The American Expeditionary Forces (Part II)
Battalion: An Organizational Study of United States Infantry
The estate of the late John Sayen has graciously given the Tactical Notebook permission to serialize his study of the organizational evolution of American infantry battalions. The author’s preface and the previous section of this book may be found via the following links:
An AEF infantry battalion consisted of four rifle companies under a major who was assisted by an adjutant and (after August 1918) an intelligence officer (both lieutenants). The Baker Board had specified that at least one machinegun company per infantry battalion was also essential but the Congressionally mandated 15-company-per-regiment limit made this possible only if least two machinegun companies could routinely reinforce every infantry regiment in combat. Therefore, the proposed Baker Board brigade machinegun battalions would expand to four companies each, thus furnishing the minimum of six machinegun companies required by a two-regiment infantry brigade. At the same time the division machinegun battalion would reorganize as two motorized machinegun companies and become the division’s road-mobile machinegun reserve. The former armored motor machinegun company would join the newly organized Tank Corps. A division staff lieutenant colonel would become the division machinegun officer and oversee the training and employment of all 14 of the division’s machinegun companies.
The machinegun companies in both the infantry regiments and the infantry brigades were all organized in exactly the same way with three platoons of four guns each (see Appendix 2.3). At first they used air-cooled French Hotchkiss M1914 tripod mounted machineguns but the companies in 12 AEF divisions received water-cooled, belt fed British Vickers guns. American-made Browning water-cooled belt-fed machineguns began to appear in September 1918. The machinegun company’s executive officer doubled as its reconnaissance officer. Although British machinegun companies included reconnaissance officers neither the Germans nor the French had any officers to spare for performing reconnaissance duties on a regular basis. However, the Americans could afford to add a second lieutenant to every machinegun company headquarters to act as ammunition officer and to relieve the executive officer of the duty of supervising the company train. A machinegun company’s train operated as the service group in the rifle company headquarters did. It worked with the supply vehicles attached to, or otherwise operating on behalf of the company and was supposed to maintain four spare machineguns without carts, crews or vehicles. Although these guns were mainly carried to replace losses, company headquarters and train personnel could operate them as additional guns. This seems to have rarely occurred in practice. In common with French and British custom, all machinegun company personnel carried only pistols or revolvers so as to keep their hands free. They would rely on the rifle companies that they operated with to protect them if it came to close combat.
The combat role of a machinegun company was to deliver long range and mainly defensive fires. Even during an offensive operation, its missions were still the defensive ones of protecting the infantry’s flanks and holding captured ground against counterattack. It was of relatively use for the direct support of an infantry attack because of its poor mobility and the constant danger of hitting friendly troops, despite the doctrinal emphasis placed on indirect fire. The complexity of the guns and their operation encouraged overspecialization among the gunners. Casualties in the machinegun companies, although heavy, were only about 60% of those sustained by the rifle companies.
To move its guns and the vast amounts of ammunition that they required the company had to rely on its machinegun carts. These were large and elaborate affairs weighing over 400 pounds apiece and carrying 500-600 pound payloads. If no mules were available they would have to be manhandled. They could move over firm ground fairly easily but soft ground could pose a serious obstacle. In a combat situation the weight these carts and their full payloads usually made it impossible for a machinegun company to keep pace with the rifle companies it supported and often seriously delayed the guns in reaching their firing positions.[1]
An AEF regimental headquarters included a combined operations and intelligence officer, however the Army did not pursue this excellent idea of combining operations and intelligence functions (since they are, or should be, closely linked to each other) but separated them soon after the war ended. In the headquarters company the headquarters platoon actually performed the earlier headquarters company roles of providing sergeants major, clerks, messengers and orderlies to staff the regimental and three battalion headquarters (see Appendix 2.4).
Although the regimental signals officer was only a second lieutenant he commanded a huge platoon. It provided sections for attachment to the regimental and battalion headquarters but these would have mainly used visual signals (semaphore, panels, lamps, pyrotechnics, etc.). There was also a telephone section could field up to eight six-man telephone squads. However, in battle, a section from the outpost company of the division signal battalion routinely reinforced the regimental signal platoon.
The lieutenant that commanded this section and also served as communication liaison officer and technical inspector for the regimental staff. His men formed four 13-man telephone “details” and a 10-man cable laying detail. Each telephone detail supplied switchboard and telephone operators and linemen to either the regimental or a battalion headquarters. Presumably, this freed the regimental telephone section to focus on company level communications. It was a rule in the AEF that a superior unit was responsible for establishing and maintaining communications with its subordinate units. However, since a brigade headquarters were too small to provide communications for its regiments, the division signal battalion, through its outpost company, provided the necessary signal personnel instead.
Despite the large amount of manpower devoted to it, infantry regimental communications remained unreliable at best. It was seldom possible to lay cable and establish telephone communication fast enough to keep up with an ongoing battle. Worse, enemy shellfire and friendly vehicle traffic were constantly cutting the wires. Visual signaling required clear weather and could not easily handle lengthy or complex messages. Messengers were relatively reliable but slow. Field radios were too heavy, complex, and faulty for front line use. An infantry brigade had none at all but there was a small radio company (three officers and 75 men) in the division signal battalion. The division artillery also had a few radios but one of the more noticeable effects of poor communications lay in the infantry’s inability to coordinate its actions with its supporting artillery. Naturally, the inexperience of both the infantry and artillery officers combined with the fact that they seldom trained together added to the problem. Engaging unplanned “targets of opportunity” was especially difficult.
The fire of a few German machineguns might easily hold up the advance of an entire battalion. The pinned-down troops could then watch their pre-planned artillery fire walk away from them while their officers were powerless to tell the guns to suspend their fire plan and shoot at the new targets. One solution to this problem was to bring field guns forward to where the gunners could see their targets for themselves. This tactic, however, was seldom successful because horse teams could not easily haul a field gun and ammunition across the broken and muddy front-line terrain. Then too, the gun and its accompanying limbers, caisson, horses, etc. presented the Germans with a very conspicuous and vulnerable target.[2]
The remainder of the headquarters company consisted of combat support specialists (see Appendix 2.4). They paralleled similar troops found in French infantry regiments. The bomber section in the sapper-bomber platoon could operate up to 30 rifle grenade launchers (some would likely be held as spares) or six 3-inch Stokes mortars.
The Stokes mortar was the original version of the standard infantry mortars we use today; however, its accuracy was poor and its effective range (as noted above) very short. Although it was still much lighter and simpler than the German minenwerfer trench mortars the bombers who operated it had no mules or carts with which they could move it and its ammunition forward to to keep pace with an infantry advance.
The grenade launchers and mortars were important because apart from them the infantry was mainly armed with flat trajectory weapons that fired solid projectiles. The infantry needed weapons that could fire exploding projectiles at a high enough angle to reach German machineguns firing from trenches, shell holes, and similar below ground and/or defilade positions. Stokes mortars were effective at this but they were heavy and few in number (only two per infantry battalion) and could only engage targets at between 250 and 750 yards’ range. Since it was usually difficult or impossible to get them across “no man’s land” quickly they generally could support an attack only during its initial stages. Rifle grenade launchers were lighter and much more plentiful than the mortars but even shorter ranged, slow firing, and very inaccurate.[3]
The one-pounder (37mm) gun platoon operated three of French-designed Puteaux lightweight infantry guns. The Puteaux was never intended to serve as an antitank weapon. Instead, it was meant to fire high explosive shells against German machinegun nests though, unlike the mortars and grenade launchers it was still a flat trajectory weapon and its effectiveness against below ground targets was necessarily limited. Though first designed and tested in 1896 the gun did not actually enter production until 1916. The one-mule ammunition cart with each 37mm gun squad carried 224 37mm rounds (14 16-round boxes). This might seem like a generous allowance but given the uncertainties of front line ammunition supply (especially during offensive operations), it was none too generous.[4]
The pioneer platoon employed four squads (a corporal and 12 men each) forming two half-platoons led by sergeants. Pioneers carried out minor but essential engineering work in forward areas. They could also form carrying parties to bring up ammunition.
The regimental supply company delivered ammunition, food, water, and other material from the division field and combat trains to all the companies of the regiment, just as it had done under previous organizations (Appendix 2.4). For this purpose it employed a large company headquarters and separate detachments for its parent regiment’s headquarters, headquarters company, machinegun company, and three battalions. The supply company headquarters planned and coordinated regimental logistics, and undertook the care and feeding of the company’s men and animals.
Company officers at first included a commander and three lieutenants. Among their other duties they supervised the three regimental supply sergeants who planned and coordinated supply deliveries to the battalions. The addition of two more lieutenants to the supply company in September 1918 allowed the assignment of a supply officer (in addition to a supply sergeant) to look after the logistical needs of each battalion on a full time basis.[5]
The supply company’s remaining sections supported the regiment’s three battalions (and their rifle companies) and its headquarters and machinegun companies. Mostly they just provided vehicles and drivers though the regimental and battalion sections also provided cooks for regimental and battalion-level officers’ messes (the company cooks served the enlisted men). A rifle company was allowed a combat wagon for its ammunition (a machinegun company would get two) plus a field kitchen (with a rolling kitchen and accompanying water and ration carts) plus an escort wagon for its baggage and additional rations. These vehicles carried three days’ rations per man. As in earlier organizations, supply company personnel acted on behalf of, but were not attached to, the units they supported unless those units were operating separately from the rest of the regiment.[6]
Unfortunately, this system of regimental logistics, though sound enough in theory, seldom worked well in practice. Supply companies tended to suffer from weak leadership because their role was not glamorous and many officers tried to avoid it. Additionally, a shortage of draft animals plagued the AEF. The War Department had reduced the number of animals shipped to France in favor of more troops. The British and French had promised to make up the animal shortfall from their own stocks but the mules they supplied were insufficient in number and already worn out by hard service. A lack of proper rest and fodder plus the usual hazards of war combined to keep animal attrition rates high.
The AEF tried to economize on animals by motorizing most of their division level and higher supply units. The infantry’s rolling kitchens and R&B wagons had to make do with only two mules apiece even though they needed four. Combat wagons, however, were supposed to get their full four mules.
While motorization at the higher echelons might appear to have been a blessing, it was a very mixed one. It is true that trucks were and are much faster than horse drawn vehicles. They can be operated and maintained by far fewer men relative to payload, and they consume a far smaller weight and volume of fuel. However, the primitive trucks of the First World War era were all but useless off well-maintained roads. Such roads were few in number.
Careful planning and supervision by experienced officers was needed to prevent the traffic on them from becoming hopelessly snarled. The AEF generally lacked such officers, especially after General Pershing dismissed his French advisors. As a result, AEF offensives usually fell apart within the day or two it took for their MSRs (main supply routes) to jam solid. This happened at St-Mihel. It also sealed the fate of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, which gained six miles on its first day but only three miles over the next 21. Animal transport could make use of many roads and trails barred to motor vehicles and could even move cross-country if conditions were favorable. However, the AEF’s draft animal shortage would have much reduced its supply wagons’ ability to proceed over adverse terrain. The construction of more roads might have made the trucks more effective but the AEF needed most of its engineers just to maintain the existing roads.[7]
Editor’s Note: The format of the many appendices to this work fit poorly with Substack. For that reason, I have placed them on a PDF file that can be found at Military Learning Library, a website that I maintain.
[1] Millett pp. 336-337; Captain A. M. Patch Jr. “Machine-gun Organization” Infantry Journal , August 1920; and see “Extracts from the Report of the Infantry Board, AEF, On Organization and Tactics” (reprint of unpublished manuscript made for the General Staff College 1919-1920) pp. 6-7. For machinegun types see Leonard P. Ayers, The War With Germany, A Statistical Summary (Washington DC USGPO 1939) pp. 65-66; see also “Notes from the Chief of Infantry - M1925E Infantry Cart” Infantry Journal Dec 1927 (Washington DC) p 627.
[2] US War Department, The United States Army in the World War Vol 1, Organization, pp. 343, 345, 352, 354, 362, & 363; and Chief of Staff United States Army, Field Service Regulations 1923 (Washington DC US Government Printing Office 1923) pp. 29-31; LTC Walter R. Wheeler, The Infantry Battalion in War (Washington DC, The Infantry Journal 1935) pp. 20-21; “... Report of the Infantry Board, AEF, On Organization and Tactics” op cit p. 3.
[3] Ibid; and Millett, & Murray, p 145; “...Report of the Infantry Board, AEF, On Organization and Tactics” op cit pp. 8-12.
[4] US War Department, The United States Army in the World War Vol 1, Organization, p. 344; and LTC Ronald E. Olson ILARNG, “The Little Old 37” Field Artillery Journal Vol 52 No. 2 (Fort Sill, OK March-April 1982) pp. 41-42.
[5] Ibid, p. 346.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray ed Military Effectiveness Vol I (Boston Massachusetts, Unwin Hyman Inc, 1989) pp. 150-151; Donald B. Adams “Engineers in Combat” The Military Engineer, Vol XXXII No. 156 November-December 1940.