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Cassandra's Curse (Third Problem)
This is the sixth installment of a decision-forcing case. If you haven’t done so already, please begin this exercise by reading the first three posts and working through the two problems that follow:
Historical Solution to the Second Problem
On 16 November 1941, you took no action related to the increase in British activity, whether in front of the border forts, in the open desert, or in the sky. Like General Rommel, you believe that the radio intercept service would have been able to detect the assembly of British formations and that forward supply dumps would have appeared on aerial photographs taken on, or before, 15 November 1941.
General Rommel, however, is concerned about the activity of British armored cars. Thus he ordered that the two reconnaissance battalions be reinforced with a company of anti-tank guns.
The Third Problem
On 17 November 1941, British aircraft conducted reconnaissance flights over the area west of Bardia and the area occupied by the 21st Armored Division.
On the night of 17-18 November 1941, British Commandos attacked the forward command post of Armored Group Africa. (The site of this attack is marked on the map with a red anchor.) However, as General Rommel was elsewhere, the Commandos failed to achieve their objective of taking him prisoner. Local German forces, moreover, soon succeeded in overwhelming the Commandos and capturing those who survived the firefight.
The operations of British armored cars convinced Baron von Wechmar, in command of both of reconnaissance battalions, to withdraw a few kilometers to the north.
It is now the evening of 17 November 1941.
General Crüwell, what do you do?