Duumvirate (III D)
The Modern Military Commander
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Georg Wetzell
Actual War and the Military Commander of the Future
(Conclusion)
As already pointed out by Schlieffen, the future, too, belongs to the duumvirate of the head of state and his military commander-in-chief. Judging from all our experiences, it is highly important not to wait until war breaks out, but in time of peace to choose the commander of the armed forces from the very best on the eligible list. Moreover, the statesmen must clearly define his political aims at an early time, so that the military commander may have a basis on which to make his peace-time preparations, on which to plan (operations draft), and on which to determine military-political objective to be gained in the event of war. In time of war, the military commander is, and remains, the executive of the will of the statesman.
Therefore, while the military commander must subordinate himself to the head of state with regard to the all-moving and all-determining policy in peace, and its aims in war, the head of state must subordinate himself to the military commander so far as the accomplishment of the military victory is concerned, for without it, the policy cannot achieve its crowning success in war. In order to attain this coordination of the political aims, military aims, and actions in war, it is necessary for the head of state in time of peace to approve, in principle, the draft plan for operations.
This was the case in the times of Bismarck and Moltke. However, the military commander must have sole authority to determine the numbers and methods used in disposing the forces (concentration) and in their employment (conduct of operations). That holds true also in a war on several fronts. He must have complete freedom in the execution of the operations which he has planned, and which the head of state has approved.
A failure to observe this roughly outlined division of the mutual responsibilities in peace and war is bound to lead to most serious crises. A warning to this effect may be found in the military history of all times and all nations to the present day, especially in that of Germany in the World War.
As difficult as it may sometimes be, a perfectly clear appreciation of the aims, gained through harmonious cooperation, mutual understanding, and mutual assistance, is the only road to victory and peace. Therefore, it is vital for the welfare of the nation that the head of state be competent to appreciate military affairs, and that, at the same time, the military commander comprehend political matters equally as well.
While this condition was met in the period of Bismarck and Moltke, unfortunately this was not the case in the years preceding and during the World War. We shall need it again, if we are ever confronted by a similar situation.
The military commander must direct his peacetime preparations for war, above all, at the education and training of his subordinate commanders and their staffs, with the aim of bringing them into harmony with his own views. In the theoretical sphere, this is accomplished by evaluating the experiences gained in war up to the most recent times, by keeping alive the study of military science and, especially, by staff rides, war games and strategic problems in which the commander-in-chief and his section chiefs must actively participate.
The second and equally important medium lies in the practical sphere and consists in realistically conducted field exercises of all kinds, including joint army, navy and air force maneuvers on a large scale. These maneuvers are necessary in order to demonstrate clearly the vital importance of the mutual cooperation of the three national defense components in war.
In this connection, I wish to emphasize the value of skeleton exercises involving all branches of national defense, for they constitute a conversion of the great staff rides into the 'practical conduct of a high command’, with all the friction of real war. Such a thorough method of training will furnish the head of state and, indeed, the entire nation, with an instrument of war composed of commands and units that are well prepared for any contingency.
Yet in order to employ this war machine expertly under actual conditions, one must have a commander-in-chief who is familiar with the use of the various technical aids of a high command. This commander-in-chief must not be a general who 'makes his plans at a desk in some distant warm office’, but a leader who is mentally alert, who keeps himself and his staff in constant motion, who enjoys to the full the confidence of his subordinate commanders and his troops, who remains near the front, and who knows how to instill morale in his armies: a man who acts.
Not only must he always be near the main effort, but he must personally intervene in the command of the armies and, in all circumstances, impose his will upon the conduct of the operations, and the war as a whole, for he alone is responsible to the state and nation.
The military history of Germany gives us the best examples of such a leader in war: Frederick the Great, Blücher, Gneisenau, and the greatest of all, Field Marshal Count Moltke. In conformity with his teachings and with the training methods of Count Schlieffen, Ludendorff, the most outstanding German general of the World War, conducted his high command during the greatest struggle in the history of the world.
Judging by my own experiences in war, this seems to me the example which is most worthy of emulation and the most realistic picture of the modern military commander. Not the 'commander at the desk', but the one who has at his disposal a carefully selected and trained staff and who extends his activities to all parts of the front, will pin the streamers of victory to his colors.
Under modern conditions, it is advisable to make extensive use of the automobile and, especially, the airplane for that purpose, both before and during the war (particularly in the period of concentration). Here, too, the personality of the commander himself, through close cooperation, creates that inner feeling of confidence which links the commander and his instrument of war, down to the youngest soldier, and which is essential to success in war.
That feeling of confidence prevailed among our troops in 1918. Yet the task exceeded our strength. Already facing practically the entire world, we finally had to fight also the Americans. What we lacked was tanks. I fully agree with Foerster that the duties of the military commander in modern times are much too great and important as to permit this 'man of fate' to assume the burden of others.
Here is where the head of state or statesman enters the picture. He alone is responsible for the establishment of the political aim, both before and during the war as well as, at the conclusion of the war, for the peace which, in the final analysis, is the aim also of the military commander.
Being responsible for the distribution of all resources of the nation in peace and war, the head of state must take care that all government departments and all other authorities lend the military commander all duly requested support. We failed to achieve this clearly defined cooperation of the highest authorities in the World War. It proved as essential to victory as it was to honor.
This series will continue with a lengthy reply, written by Wolfgang Foerster, to the three articles written by George Wetzell. Once the components of that answer have been posted, display links will appear on the following page.