Twenty-Piece Machine Gun Batteries
The following post reprints, verbatim, two descriptions of the use of indirect machine gun fire to supplement the services performed by the 105mm howitzers. The first account comes from a report circulated within the US Army in the spring of 1945, the second from the unit history of the 388th Field Artillery Battalion.
Massed Indirect Fire with .50 Caliber Machine Guns
88th Infantry Division December 1944
Organization
Three batteries of twenty .50 caliber machine guns each were set up to give indirect fire support to the infantry regiments in the diviÂsion. The three batteries were organized into a Provisional Machine Gun Group under the reconnaissance troop commander and were attached to the division artilÂlery for operations. Each battery consisted of one officer, three noncommissioned officers, forty gunners, two cooks and an aid man. Personnel was drawn from the reÂconnaissance troop, the infantry regiments, and the division artillery. Machine guns were furnished by the regiments and the artillery.
Functioning
Each battery functioned as an additional battery in one of the light field artillery battalions. Fire missions and data were received in the same manner as for the howitzer batteries. Decisions as to the employment of each machine gun battery rested with the supported regimental commander. The field artillery battalion commander was responsible for executing surveys, registering the guns, maintaining a firing chart, furnishing a battery fire possibility chart, insuring effective handling of the guns, and providing transportation for displaceÂment. The Provisional Group commander was responsible for coordinating reconnaissance and for selecting and occupying firing positions.
Positions
Each battery was emplaced, insofar as possible, within its own assigned regimental boundary and about 2,000 yards in rear of the front line-elements. Sections consisted of two, three, four or five guns and were spaced from 20 to 50 yards apart. They were tied into the battery command post by telephone.
Locating the guns 2,000 yards to the rear had these advantages:
they were beyond enemy light mortar range
they were less susceptible to enemy detection
control by the fire direction center was easier
and greater coverage of the regimental sector was possible
Conclusions
One week of intensive preparatory training should be given to personnel.
Positions should be approximately 2,000 yards behind the front line.
The flat trajectory of the weapon prevents the use of indirect fire from positions farther forward, and communication and control problems prevent massing the guns,
The large amount of ammunition used makes it essential that positions be accessible to main supply routes
Use of two to four-gun sections facilitates control and supervision of fire and reduces the amount of fire control equipment required.
Tracer ammunition should be removed from the belts to avoid disclosing positions.
‘Immediate Report Number 144 (Combat Observations), 22 April 1945’ Immediate Reports of Combat Observations 130 to 1 Combined Arms Research Library
On December 2nd our machine-gunners went to attend a school to learn the intricacies of indirect firing with the .50 calibers from forward positions.
On the 6th, our battalion, as well as the other battalions in the Division Artillery, placed ten men with five .50 caliber machine guns on detached service with the provisional ‘Zebra’ battery that was organized to be used on harassing and neutralizing missions, using indirect fire methods.
The guns were located about 150 yards north-east of the battalion command post, and the fire direction center (FDC) was in direct communication with them, and prepared all firing data. Targets selected by the Infantry were passed on the FDC for computation of data. The plan was successful and the rounds that went over into ‘Jerryland’ helped keep their heads down considerably.
Direct Support: A Story of Fighting Men, 388th Field Artillery Battalion (Milan: G. Ricordi, 1945) pages 55-56
For Further Reading
The following posts make use of information found in Immediate Reports of Combat Observations.
Machine gun theory in action, this would still work and for suppression quite well, the use of MG as indirect fire was standard in WW1 and in a static or perhaps stalled/Stasis environment may return.