Supplying the Infantry Regiment of 1938

Battalion: An Organizational Study of United States Infantry

Service Company, 38th Infantry Regiment, 1935

The estate of the late John Sayen has graciously given the Tactical Notebook permission to serialize his study of the organizational evolution of American infantry battalions. The author’s preface, as well as previously posted parts of this book may be found via the following links:

The designers of the infantry regiment described in the tables published in December of 1938 sought to create a unit that could both move quickly over the battlefield and generate a great deal of firepower. For them, the key to reconciling these competing qualities was an early form of what we would now call “just in time logistics.”

The infantry regiment’s service company was the primary operator of the new system. This company was designed to release the greatest number of men for combat service while filling all routine supply requirements. The regimental supply officer (S-4), who was a major, did not command the company although he was administratively assigned to the its headquarters. Instead, his assistant, a captain, was the actual company commander. As such he was responsible for the company’s discipline, administration, and training (except for the special training conducted by regimental staff officers). He was also responsible for the regimental motor echelon, while it was moving or in bivouac.

The motor echelon consisted of the service company transportation platoon (less detachments), plus any rifle or weapons company vehicles that might temporarily fall under regimental control. The service company headquarters was divided into a command group and an administrative group. The former included the vehicles, messengers, and orderlies (the latter not added until 1940) used directly by the company commander and S-4. The latter handled “housekeeping” for the rest of the company and included the mess detail, supply sergeant, clerk (a corporal), armorer, carpenter, and the kitchen and baggage truck with its driver, and was led by the mess or supply sergeants, whoever was senior. The two motorcyclists in the company headquarters were attached to the supply section of the regimental headquarters platoon.

The service company’s regimental headquarters platoon was, as before, a notional structure that administratively housed the regimental staff and supply sections (and, in earlier days, the regimental band). The staff section’s purpose was to support the regimental adjutant (S-1) and operations officer (S-3). A personnel officer, personnel sergeants, administrative and mail clerks, and the chaplain’s assistant all worked for the adjutant. A technical sergeant (operations) assisted the S-3 and some of the administrative clerks also performed S-3 functions. The two regimental color sergeants still looked after the regimental colors but now they also oversaw the interior security of the regiment, guard details, and related tasks. In combat, they worked with the regimental headquarters commandant (the headquarters company commander) to control stragglers, guard prisoners, and the security of the regimental baggage.

The supply section accomplished most of the administrative work of the regimental supply system. Functionally, it was organized into a supply-office group, a receiving and distributing group, and an ammunition supply group. The supply-office group directly supported the S-4 in his capacity as a regimental staff officer. Operating with the regimental train and staffed by the regimental supply sergeant, three clerks, and two messengers, it maintained records, consolidated requisitions and receipts, and compiled reports. The receiving and distributing group operated directly under the service company commander and received all items (other than ammunition) that arrived at the regiment from higher supply echelons.

The group established regimental distributing points for Class I (rations/water), Class III (petroleum, oil, lubricants; or POL), and Class IV (engineer supplies, mainly tools) and then sorted and apportioned the supplies among the different elements of the regiment for collection by their intended recipients. As the group consisted of only a staff sergeant and a few clerks and basic privates, it could actually perform only its administrative functions. Work details from the units that were to receive the supplies actually performed most of the physical work of loading, unloading, sorting, and distributing them.

Finally, the ammunition supply group directed the handling of Class V supplies. It consisted only of the regimental munitions officer (a captain) and the munitions sergeant, though both men were issued service company motorcycles with sidecars and drivers. (Until 1940 one motorcycle came from the company headquarters and the other from the supply section. After 1940 both motorcycles came from company headquarters.) They operated the regimental ammunition point and took charge of those ammunition vehicles operating under regimental control. For labor, they would have the use of the three battalion ammunition and pioneer sections.

The largest and most important element of the service company was, of course, the transportation platoon. The platoon commander (a captain) was also regimental transport officer and effectively functioned as the service company executive officer. He assisted with the establishment, control, defense, and operation of the regimental train bivouac. He was responsible for the maintenance of his vehicles and for the training of his drivers and mechanics. He was also responsible for their operations except when they were detached from the regiment or had passed to the control of the regimental munitions officer. A master sergeant transportation chief and mechanical inspector served as the transportation platoon commander’s assistant and platoon sergeant. He also supervised vehicle maintenance and the preparation of records and reports. The truckmaster (a sergeant) assisted in controlling the movement and operation of the regimental train and usually accompanied the kitchen and baggage vehicles when they were under regimental control. In addition there were drivers for platoon headquarters vehicles.

The commander of each battalion section was a lieutenant who doubled as the supply officer of the battalion that he supported. His section sergeant also served as the supported battalion’s supply sergeant. Although the lieutenant commanded his section in garrison, in the field he was really in charge of his trucks and drivers only when they operated under battalion control. The section truckmaster (a corporal) was responsible for the movement of the section vehicles and usually rode with them.

Two of the section’s 1.5-ton trucks carried supplementary ammunition for the rifle companies. Four others carried the field kitchens, a day’s rations, and the bedrolls for the battalion’s four companies (the battalion headquarters detachment fitted itself in where it could) and the remaining truck was a spare. The field kitchen trucks were badly overloaded. Although each of them was equipped with a 3/4-ton trailer, this only raised its rated payload to about 4,500 pounds while the payload it actually had to carry was some 6,800 to 8,350 pounds, depending on how much water was included. Each truck had to make two trips to ferry its required load. However the Infantry School recommended the alternative of cramming the essentials into one load and leaving the officers’ and men’s bedding/pack rolls to be brought forward later in trucks furnished by higher headquarters. 

Besides the three battalion sections, the transportation platoon included another kitchen truck with trailer, driver, and relief driver for the regimental headquarters company. Another such truck for the support of the service company existed in the service company headquarters. There was also a small motor maintenance section manned by a staff sergeant, a clerk, three mechanics, a welder, and a motorcyclist. For the battalions there were three two-man maintenance teams, each carried in a 1/2-ton pick-up truck.

The vehicles and drivers from this unit and from the regimental medical detachment constituted the regimental train. The Army defined a “train” as that part of a unit’s transportation that operates immediately under the orders of the unit commander and is used primarily for supply, evacuation, and maintenance. The train did not include the weapons carriers in the rifle and weapons companies that were permanently assigned to squads, platoons, and companies for tactical use. In an infantry regiment, the train was further divided into four parts. Which part a given vehicle and driver happened to be in depended on what functions it was performing at the time.

The ammunition, or “combat,” train included all vehicles and personnel used to carry ammunition; the kitchen-and-baggage or “field,” train included the vehicles carrying water, rations, kitchen equipment, and other gear not required for actual combat. The engineer equipment train was essentially the engineer equipment section (referred to above) when it was attached. There was also a medical train. The maintenance section was also considered a train.

When not released to battalions or otherwise employed, regimental train vehicles would occupy a bivouac area some miles in the rear. The area chosen had to be accessible to vehicles but it should also offer some cover and concealment and be outside the range of at least the enemy’s light artillery. The regimental maintenance shop could be located there and baggage and bedrolls staged there for issue when appropriate. The company field kitchens and mess teams would normally stay there during the day to rest and prepare food to carry up to their companies. However, meals might alternatively be prepared in a battalion bivouac area.

There would also be a regimental supply point for the receipt and distribution of supplies other than ammunition. The receiving and distributing group of the regimental supply section would operate it. Non-ammunition supplies were brought forward from the supply head to the regiment by vehicles of the kitchen and baggage train using methods similar to those used for ammunition. The trucks (usually the battalion kitchen trucks doing double duty) would pass through a division supply point en route to the supply head. At the regimental supply point they would either drop their loads or be directed further to the battalions and/or companies.

By 1941, the ration situation had considerably improved. The Army defined a ration as an allowance of food (or water) for one person for one day. The War Department had developed and type classified a new series of standard rations designed to meet situational requirements. Field Ration A was essentially the normal peacetime garrison ration and featured commercial-type perishable food requiring refrigeration. Field Ration B was the same except that non-perishable canned substitutes replaced the refrigerated items. Field Ration C was a cooked, balanced, canned ration which, during the Second World War era, consisted of three cans of prepared meats and vegetables and three cans of crackers, sugar, coffee, etc. Non-perishable, it was intended as a unit or individual reserve ration.

Field Ration D was what the Germans called an “iron ration.” Intended for emergencies and to be carried by the soldier into combat in place of or addition to C rations, it consisted of three four-ounce chocolate bars. Neither the C nor D rations required any preparation by company field kitchens and were merely issued as required. The goal was to give the soldiers three meals a day of which two would be hot meals (A or B rations) prepared by the mess teams. Meals would generally be served (and filled water and gasoline cans delivered) after dark and just before dawn. Kitchen trucks could get much closer to the troops during hours of darkness without being seen or fired upon by the enemy.

Because of the greatly increased quantities of material involved, efficient ammunition supply was central to the success of the whole system. Ammunition was carried by motor vehicle as far forward as possible before unloading and final distribution to users. When in combat and after he had dumped his organic load, the driver of a transport vehicle not needed for some other purpose was usually given a requisition for ammunition and sent to the ammunition supply points of progressively higher units until his requisition could be filled. When not in combat, transport vehicles used as ammunition carriers maintained an initial load of ammunition that was additional to what the men carried on their persons. This initial supply was calculated to last until a regular flow of ammunition from a higher headquarters supply source could be established.

The bulk of the initial ammunition was carried in the battalion weapons company vehicles that served as mortar or machine gun squad weapons carriers. The load that had to be carried by a machine gun or mortar squad totaled between 700 and 1,000 pounds. An HMG squad had two guns but carried water and ammunition for only its primary gun. Each HMG with its tripod weighed 85 pounds, exclusive of seven pounds of water carried in the primary gun (the reserve gun was left dry). For the primary weapon there were four 23-pound water chests. These would cool the gun while it fired off its standard load of 6,750 rounds of ammunition (27 250-round belts packed in metal boxes and weighing a total of 554 pounds). A single 250-round belt could be consumed in only two minutes if fired off at the heavy machine gun’s maximum sustained rate. Thus, 27 belts were not considered an extravagant supply for one gun.

Likewise, an 81mm mortar squad had to carry 143 pounds’ worth of tube, mount, and accessories. Its 949 pounds of ammunition included 78 rounds of “light” shells, at 9.1 pounds apiece for a complete round in its carrying container, and 18 rounds of “heavy” shell at 13.16 pounds per complete round. The heavy shells were special short ranged (1,200 meters) high explosive projectiles intended to demolish bunkers and other “hard” targets. The 96 rounds constituting the mortar’s basic ammunition supply could be fired off in only six minutes at the mortar’s best sustained rate of fire or in as little as three minutes at the maximum rate.

An antitank squad had the smallest load. Its .50-caliber M2 machine gun and tripod weighed 125 pounds and the 1,200 rounds of ammunition carried for each gun, a mere 432 pounds.

These loads made a light truck or “weapons carrier an essential part of every weapons squad. Initially, 1.5-ton cargo trucks served in this role. Although these trucks had adequate cross country mobility and a more than ample payload capacity (it could carry all the squad members as well as their ammunition and equipment) they were too large and conspicuous to operate safely anywhere near the enemy.

Testing revealed that the new 4x4 1/2-ton trucks had better cross-country mobility, were much less conspicuous, and could still carry sufficient payloads. These machines replaced the 1.5-ton trucks in the weapons carrier role (the 1.5-tonners remained the principal cargo carriers for the service company) on a “one-for-one” basis as they became available during the early part of 1940. They also replaced the 1.5-tonners in the regimental signal platoon on a “two for one” basis.

The 1/2-ton truck appeared in both “command and reconnaissance” (C&R) or “weapons carrier” (WC) variants. The C&R version featured a full-length passenger compartment with seats. The WC type, on the other hand, had a two-seat cab forward and a cargo bed behind. There was even a “pick-up” version with a folding tailgate. The C&R trucks, being sturdier and having better cross country mobility, replaced most of the Phaetons used by weapons platoon and company commanders. Ammunition supply plans were soon recalculated based on the cargo capacity of the 1/2-ton WC or pick-up truck.

Only three members of an eight-man weapon squad could actually ride in a 1/2-ton weapons carrier in addition to the squad’s weapon and ammunition load. Five squad members had to walk; though in some cases one man per squad could ride in the platoon commander’s vehicle. This divided a squad into separate “ground” and “motor” elements, each with very different rates of travel. If the enemy was not in close proximity and there was no great danger in allowing the two elements to separate, they could displace by moving at different times or along different routes. If action was imminent, or if the enemy were close enough to be a serious threat then all squad members (except for the weapons carrier driver) would march together on foot, hand carrying one weapon and as much ammunition as they could. The residual ammunition would follow in the weapons carrier.

A heavy machine gun was a three-man load. An 81mm mortar and its accessories required four men. The remaining three or four squad members could either carry 18 81mm rounds or a water chest and seven boxes (belts) of machine gun ammunition (1,750 rounds). Individual loads varied between 30 and 60 pounds, besides 40-50 pounds of personal weapons and equipment. Handcarts could have more than doubled the amount of ammunition that a squad could carry but they do not appear to have been much used. The soldiers seem to have preferred hand carrying over short distances to pulling carts over longer ones.

Once its squad had “dismounted” the weapons carrier could remain nearby or go back for more ammunition. In an attack, ammunition would be kept on board the carriers as much as possible so that it could be readily moved to follow the course of the battle. When directed by the company transport sergeants and platoon transport corporals, a few carriers at a time would be sent to the rear to pick up more ammunition. The remaining vehicles would keep as close to their heavy weapons as they could, using ammunition bearers from their own squads or from the battalion pioneer section to get ammunition from each carrier to its gun as it was needed.

In the defense, the carriers would dump their ammunition close to the guns and move well to the rear. Small additional dumps could be created near command posts. In battle, the mortars would require the most frequent resupply because they consumed ammunition faster than any other weapons. However, because they could fire from defilade positions they were usually the easiest to reach. Even so, it was expected that carrying parties from the pioneer section would most frequently be needed to bridge the gap between the mortars and their carriers. Based on First World War experience, heavy machine guns were also expected to be heavy ammunition consumers but much less accessible to vehicles and/or carrying parties since they were likely to deploy closer to the enemy and in a direct fire mode. The .50-caliber guns seemed to pose the fewest ammunition supply problems since their rate of expenditure was likely to be low.

In a rifle company, ammunition supply procedures were somewhat different. The rifle company weapons carrier was at first a 1.5-ton truck, replaced in early 1940 by a 1/2-ton weapons carrier. This vehicle would carry the company’s three 60mm mortars (including the one spare) and four M1919 light machine guns (including two spares). The mortars weighed about 40 pounds apiece and the light machine gunss, with their tripods, spare parts, and other accessories weighed 51 pounds each. Also carried would be 120 rounds (420 pounds) of 60mm ammunition and an uncertain quantity of light machine gun ammunition, probably 10 to 12 250-round belts totaling 200-250 pounds. However, until late 1940 practically every rifle company used M1918A2 BARs as its light machine guns. When this occurred none of the four light machine guns served as spares.

Each light machine gun gunner, assistant, and ammunition bearer would carry 80 rounds (in 20-round magazines). Another 900 rounds per light machine gun would be carried on the truck. Just prior to combat each light machine gun team would receive 300 rounds beyond what it was already carrying (100 each for the gunner, assistant gunner, and ammunition bearer). Each 60mm mortar squad would carry its mortar and 30 rounds. In the rest of the company, each rifleman would receive a 96 round bandoleer in addition to the 40 rounds he was already carrying. The bandoleers would come from the two trucks of the battalion’s ammunition train (part of its service company transport section). These trucks would also carry a total of 360 rounds for the 60mm mortars plus additional light machine gun, pistol, and rifle ammunition. After the weapons carriers had been “topped off” whatever ammunition that remained on these trucks would be left at the battalion ammunition supply point (ASP) while the trucks themselves headed for the rear to pick up another load.

The battalion ammunition supply point (ASP) would be located at a place close to the companies where trucks could be loaded or unloaded under cover. It could shift as necessary to conform to the tactical situation. The battalion’s pioneer and ammunition section (see below) would operate it under the supervision of the battalion supply officer. Weapons carriers arriving there in search of ammunition would be loaded and sent forward as long as ammunition remained.

Thereafter, the weapons carriers would be transferred from battalion to regimental control and ordered to proceed to the regimental ASP. Designated by the regimental commander with the advice of his supply officer (S-4), the regimental ASP would normally be located two to three miles to the rear depending on the road net. It would be on, or easily reached from, the MSR (main supply route) and was movable according to the tactical situation.

The regimental ASP would offer cover for several vehicles and be operated by the regimental munitions officer, assisted by his sergeant. Empty vehicles could be loaded with any ammunition available there or they could be sent to the corps/army level supply head (perhaps 20-30 miles to the rear), passing through the division supply point (usually just a control point) en route. Service company trucks would normally make these runs, though company weapons carriers might do so if the need was great. There, they would pick up a new load of ammunition as directed by the munitions officer. They would then return to the regimental ASP by the same route. Upon arrival, loaded vehicles could be held in reserve, sent to a battalion ASP, or unloaded and sent back for more ammunition.

Finally, the 1938 tables for the first time organized regimental medical unit was into permanent battalion and regimental sections, giving unit commanders some firm guidelines on how medical personnel should be distributed.  The detachment’s officers, except for two dentists with detachment headquarters were Medical Corps or Medical Service Corps members. They usually ranked as captains but sometimes as first lieutenants. The commanding officer, or regimental surgeon, was a major. Each battalion section included eight medical aid men (two per rifle or weapons company), three (two in peacetime) four-man stretcher teams, and an aid station run by two officers and seven men (four in peacetime).

Editor’s Note: The format of the many appendices to this work fit poorly with Substack. For that reason, I have placed them on a PDF file that can be found at Military Learning Library, a website that I maintain.

Sources:

US Army Adjutant General Table of Organization T/O 7-13 “Infantry Company, Service, Regiment, Rifle” (Washington DC 1 October 1940)

• “The 1939 Infantry” Infantry School Mailing List July 1939 pages 243-275 

• “Loads of Infantry Motor Vehicles” Infantry School Mailing List July 1940 pages 217-260

• Lieutenant Colonel William G. Livesay “Supply in the New Regiment” Infantry Journal November 1939, pages 535-539

• Lieutenant Colonel Richard G. Tindall, “Ammunition Supply in the New Regiment” Infantry Journal March-April 1939 pages 150-153

• Captain Harold G. Sydenham “The Infantry Mortars” Infantry Journal May-June 1939 pages 224-227