainly convenient for them to be so since the Army could expect to be the first to receive any new gear that was available. Also, experience in Nicaragua had given the Marine Corps a different perspective on how best to use the new weapons. The Army had slated M1 Garand rifle, for example, to replace not only the reliable and highly accurate M1903 Springfield rifle but also the Browning automatic rifle (except in its role as a light machine gun) and the Thompson sub-machine gun.
The Garand’s firepower was very attractive. The Marines understood that it would have to replace their beloved M1903 though they did not object to losing the Thompson gun, given the latter’s non-standard ammunition and limited range. However, they were not so eager to drop the improved automatic rifle from their rifle squads. To them, Nicaragua had firmly established the value of fully automatic weapons in small units.
The effectiveness of the rifle grenade launcher had also been demonstrated but since there was no grenade launcher for the Garand, at least some Springfields would have to be retained for the rifle grenadiers. The 60mm mortar was supposed to replace the rifle grenades but many Marines doubted whether it could do so. The Marines therefore kept their automatic rifles and rifle grenade launchers, though noting in their organizational tables that M1 rifles might later replace them. The new rifle company would not include an Army-style weapons platoon since neither manpower nor equipment could be spared for it.
Based on these concepts, the Marines issued new tables of organization for their FMF units in 1938. The table for the new rifle company (see Appendix 4.19) continued the basic company structure adopted in 1934 though the increased the strength of the rifle squads (on paper at least) from eight men each to nine. Plans also existed for larger squads when more manpower became available. The new tables also strengthened company and platoon headquarters, “padding” them with additional non-commissioned officers (such as having two “guides” in each platoon) who could be used to support further expansion.
Among other things, these new tables would, for the first time, follow Army practice by introducing specialist ranks for those with special skills justifying more pay but not more responsibility. This had the biggest impact on Marine cooks, who had previously ranked as privates despite the difficulties and importance of their thankless task. Henceforth, a company mess was to be led by a mess sergeant or mess corporal. Supervising them at the battalion level would be a staff sergeant (mess) and at the regimental level, a technical sergeant (mess). In addition there would be chief cooks, who would be paid as sergeants though ranking below them; field cooks (paid as corporals), and assistant cooks.
The 1938 tables also instituted the planned change in the 1936 wartime tables under which the machine gun and howitzer companies would become pure machine gun companies by transferring their howitzer platoons to their battalion headquarters companies (see Appendix 4.20). The three machine gun platoons that each machine gun company retained would also lose their ammunition squads but the gun squads would be larger and platoon headquarters would expand to handle fire control, observation, and communication.
Transportation would depend on handcarts, since Marine infantry battalions did not have their own motor vehicles. This considerably reduced shipping space requirements and eased movement by boat. However the loads that could be carried would be much smaller. Supply distances would therefore have to be short but on the numerous small Japanese-held Pacific islands, this was not expected to be a problem.
To improve their load carrying abilities the Marines chose to replace the old Cole cart with the Army’s new handcart. The Marines assigned two carts to each machine gun squad (one for the gun, one for ammunition), thus tripling the payload that the men could have hand carried.
In addition to the twelve machine guns in the squads, each machine gun company would also have twelve spare guns so that each squad could be issued a second gun for defensive use. Unlike Army practice, company headquarters held control of these guns instead of routinely issuing them to the squads. Brigade level motor transport was probably delegated the task of actually moving the spare guns around during the times when they were not needed.
One more change in armament of the machine gun company was in its small arms. Until 1938 all or most machine gun company personnel were armed with pistols so as to leave their hands free. Though this limited their ability to defend themselves it was assumed that the rifle companies could always provide sufficient local security. Doubts about the validity of this assumption led to the decision to arm about two thirds of the enlisted men in each machine gun company with rifles. Rifle-armed men could use the same ammunition as the machine guns while still being able to carry ammunition boxes or pull handcarts.
The battalion headquarters company was similar to that of 1936 (see Appendix 4.21). The principal addition was the 81mm mortar platoon. Having no vehicles the Marine platoon needed 70 men and two officers (one of whom served as liaison officer at battalion headquarters) in order to carry sufficient ammunition for its four mortars. It received additional ammunition bearers on 23 August 1939. Because of its motorized weapons carriers, the Army needed only one officer and 44 men to support four mortars. However, the Army platoon with its vehicles would take up more shipping space, would have considerable difficulty crossing a beach that had not been well prepared by the engineers in advance, and would find its mobility restricted by the extent and quality of the local road network.
The Marine unit, on the other hand, could operate almost anywhere, albeit at the end of only a very short supply line. Unlike its Army counterpart, it was not expected to position itself where it could see most of its parent battalion’s frontage. Instead, the Marine unit would have its own observers able to establish at least two observation posts and its own telephone linemen and operators to link the observation posts to the guns (and, if practical, battalion headquarters). Thus the Marine unit was expected to function more like field artillery, in contrast to the Army unit which was mainly a direct fire unit intended to clean up what other supporting firepower had missed.
Unlike the machine gunners, most mortar men were so heavily loaded the only personal defense weapons they could carry were pistols. However, to beef up the platoon’s defensive firepower, its mortar and ammunition squad leaders carried automatic rifles. These weapons were of course a very heavy additional burden and it is surprising that sub-machine guns were not used instead since, as local security weapons, they would have been very nearly as effective and much lighter. However, eyewitness accounts speak of Browning automatic rifles still being carried by mortar platoons even as late as the Guadalcanal fighting in 1942.
Naturally, in peacetime, this new organization could not attain its full strength and numerous economies had to be made. A rifle company could field no more than four officers and 95 men while a machine gun company would have no more than three officers and 85 men and only two of its three machine gun platoons. Rifle and machine gun squads could not be filled beyond eight men each. A consolidated battalion mess replaced all the company cooks. Similar cuts in the battalion headquarters company reduced the new mortar platoon to little more than a training unit with an officer, a warrant officer, and 36 men (see Appendices 4.19, 4.20 and 4.21 for details).
Apart from its skeletal battalions an FMF infantry regiment in 1938-39 continued to exist mainly on paper. Its regimental headquarters and headquarters “company” was allowed just three officers and 17 enlisted men (15 of them in the communication platoon). Its service company was not manned at all.
In August 1939 the regimental headquarters and service companies officially combined into a single headquarters and service (H&S) company (see Appendix 4.22). This was done by eliminating the service company headquarters and the transportation platoon (ending any further attempts to give the regiment its own trucks) and moving the pay and supply sections (unchanged) into the regimental headquarters company. At the same time the H&S company also acquired an antitank platoon similar to that of a December 1938 Army infantry regiment although there was still no one available to man it. Further cuts in the battalion mortar platoons yielded enough men to serve as cadre for a future platoon.
This was the last significant change to Marine infantry organization until March 1941 when the Marines adapted their infantry regiment to form the fighting core of the newly authorized Marine divisions.
Sources:
Memorandum from the Director, Division of Operations and Training to the Major General Commandant, 14 August 1934, US National Archives, Record Group 127 Entry 18, Ellsdran File 2385-60.
US Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Washington DC USGPO 1940; reprinted 1987 as NAVMC 2890) paras 2-38 to 2-42; USMC Organization Tables, “Rifle Company, Marine Infantry Battalion (peace strength)” Table No. 1P and “Machinegun and Howitzer Company (peace strength)” Table 3P (both Washington DC 1 November 1934).
USMC Organization Tables, “Howitzer Platoon, Machinegun and Howitzer Company (peace strength)” Table No. 2P and “Machinegun and Howitzer Company (peace strength)” Table 3P (both Washington DC 1 November 1934).
USMC Organization Tables, “Headquarters Company, Marine Infantry Battalion (peace strength)” Table No. 4P and “Marine Infantry Battalion (peace strength)” Table 5P (both Washington DC 1 November 1934).
Letter from the Major General Commandant to the Chief of Naval Operations 18 May 1936 regarding the FMF staffing plan for Fiscal Year 1937, Record Group 127 Entry 18 Box 219 Ellsdran File 2385/5-1.
USMC Organization Tables, “Headquarters Company, Marine Infantry Regiment (peace strength)” Table No. 7P (Washington DC 6 Feb 1935).
USMC Organization Tables, “Service Company, Marine Infantry Regiment (peace strength)” Table No. 6P (Washington DC 6 Feb 1935).
Characteristic Sheets for the Stowage of Marine Corps Vehicles (Washington DC 1932)
The appendices to this post can be found by means of the following link, which will take you to the Military Learning Library, a website that I maintain.
Extraordinary work which in many ways is relevant to the current “battle to save the Marine Corps from FD 2030”! Have you considered visiting Marine Corps Compass Points and offering your historical expertise?
Bruce, are you going to post all of John Sayen's work when you've finished serializing it? This is all really valuable. It's a shame it wasn't formally published.